

Public Management Culture and Meritocracy in Georgia – through the Prism of Development of State Institutions

Tamar Charkviani PhD.
Associated Professor.

School of Social Sciences Georgian Institute of Public Affairs, Georgia

Abstract: Aim of this Article is to offer an overview/analysis of general characteristics of the public management and governance culture in Georgia; identify trends and controversies of the reform that are undertaken in public management system; The special focus in the article will be made on analysis of appellate commissions of the civil service. Based on this aim of the work, the main question – is to what extent is the commission performing the tasks and carries out its duties, which implies instrumentalizing fair and just recruitment in the civil service. Focus of the analysis covers three periods of governance since the restoration of independence: Shevardnadze period (1992 - 2003), Saakashvili (2003 – 2012) and Ivanishvili period (2012-2014). Methodological strategy is based on the analysis of the empirical data acquired through desk research – description and overview of the published patterns; Interpretation of the state strategic documents, statistical data and expert opinions; Identification of general trends of state policy in civil service and scientific studies.

Introduction

It would be difficult to adequately understand the model of Georgian public management without considering its substantive - historic background. Since the restoration of independence in Georgia in 1991, history of formation of democratic public institutions had been launched. Reformation of public sector and creation of effective public management system haven't lost their urgency in the political agenda of Georgian Government for decades.

Various levels of social and historical developments are always characterized by the transformational processes that are followed by various types of difficulties and challenges. One of the key challenges of the restoration of Georgian State is introduction and implementation of the modern democratic central principle in Georgia '**new public management**'.

The New Public Management (NPM) was accepted as the 'gold standard for administrative reform' (Farazmand 2006) in the 1990s. The term New Public Management (NPM) has been introduced by scholars from UK and Australia (Hood 1991) to propose a new point of view towards the organizational design in the public sector. New public management concept is based on the classic theories of the public sector management and the synthesis of private sector management experience, it is closely linked to the quality and productivity problems in the government (Kikutadze 2015). The idea for using this method for government reform was that if the government guided private-sector principles were used rather than rigid hierarchical bureaucracy, it would work more efficiently. NPM promotes a shift from bureaucratic administration to business-like professional management. The basic postulates of which is based on the essence of the New Public Management, in the implementation process of Public administration is focused on product, internal processes and customer service, decentralized responsibility and central management; employee qualification and motivation, teaching and public impact-oriented administration (Kikutadze 2015).

An attempt to implement new public management concept in Georgia started since the country gained its independence. However, since 2004 as a result of the governmental changes in the country radically changed the situation, conducted wide-scale reforms in the direction of improving and optimizing the public administration system in the public sector, where emerging the challenges and opportunities implementation of the basic postulates of New Public Management reform programme (Kikutadze 2015). In post soviet Georgia, being in the transformation process, implementation of the 'new public management' principle is followed with number of difficulties. To certain extent, this can be also explained by long time totalitarian ruling (Greenwood, Pyper, Wilson 2002).

Along with modernization, western model state is being implemented. This is mainly reflected in the development of formal institutions – the Constitution, separation of power in three branches, central and local governances. Theory of liberal democratic governance considers democracy rather not as an order, that allows citizens to participate in the political life, but as a mechanism, that protects from the state and from the illegal action of other persons.

Problems related with the establishment of rule of law and protection of human rights in Georgia become even more critical due to the number of other negative factors that are legacy of the past. These factors are: authoritarianism and totalitarianism, super power of the state and limited rights to citizens, solid and widespread tradition of legal nihilism for many years, lack of experience of freedom, rule of law, self -

governance, democracy, constitutionalism, low level of political and legal culture, public subordination to the state, etc.

Few experts believe that 'regardless the fact that 'body' of the democratic state was established in Georgia through democratic institutions, problem remains how state structures perceive themselves. Since 90ies wide spread public opinion in Georgia was that civil servants were not enforcing the law but rather were oriented on personal financial interests and benefits (Shelley 1999; Handelman 1995; Favarel-Garrigues 2003; Bebler 2001; Taylor 2011; Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Kolennikova et al. 2008; Waller and Yasmann 1995; Volkov 2002).

Shortcoming of the governance in Georgia is having no restrictions on executive branch. This is demonstrated in lack of '**check and balance**' between judicial and executive institutions (The World Bank 1999-2011).

In the new, constantly changing environment, with the background of inherited mistrust towards soviet institutions, there is general mistrust. Formal democratic institutions (formal and moral criteria of the success) are still in the formation process, **informal factors** still play significant role in determining socio – economic success (clientelism, chronism, protectionism, nepotism, etc.)

Modern governance culture faces challenges in Georgia – it will either transform into the system following the '**new public management**' principles, or will find alternative mechanisms for functioning that will hamper its formation into open, democratic system.

Aim of this Article is to offer an overview / analysis of general characteristics of the democratic public management and governance culture in Georgia; identify trends and controversies of the reform that are undertaken in public management system; The special focus in the article will be made on **analysis of appellate commissions of the civil service**. *Based on this aim of the work, the main question is to what extent is the commission performing the tasks and carries out its' duties, which implies instrumentalizing fair and just recruitment in the civil service.*

Focus of the analysis covers three periods of governance since the restoration of independence: Shevardnadze period (1992 - 2003), Saakashvili (2003 – 2012) and Ivanishvili period (2012-2014).

Methodological strategy is based on the analysis of the empirical data acquired through desk research – description and overview of the published patterns. Interpretation of the state strategic documents, statistical data and expert opinions. Identification of general trends of state policy in civil service and scientific studies. In order to focus on the appellate commission and describe the institution and its mechanisms/strategies, as one of the latest components of the civil service reform we have performed the description of a specific practice, its review and analysis – identifying general tendencies regarding the appeals and reaction to them by the appellate commission – which methods the candidates use to defend their rights, what kind of barriers and obstacles they face and what results do their appeals yield. What is the situation in terms of appealing against a decision in court? Which strategy is more effective in terms of defending one's rights?

Our overview is based on the qualitative researches conducted in Civil Service in 2011 and 2014. We will consider research conducted in 2011: 'The process of the formation of Meritocracy in Transforming Public Service' (Charkviani, Chelidze 2011) and the research conducted in 2014 'Civil Service in Georgia - Problems and Challenges' (Ghonghadze, Dolidze 2014).

Data analysis - mainly relied on description procedure method, however, used such methods as interpretation, conceptualization, data grouping, typology, correlation analysis, etc.

Chapter I: Public Management Reform Process in Georgia - Achievements and Challenges

1.1. Shevardnadze's Government – Strategy, Problems, Challenges

According to the modern researchers' papers (Meyer-Sahling 2004; Dimitrov et al. 2006; Verheijen 2007; Oleinik 2009) on bureaucratic systems, Eastern Europe former socialist countries and post-Soviet countries' political institutions have gone through changes relatively faster than the bureaucratic systems. Their reformation appeared to be much more difficult process and often unrealized. Even successfully implemented reform was not without shortcomings. In number of cases, stagnation of administration modernization process took place, in certain cases modernization did not happen at all.

Since 90es wide spread public opinion in Georgia was that civil servants were not enforcing the law but rather were oriented on personal financial interests and benefits (Shelley 1999; Handelman 1995, Favarel-Garrigues 2003; Bebler 2001; Taylor 2011; Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Kolennikova et al. 2008; Waller and Yasmann 1995; Volkov 2002). Researchers of post communist countries agree that Georgia was 'failed state' with widespread corruption, with deals / coalitions between criminals and politicians and inefficient public institutions.

Georgia, as well as central and Eastern Europe Governments, had to deal with number of difficulties and challenges in this period of time. Transformation of a planned economy and authoritarian regime in a democratic society and market economy had been described by Ralph Dahrendorf as follows: 'We can assume that change of political institutions could take up to six months, change in the economic affairs - six years, as for the habits, attitudes, behaviours and values of persons – their transformation takes sixty years.'(Dahrendorf 1990)

Since 1990, key task of politics had been to adjust public institutions (and if needed form new institutions) with new economic and political contexts. These changes were the natural follow up of the new definition of relationships between private and public sectors.

During Eduard Shevardnadze's administration, entire state apparatus was organized around a pyramid of corruption. Public positions were sold at all levels and officials were expecting profit from their investments. Money was made through the waste of administrative resources, bribes, sale of public property, organized crime deals, extortion, and many other more sophisticated forms of turning public / administrative power into the private economic capital (The World Bank 2011). Despite the fact that in 1997 the new Law on 'Conflict of Interests and Corruption in Public Service' (The parliament of Georgia 1997) has been established the fact hasn't actually improved the real practice.

Georgia's moving to market economy was characterized by quick decrease of productivity that had led to budget crisis and deterioration of living conditions in the country. Disruption of formal institutions and inability of the state apparatus facilitated strengthening of informal institutions in public and private sectors. Growing unemployment rate and social downfall did not convince Government to decrease number of civil servants, which resulted in oversized civil service sector. Civil servants' salaries were low; however, many of the civil service positions were associated with bribes, privileges and unofficial benefits. At the end of XX century civil service in Georgia was similar to the United States 'poisoned system', which existed a century ago, due to its widespread nepotism and corruption.

Early efforts of the reform were made in 1991 – 2003. Since gaining independence, Georgia had extremely difficult period. In this short period of time, Country has gone through three armed conflicts. In 1995, Government was able to ensure secure environment to certain degree and destroyed military formations that fought for power. Government was also able to reach macro-economic stability.

In 1992-1994 Georgia was devastated not only by the war but also by hyperinflation and collapsing economy. Average rate of inflation was 7000% in this period, while the rate of economy declined by more than 28%. Tax collection was in poor condition, 15% state revenue share of GDP in 1992 was reduced to 2.3% in 1993. The Government of Georgia stabilized situation in 1995 through introducing new currency, carefully managing money volume, eliminating price control and reducing trade barriers. Almost all macroeconomic indicators increased significantly starting 1992-1994 up to 1997 (The World Bank 2011).

Civil service in Georgia was least effective until 2003. The following features characterised it: overlapping of the functions, extensive interference of the state in private sector, oversized civil servants and excessive public institutions, low motivation of civil servants, years of accumulated salary debts and financial non-stability, ineffective budget planning and expenditure; high level of corruption (as well as corruption opportunities), low level public trust towards the Government.

The Parliament of Georgia has adopted the current Law 'on Civil Service' in October 1997, which has been amended over a hundred times since its adoption. Implemented legislative amendments had a largely non-systemic nature, and therefore this law fails to advance legal regulations required for fostering a strong body of civil service free from party influence. This naturally sets forth the necessity of civil service reform (Nadiradze, Chikhladze 2015).

Taking into consideration this background, Country had policy and strategy documents, offering midterm and long term vision of Government at different stages towards various institutions; however, there was no ideological and / or strategic unity. Number of priorities was not realistic (for example, economic development and poverty reduction program covered more than 600 priorities), which did not correspond to the available resources nor the priority of their expenditure; Ministries in Georgia traditionally did not pay enough attention to institutional and sectoral policy development issues and to the distribution of resources according to the priorities. This had led to waste of efforts and resources (separation) and inconsistency of actions taken. Accordingly, budget planning and spending was non-transparent, ineffective and not targeted.

In fact, state did not perform its public functions and did not provide its basic services, because entire state mechanism was transformed into a private market of corrupt informal transactions. The main reason for the 'Rose Revolution' was massive corruption and dysfunctional state of 2003 (Engvall 2012).

It was quite challenging task to introduce order along with maintaining level of legitimacy in this society. From this point of view, Mikheil Saakashvili inherited Georgia in similar situation as it was in chaotic years of Eltsin in power in Russia. In order to develop new, efficient state, it was necessary to develop strong policy to fight corruption and organized crime (Kupatadze 2012). Georgia's approach was oriented to build strong state, modernize and liberalize the market. State focused on improving legislative regulations and reorganizing state institutions / structures.

1.2. Saakashvili's Government – Strategy, Problems, Challenges

Since the 'Rose Revolution' in 2003, reforms were launched in many state institutions in Georgia. Civil service reform was especially important one to ensure efficiency of state activities. All groups of society are interested to have effective, capable and transparent civil service.

The civil service reform started in 2004, when the state authorities presented new structure of the Government and launched reforms in various spheres of state policy. In accordance with the civil service concept, civil service model is based on professional civil service institute. Along with traditional bureaucratic model, plan was to create mechanism that would be free from political influence, taking into consideration key aspects of 'new management model' (Izoria and Turava 2012).

First actions taken by the Government in civil service reform process was abolition of unnecessary agencies and significant reorganization of personnel. However, due to the fact that responsibility over the reform was distributed among several bodies and available time for carrying out the reforms was utilized in too speedy manner, it had led to ineffective coordination of the reforms (Turmanidze 2006).

Political vision on civil service reform was elaborated, in order to solve above mentioned issue, based on the analysis of the existing problems and challenges. Within the framework of this vision, institutional changes had been planned on: optimization of number of civil servants, improvement of motivation system, budget planning and budget spending mechanisms and raising level of their transparency, decreasing to minimum possibilities of corrupt deals, as well as decreasing to minimum possibility of interference in private sector activities. Also drafting common strategy of the Government and formation of mid term plans for the ministries. Challenges that the Government faced as a result of the 'Rose revolution' required immediate response. Accordingly, civil service reform goals were short term oriented at its early stage and had foreseen solving specific goals in minimum period of time (Bennet 2011).

Consequently, significant institutional changes were carried out during this period; unified Strategy of the Government was drafted; Medium-term plans formation had been regulated; optimization of the number of public servants had been launched; motivation system for civil servants had been improved; opportunities of corruption had been minimized and accordingly minimized corruption in civil service; budget planning and spending mechanisms had been improved; the Government has improved degree of transparency; Government regulations on private sector had been minimized.

The new Government had the following approach – dismiss high officials of the previous Government and bring 'new blood' to state institutions. Appointment of the new management was followed by 'cleaning' of lower levels. There were several methods for such 'cleaning':

1. Employees were offered to write resignations promising them that new management would reappoint them. Cheated and scared employees massively wrote resignations;
2. Structural changes – number of agencies or departments were merged that was followed by reduction of staff. For example Ministry of Security and Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of State Property Management was merged with the Ministry of Economy, Department of Sport - with the Ministry of Culture;
3. Reform resulted in change of the departments' old names with new ones (Charkviani 2006).

According to Giga Bokeria, former Secretary of the Security Council and one of the leaders of the Rose Revolution, major part of bureaucracy was scared because corruption was established 'rules of the game' and it was replaced with aggressive fight against corruption, and this was natural to certain extent in this situation. It also had side effect – bureaucracy with lack of competence has difficulties to make decisions. This seriously hampers bureaucracy to perform its primary function – to serve citizens: 'Obviously sensitive steps were taken to reduce bureaucracy; however this was necessary and correct. State practically did not pay salary to the bureaucracy. They had green light to rob our citizens and roughly

speaking pay share to the Government authorities. We will not allow this approach any more. Bureaucracy has to be adequately funded, controlled and kept accountable in the country. We would not be able to achieve the latter unless we took this step. Not only in Georgia, none of the normal countries have such a big bureaucracy' (Bokeria 2004).

According to the statement of Kakha Bendukidze, former Minister of Economy, downsizing of the bureaucratic sector was extremely important for defeating corruption. State corruption begins with the relationship of state official with an ordinary citizen: 'in case of big state, this contact is rather frequent. Government of Georgia has very soon realized that corruption cannot be defeated with the fire and sword. In this case, corruption will appear again. Thus, economic reform program that aimed reduction of state interference in economy, coincided with anticorruption program aiming downsizing of ordinary staff – obviously, it is easier to observe two bureaucratic organizations, than two thousand. State official has to be convinced that no one around him / her and especially above him / her is stealing.' (Bendukidze 2012)

General number of employed persons in Georgia was 1 656 100 in 2009, among those, 1 628 810 persons were employed in private sector and 27 290 - in public service. The ratio of civil servants in relation with the country's population showed that in 2009 every other 162nd and in 2010, every other 163rd was in public service (Civil Service bureau 2012). Survey conducted by Institute for Development of Public Information (IDFI) in 2013 showed that 74 532 persons were employed in 166 state institutions. Among those, 8714 persons were on managing positions (heads of units and higher), Among 74 532 public servants, 25 703 persons were employed by the central apparatus of the Ministries and State Minister's Offices; 20 644 persons were employed in the Legal Entities of Public Law and State subordinated agencies; 10 421 persons – in local self governances, remaining 7764 persons - in other state institutions (IDFI 2013).

Based on the Report of the Civil Service Bureau, state budget allocations on salaries from the state budget in 2003 was 138 321 200 GEL; in 2004 – 198 675 600 GEL; (43% increase compared to the previous year); in 2005 – 276 461 300 (39% increase compared to the previous year); in 2006 – 372 651 400 GEL (35% increase compared to the previous year); in 2007 – 462 177 100 (24% increase compared to the previous year).

Salary fund between 2004 and 2007 years had been increased by 132 %. All previous salary debts had been paid and system became so sustainable that there is no problem in terms of lack of budget allocations to pay salaries neither there is a problem of delayed payments.

As a result of the above listed measures, we could conclude that number of state institutions and civil servants had been optimized; motivation system has been enhanced. Accordingly, efficiency of civil service has increased significantly, system became more flexible and quality of planned and performed tasks has improved. Thus, public trust towards civil service has increased.

According to 'Transparency International', outcomes several surveys indicate that Georgia has achieved remarkable progress in terms of defeating corruption. Based on the survey conducted in 2010, Georgia was on 68th place among 178 countries with 3,8 points.

Georgia had better outcome than any neighbouring countries (except Turkey) and any former Soviet republics (except the three Baltic States). Georgia was on the fourth place in Eastern Europe and Central Asia in terms of freedom from corruption (after Turkey, Croatia and Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). Results of 'Global Corruption Barometer' prove widely spread opinion that petty corruption, including bribery had been practically eliminated in Georgia. Based on 'Global Integrity Index' that assesses strength of the anti-corruption mechanisms, Georgia's rating was constantly changing in recent years. In 2006, country had been awarded 'average' rating, in 2007 – 'weak', in 2008 – 'very weak', in 2009 – 'average'. In

2009, country had been even removed from the 'list to be observed on elite corruption'(Transparency International - (NIS) 2011.).

According to Thomas De Waal, central Government achieved significant results after the Rose Revolution. They had successfully eliminated petty (daily) corruption and crime. Attracted foreign investments. Currently, Georgia has an effective system of state services. We could not say the same regarding majority of Georgia's neighbours. It is possible to purchase apartment or take driving license quickly and without paying a bribe (De Waal 2011). Civil service had been managed more effectively and financial conditions of the central government had been remarkably improved as a result of tax system reforms (Matthais 2011).

This common trend of achieving modernization and gaining power at the same time is described in details in the comparative research on Authoritarian Management Methods in Caucasus by Christoph H. Stefes. Stefes stated: 'The state budget had increased in a few years. Considerable proportion of this amount is allocated for the modernization of the police and defence (...). Overall, modernization of the state apparatus made it possible to concentrate the power in central Government. Using his party the President was able to develop a patrimonial network' (Stefes 2010).

Results of the Research conducted in 2011(Engvall 2012) revealed that in several years from the 'Rose Revolution' implementation of the important reforms had been stimulated from the top level of political monopoly. At the same time, political power got concentrated in the narrow political group. Key challenge for the Government of Georgia turned to be biased approach based on party affiliation and favoritism at highest political level. International and local NGOs were concerned on several aspects, including decentralization of power, weakness of political accountability, lack of independence of the judiciary and other state institutions (for example, tax office or chamber of control). However, these problems are not unique to Georgia, as arbitrary use of power is common to all states that are on the edge of authoritarian and democratic governance (Engvall 2012).

Following key problematic areas had been listed: accountability of the Government, budget process, business regulation and activities of the law enforcements (Global Integrity 2009). While no one argues that the Government was successful in eliminating petty corruption, once in a while there is an opinion that corruption has changed its form in Georgia. For example, one of the analysts believes that before 2003 corruption was widespread and rampant in Georgia, however, now we see 'clientelistic system', where country's leadership 'allocated resources' to ensure needed commitment and support to remain in power (Kupatadze 2011).

Opinion is expressed that there is high probability of 'nepotism and internal deals' in the country, as 'power is concentrated in closely related narrow group of persons' (Berteslmann Stiftung 2009). The circumstance that Georgian society, in general, has a low degree of confidence in public institutions and gives advantage to more traditional, informal relations may be one of the contributing factor to this (CIPDD 2010).

Kakha Bendukidze believed that civil service reform speed was rather slow: 'this reform is undertaken a bit slowly (civil service reform). Practically there is one established practice and Law on Civil Service already contradicts with the reality. Thus, sooner we move to the new model that will be merit based not carrier based, the better. The biggest problem of our civil service, I believe is, nepotism. Selection in civil service has to be competitive indeed. This is the most important issue today for civil service as well as for the entire country.' (Civil Service bureau 2012)

II Chapter: Public Management System since the Government Change in 2012

2.1. Recruitment Policy in Civil Service

As of the data of 2016, there are 19 Ministries, more than 200 state institutions and state enterprises operating in Georgia. These institutions are delivering thousands of different services. In accordance with the new Law on Civil Service, adopted in July 2015 and that will be enforced starting January 1, 2017 formation of effective civil service is important for integration in European and Euro - Atlantic structures.

According to Government of Georgia (GoG), civil service reform is one of the most important priorities. According to strategic plan 'Georgia 2020' 'the Government will facilitate the development of a human resources management system as part of efforts to ensure the stability of public service provision and the recruitment of qualified staff through relevant material and career motivation.' (GoG, 'Georgia 2020'). In order to implement the reform, GoG has taken several successful steps during 2013-2014 (Civil Service Bureau 2013). Non-governmental sector points to the improvement of legal acts regulating the civil service. However, they also point to numerous violations and irregularities in terms of competitions and certification (attestation) (TI Georgia 27.07.2015).

After 2012 parliamentary elections, reorganization in civil service came under public scrutiny and has not lost its attraction ever since. Transparent and fair recruitment procedure in public institutions is the bulk of proper functioning of civil service. Such principles are the necessary tools to convince the citizens that civil service recruits not relatives, friends or political affiliates, but professionals.

According to the Action Plan of 2014 – 2015, problem related with the assumption of nepotism had to be eliminated. With the enforcement of the Government Decree dated July 20, 2014 rule for conducting competition in civil service has been improved significantly – more guarantees had been introduced to ensure fairness and impartiality principles during competitions (Merabishvili 2014). Mechanisms of the recruiting process and appealing results were established (Decree of the Government of Georgia №412 2014). If the candidate considers that the commission has inadequately assessed the compatibility of his or her professional habits, qualification, capabilities and personal characteristics with the requirements of the proposed vacancy – the candidate has the right to appeal to the appellate commission and later to the court, or not use the mechanism of appeals and address the court immediately, as set out in the Georgian legislation (Practical Manual 2014).

The existence and effective use of the legal mechanisms of appealing against the results of the recruitment competition is an important instrument of ensuring transparency and fairness of the recruitment process, as well as a mechanism by which the candidate can defend his or her rights. Every decision of the selection commission, as well as of the appellate commission must be substantiated and justified. In my regard, the above-mentioned mechanism has another function as well, as the possibility of candidate defending his or her rights is an effective indicator of the commissions' functionality.

Despite the above stated, nongovernmental sector see politically motivated process behind massive dismissal of civil servants that took place after 2012 parliamentary elections (Kotetishili 2013; 2015). Lawyer of 'Transparency International – Georgia' stated that the absence of civil servant development policy makes this servant dependent on political environment and change of Governments.

'Everyone has feeling that their job is not stable. If civil servant knows that he / she will be promoted if he / she raises qualification, or fulfils specific plan, this will end conversations regarding nepotism in civil service. Today, this is not prescribed by the law and depends on the public officials with suspicious preferences, who leave impression that for them most important is loyalty and past service to the party and not professionalism'. (Gabuldani 2015)

Fair and transparent recruitment procedures in civil service ensure proper functioning of the staff. Competition administered following these procedures is necessary instrument to convince public that professionals are recruited in civil service and not relatives, friends and political allies.

Changes among civil service employees launched right after Parliamentary elections of 2012, attracted public interest soon after and still remains to be critical. Dissatisfaction towards competitions conducted in the capital as well as in local municipalities is increasing. Main reason for dissatisfaction is mistrust to their fairness. Candidates pronounce complains through various sources: media briefings, articles, social networks, open letters addressing high officials, applying to the NGOs and courts.

Public Opinion Survey conducted in 2015 shows citizens' perceptions on nepotism and other forms of corruption in civil service. Number of persons **who think that occasions when high officials use their positions for own benefits is spread or widely spread**, have doubled compared to 2013 – number of these persons in 2015 was 25%, whereas in 2013 it was 12%. Number of persons who think that number of persons who use their positions for personal benefits is partially common, partially not. In 2015, 31% of respondents used to agree to this opinion, in 2013 – 21% (CRRC 2015).

In order to identify level of nepotism during recent two years, respondents were asked to recall if they had heard cases (except for information spread through mass media) when competition announced in civil service was not fair and when management had given advantage to friends, relatives or members of party. 15% of respondents stated that they had often heard about such cases, 29% stated that they rarely heard of such cases. 39% of respondents had not heard information on unfair competitions in civil service from other sources rather than mess media (CRRC 2015).

Presented quantitative study shows that negative public perception towards recruitment system reform in civil service is increasing. Research Methodology presents perception; therefore it cannot offer absolute objective reality. However, it proves failure of accomplishing one of the strategic goals of civil service – raise public confidence towards recruitment policy.

2.2. Analysis of Appellate Commissions of the Civil Service

Civil service is one of the most prestigious and competitive areas of the Georgian labour market. After the amendment of 29 June 2012 to the 'Law of Georgia on Civil Service', it is mandatory to announce a call on all positions. This is the reason why at the end of 2013 numerous vacancies were announced on the civil service website.

According to the administration of <http://www.hr.gov.ge>, 686 new vacancies were announced on average in a month by the civil service sector. By that time 130813 users were registered on the website. As the data explicitly shows, the number of people involved in the process has increased significantly over the last years.

The article generally discusses the lack of trust towards the commission. The reasons for mistrust are various. The principal protest from the candidates refers to certain infringements during the interview

process: Questions regarding impartiality of the commission, lack of professionalism, incompetence, irrelevant questions, and interview held without set criteria, incongruent practice, members of the commission being the persons who also take part in the competition, as they for that period were 'acting' officials etc.¹ (Rukhadze 2015). We shall not dwell into details on this matter, as the appellate commissions include representatives of the selection commission as well, thus the criticism applies to both. As the major protest is caused by the interview process, the main bulk of infringements also appear to be present during this stage of the recruitment process. Therefore, the appeals to the commission and the court mostly contain the above-mentioned flaws.

The appellate commission is obliged by law to react to appeals. The commission is also obliged to inform the appellant about its decision in written form and must justify it. Unfortunately, a single practice has been established, which involves sending one type of response to all appellants; *'Each and every one of us got an identical response, not a single phrase was different'* (Khutsishvili 2014).

We can refer to the first strategy as the **'the easy way of dismissing the appellant'**, whereas the second – **'the hard way of dismissing the appellant'**.

1. The appellant provides the proof of relevance of his/her **education and narrow specialization** to the announced vacancy (based on the documents confirming relevant education and qualification). Indicates that the candidate preferred by the committee does not meet the requirements.
2. The appellant proves his/her relevance in the education, qualification section of the announced vacancy (providing the documents confirming relevant education, qualification). Indicates that the candidate preferred by the committee does not meet the qualification requirements.

The abovementioned two factors on the part of appellants are considered to be objective preconditions to schedule the second tour, interview anew. What is interesting is what kind of response strategies are institutionalized in the work of the appellate commission in such cases.

In such cases, the complaints and appeals made by the appellants are so reasonable that the commission cannot react via the first strategy. In other words, the standard response will not suffice, therefore the appellate commission is obliged to address the selection commission with a recommendation to take the appellant's claim into account and set another interview. Creating an appellate commission is a discretionary power of the executive head of the civil service.

The number and composition of the commission is determined by the director of the institution/entity. The appellate commission includes the chairman, deputy chairman and senior employees of the institution. Considering the impartial and transparent character of the commission, representatives of CSOs and independent experts should be invited as members of both the appellate commission and the selection commission.

The court rulings and decisions reinforce the claim. Even though the legislation rules that in order to ensure the impartiality of the appellate commission, the members of the commission must not take part in any other process of the competition or the recruitment process, the research has not been able to identify the execution of this requirement. However, if external actors are exempt from participation in the commission, this creates doubts about the composition of the commissions, as well as their decisions.

¹ NOTE: Under Article 2 of the Law of Georgia on the Conflict of Interests and Corruption in Civil Service, acting officials can be appointed to a vacant position that shall be filled through a competitive process for no longer than one year, and to other positions for no longer than three months. The same person may not be reappointed as an acting official to the same position. This amendment will be enforced from 1 July, 2013. – See more at: <http://www.csb.gov.ge/en/faq#sthash.QgK6uTRZ.dpuf>

A question arises, whether these measures by the appellate commission are enough for impartial decisions. The established practice indicates that it is not! What are the reasons? In fact, this form of reaction does not have an imperative character, however the flaws of the selection commission are pointed out and it is up to the selection commission to react. How does the selection commission react to the recommendations of the appellate commission? Form of reaction and strategy are as follows: The selection commission mostly takes the decision of the appellate commission into account and does not appoint any of the candidates on the position. Therefore, the call for the position is annulled. This happens despite the fact that the appellant asks for another interview and not annulment of the competition. What happens next? After receiving a recommendation letter from the appellate commission, the executives of the public service institution changes the requirements of the vacancy, the title of the position and the candidate requirements, which is completely tailored for the CV of the temporary officiate. This means that the appellant will not be able to participate in the new call for position (Nemsadze 2014).

As a result of a justified appeal from the candidate to the appellate commission, the vacancy is annulled and the appellant denied the possibility to participate in the new call for position. It is evident that the appellate commission shared the comparative advantage of the appellant and tailored the requirements for the position not according to the law on civil service, but to the informal practices, such as – nepotism, patronage, protectionism etc.

As the practice indicates, appeal to court is more effective in such cases. NGOs assist the appellants with preparation of the complaints and during the trial. There are several examples:

1. The Court of First Instance in Zestafoni satisfied the appeal of 21 appellants, whose interests were protected by the representative of 'Fair Elections'. The court repealed the decision by the selection commission, according to which the applicants were denied the vacant positions and the commission was ordered to schedule the interview stage anew. (ISFED 02.12.2015)
2. On 13 November 2015, the Court of First Instance of Tsageri satisfied the appeal of the appellant, whose interests were represented by the representative of 'Fair Elections'. (ISFED 20.11.2015)

The court proves the unjust decisions based on the following arguments:

- The activities of the selection commission was in breach of the principle of publicity, which was manifested in the denial of observation of the interview process to the interested parties.
- According to the charter of the selection commission, identical questionnaire is used in case of every candidate. However, the selection commission was not in possession of such a questionnaire. The commission should have also used the assessment form, which according to the charter was supposed to assess the skills of the candidate.
- During the interview process, the commission made a biased assessment regarding the criteria, such as 'work experience'. More specifically, applicants with less working experience received significantly higher evaluation.
- During the interview, there were cases of inadequate questions to the candidates, which were not relevant to the professional experience of the candidate and were politically biased, which constitutes a breach of the Georgian legislation.

We can conclude that the mechanisms of functioning of the appellate commission, especially the process of forming the commission, requires strict control. The mechanisms of such control is the basis of functioning of any institution. Examples indicate that there are doubts about the process of forming the appellate commissions.

The decision of the appellate commission serves as a recommendation, meaning that it is not imperative and does not imply that the initial requirements of the competition should be revised, as it is not within the competence of the appellate commission.

It is true that the law gives the applicant a choice to address appellate commission, or the court primarily. However, on the one hand, the costs of establishing the appellate commission, time and human resources are problematic and on the other hand applicants' appeals to the court due to the inefficiency of appellate commission, which also relates to ineffective loss of financial, time and human resources.

2.3. Human Resources Management Model and Carrier Development Mechanisms

In accordance with the new Law on Civil Service, civil service institute based on carrier principle is being established. Civil servants are given opportunities for continued development and raising qualification. This is fundament for merit based civil service. Merit based carrier development should depend on professional trainings and skills (GoG 2015). New management model free from political pressure should be created along with the traditional bureaucratic model, taking into consideration major aspects of 'new management model'. As the key factor of proper functioning of civil service is stability for civil servants (Izoria, Turava 2012).

First and foremost priority is that civil servants be protected from political changes – when new government comes to power, it should not lay grounds to change of top, mid or low level management. They should be given opportunities for carrier development and their status will be much more solid, than it is now. No one will be able to easily dismiss them.



Civil Service Bureau plans to increase public trust towards recruitment process through mandatory certification. According to the new Law on Civil Service, only certified candidates will be able to apply to vacancy in civil service. (Izoria, Turava 2012).

Regardless the above-mentioned statement, NGO sector believes that massive dismissal of staff from civil service since 2012 was politically motivated process. 'Transparency International – Georgia' stated that absence of civil service development policy makes these persons dependant on political environment and change of government (Kotetishvili 2013).

Problem that is particularly critical with the new Government is related with common practice when persons 'acting' win the competition on the same position they are assigned 'acting' to – this results in their '**automatic reappointment**'. Based on statistical data, recruitment process is assessed as '**having outcome preliminarily defined**.' (Selimashvili 2014)

Requirement to publicly announce competition in civil service is formally satisfied – information regarding vacancy is published on governmental recruitment portal www.hr.gov.ge and registration of candidates is done electronically. Results of the survey reflect reality, according to which formulation of strategy on recruitment procedure policy in civil service is following: **Appointment of persons of so called acting on the positions prevails number of staff recruited from outside.** (See table 1).

<p>Table 1. The results of the competition in the civil service, percentage of persons selected among 'acting' employees (between October 25, 2012 and January 1, 2014) based on the information obtained from the state institutions). (Selimashvili 2014)</p>



The data confirms that publication of the existing vacancies on the portal www.hr.gov.ge that means to follow formal procedures of the competition does not ensure a fair and transparent competitive environment for the applicants. This results in unfair competition environment that obviously does not provide equal opportunities to all candidates, and also creates fake, illusory ‘transparent and objective’ reality for the competition. It is clear that publication of all civil service vacancies on the portal www.hr.gov.ge ensures transparency of the procedure and it is exaggerated to believe that the latter **provides equal chances to all the applicants.**

Therefore, we have environment in which public agencies use their financial and time resources inefficiently to make decision that is predefined without holding competition. The fact that ‘acting’ employees enjoy certain privileges during competition limits number of good candidates who should be attracted to civil service. Recruitment of less qualified personnel weakens bureaucracy and public confidence towards civil service, as an employer, objectively declines. In addition, this bureaucracy will not support comprehensive reforms in civil service as it will have to introduce and implement

mechanisms like: performance evaluation of employees that leads to identification of incompetent civil servants (Natroshvili, Nadiradze, Chikhladze 2015).

Thus, regardless multiple competitions in civil service, that should prove openness and transparency of the civil service, in fact significant number of competitions are just formal.

European Commission considered only partially fulfilled fight against corruption in its third report of visa liberalization implementation action plan. It has issued several recommendations for the Government. One of the requests of the European Commission to prevent corruption and fight against it is: civil service reform and adoption of the new Law. New Law should ensure: *'... a model in which part of civil servants will not lose their jobs during each new election and new staff will not be recruited.'*

According to the statement of USAID representative, corruption in civil service takes place during recruitment process – *'Reform will depoliticize civil service, there will no more be a model in which persons lose their jobs during each elections and new staff is recruited. One of the MPs half joking said at one a discussion: I like civil service reform because when my neighbour asks me to find him / her a job, I can say: I'm sorry but I cannot help you, you have to take exam, get certificate, you should apply through web page and this is full process.'* (Gabuldani 2015)


Analysts believe that corruption does not necessarily mean bribery. There is political and bureaucratic corruption as well as cronyism (when loyal persons are appointed on the positions) and nepotism (appointment of relatives), accepting presents not prescribed by law for delivery of services prescribed by law (Begiashvili, Bostaghanashvili, Lejava et al. 2007). More generally speaking, corruption is when subject of the system considers himself / herself above the law and in order to strengthen own positions uses illegal ways without being punished (or uses methods where it is difficult to differentiate between legal and illegal actions) Elite corrupt system can be formed by a party that understands that XX century authoritarianism does not work in XXI century and has sufficient inventive potential to apply modern forms for maintaining the power (Andronikashvili 2012).

2.4 Increased Bureaucracy Trend and its Threats

Increased number of persons employed in civil service and increased trends during recent years is reality that needs to be taken into consideration. Although it is the goal of the state to reduce unemployment in the country, Parliamentary and Non-parliamentary opposition and experts believe that this problem needs to be solved through increased employment opportunities in private sector and not in civil service (Alapishvili 2015). When discussing state budget of 2015 political opposition argued that number of persons employed in civil service is increased according to the budget. This happens because government is unable to attract investments in private sector (Khimshiashvili 2015).

'Fact Check' published information based on GEOSTAT data – each 6th employed and each 3rd hired are in civil service. Their salary range according to the data of 2014 is 2 billion 422 million GEL. (Table 2).

Table 2. Employment in civil service (source: State budget of Georgia 2015) (Khimshiashvili 2015)



As a result of verification of the factual data, we can conclude that the number of employees in civil service is increased. In 2012, 102 976 persons were employed in civil service, while according to the draft budget of 2015 number of employees will be 116 442, which means that number of employees in civil service increased by 13 466 in three years. Increased bureaucracy leads to increased costs of their maintenance and increased burden for taxpayers (Khimshiashvili 2015).

Regardless the above mentioned, 2014 year's budget envisages increased fund for salaries, additional funds to finance newly created positions. Similar change in the budget and formation of the new agencies questions the Prime Minister's statement and creates possibility to continued increase in bureaucracy. Experts believe that economy in which key employer is civil service is not oriented on development. It is even impossible to plan development (Mchedlidze 2014).

III Chapter. System of Salary Supplements / Bonuses and Politically Neutral Civil Service

Remuneration policy in civil service attracts special attention. Practice of issuing salary supplements and bonuses had been subject of criticism many times. According to the information of NGO sector, amount of salary supplements and bonuses allocated in 2012 – 2014 may exceed 100 million GEL. Government of Georgia had spent several million GEL on bonuses and salary supplements in 2014. Average amount allocated for the remuneration of civil servants exceeds 1.381 billion GEL annually (Gegechkori, 2015).

Georgia has leading position among 8 of the post-Soviet countries according to the average remuneration of employees in budgetary structures. According to GEOSTAT average remuneration in civil service is 1330 GEL. It should be noted that the average remuneration in the public sector is higher than average remuneration in the private sector during recent years.

Public disappointment on the practice of awarding specific high officials with bonuses and salary supplements is increasing and we constantly hear questions: who deserved and who did not? Whose 'subscribed' bonus was higher? ('Subscribe' is rather interesting practice, often high officials subscribe bonuses and salary supplements to themselves).

Problem is widely covered by media. Public discussions on this topic is well described in the titles of the publications: 'Bonus System in Civil Service Turned into Budget Misappropriation Mechanism', 'New System of Bonuses in Civil Service Excludes Previous Years Malpractice', 'Shortcomings of Governance', 'It is Necessary that Law Distinguishes between Bonus, Salary Supplement and Remuneration', 'What is the Cost of Government? – Colossal Salaries, Bonuses and Salary Supplements', 'Bonus – form of Charity from


the Boss’, ‘Salary Supplement Replacing Bonus’, ‘Georgia has one of the ‘Expensive’ Governments’, etc. (Charkviani 2016)

For example, journalists in Sagarejo region state that ‘employees appointed ten days ago received bonuses in the amount of one month salary. When we, journalists, asked for explanation, Sagarejo Governor told us that they did not want to disappoint them. Sorry, but they deal with budget money and not the pub money. What does it mean not to disappoint them?’ (Mtvilishvili 2015)

Even representatives of Government recognize need to regulate the situation. At the end of 2014, Georgia’s Government declared the so-called ‘belt-tightening’ policy in relation with administrative costs and on the background of monetary crisis. So called ‘belt tightening’ policy was reflected in **Government Decree # 449 of July 15, 2014 – ‘On Approving Rule to Define the Amount of Bonus’** – before January 1, 2016, up to 746 public officials were deprived the right to receive bonus. Persons, authorized to issue bonuses had been defined, restrictions were envisaged on frequency and amount of bonuses. Amount of single bonus shall not exceed remuneration of a person and it may be issued on quarterly basis only. Following are the bases of issuing the bonus: overtime work; excellent performance; especially high responsibility and workload; especially high workload in non-working hours; long and good service; completion of especially difficult assignment (Chikhladze 2014).

Above-mentioned Decree envisages regulation of bonus system for civil servants only and does not mention anything regarding salary supplements. Based on State Audit conclusion, since July 2014, bonuses were replaced with supplements (IDFI 2014/2015). It is written in the State Audit Report of 2014 that percentage of issued salary supplements was higher than bonuses between July 2014 and November.

Practice studied by Institute of Development of Public Information (IDFI), as well as assessments of the State Audit, prove the fact that above mentioned Decree of Government cannot fully solve the problem –introduced regulations apply only to bonuses in civil service, this has caused replacement of bonuses with salary supplements in number of state institutions. (See table 3).



State policy to fully regulate system of bonuses and salary supplements is purposefully weak. In the presence of political will it would be possible to introduce regulations on salary supplements as well.

Civil society and political opposition believe that enforcement of the new Law since 2017 is related with the Parliamentary elections (TI Georgia 22.09.2015). Link between elections and remuneration policy in the civil service causes number of questions and concerns. Key problem identified in this process is: *To what extent it is possible to have politically neutral civil service on the background of existing remuneration policy ensure? Currently enforced bonus and salary supplement system in Georgia is threat to effective functioning of bureaucracy in Georgia and thus possibility of laying grounds for politically neutral bureaucracy is weak.* We will try to prove legitimacy of above mentioned conclusions through referring to several arguments.

Formation of politically neutral civil service envisages existence of the system based on the principles of integrity, impartiality and professionalism; It remains in service in case of any government, regardless which political power is in government; Employment in civil service should be long term, following properly pre-defined rights and duties. Practice proves that this principle is not implemented in Georgia. Change of Government is followed by dismissal of top and middle level employees.

'Neutral Competence Doctrine' that is the first civil service reform in America, envisaged recruitment in civil service based on professional qualification, experience and credits and not based on political views (Wilson 2004).

Neutral civil service is a system that is based on meritocratic principle and promotion, support and appreciation of professionalism. Civil service management system is also focused on creation of fair mechanism for protection of the professional civil servants' rights.

It is impossible to establish carrier based civil service in these conditions, as loyalty to ruling political elite prevails professionalism. Loyalty to the leadership is beneficial. According to the State Audit Report, 81% of the spending agencies do not have employees' performance evaluation system in place. In order to ensure fair incentives it is important to introduce working hours tracking system/ what was the logic behind issued bonuses? – A journalists wrote 'Heads of institutions used to decide this issue individually and despite the fact that Administrative Code requests each act to be reasoned, there is no reasoning at all why would the head issue bonus to his / her particular employee. This requires reasoning that this employee was distinguished from other with productive and effective work, however, this approach was missing.' (Rekhviashvili, 2013)

Misuse of administrative resources is a negative practice that is widely spread in Georgia. Keeping political system in power correlates with maintaining position in civil service, thus officials are interested to contribute to maintaining the system through mobilizing available administrative resources and through other types of election activities, especially when instruction comes directly from leadership (TI Georgia 2014).

Based on all above mentioned circumstances, we can assume that enforcement of the new Law starting 2017 will generate all above mentioned problems. Levan Berdzenishvili, former member of majority expressed concern: 'Although we said that this Law should be enforced starting 2017, but when the new Parliament comes they will immediately say, maybe we should enforce the law starting 2018 or 2019. But we need to try to enforce it.' (Berdzenishvili 2014) It is difficult to imagine functioning of neutral and impartial civil service in these conditions. Practice of issuing salary supplements without any analysis of performance, with rather simple form and as mentioned above, without analyzing results, had continued in 2016. Similar system creates **solid ground for abuse of power; as for the Government policy on**

remuneration it increases influence on state institution management. This contains risks in terms of organizational autonomy of bureaucracy.

IV Chapter: Analysis of the Decision Making Process in Civil Service

While reviewing decision making process in civil service, we will try to focus on the practice of civil servants' participation in decision making process. We will discuss and identify general trends in decision making process that characterizes two major periods of civil service reform. First stage includes years 2004 – 2012 and second – since 2012 up to now.

According to the modern management theories, institutions with high level decentralization is typical for open and democratic systems – decision making process is transparent and in most cases more effective than highly centralized organizations.

Decentralization is especially important for civil service organizations in order to ensure better distribution of authorities between various units and for reciprocal control. Decision making process that is not handled by single individual ensures better participation of different units and transparency of the decision making process. Decentralized civil service organizational structure is directly linked with the establishment of effective reciprocal control mechanisms, as well as specialization– assigning specialists to various tasks to ensure better performance of outcome.

Before 2012 decision making process was not uniform and was not based on commonly recognized principle, shared and implemented by each and every head of civil service organization.

Interpretation of subordination principle by civil servants automatically excludes participation in decision making process – 'received task' cannot be subject of discussion. Decision making process in civil service has centralized management features. Although civil service is hierarchical system, decentralization requires decision making within relevant competence and discretion at every level. Civil servants list hierarchy and subordination as reasons for not participating in decision making process.

Making decision means taking responsibility, whereas responsibility is entirely 'manager's' prerogative. Accordingly, when speaking about job descriptions, elaborated for various positions in civil service, we refer to rights and duties relevant to ranking, in this case it means duties only, as for the rights – they are fully delegated to the 'manager'. Therefore, separation of rights and duties is questioned, which could be considered as obstacle to effective performance. Civil servant becomes executor and not responsible on his / her own work. Thus unhealthy relations are formed between manager and staff.

Interpretation of subordination principle by civil servants automatically excludes participation in decision making process – 'received task' is not subject of discussion (Berdzenishvili 2014).

Data of scientific studies of 2014 show new trends in terms of civil servants' attitudes towards decision making process in civil service.

Centralization trend is characteristic of period before 2012, situation changed since new Government came to power. Mostly this is reflected in discussions of civil servants focusing on shortcomings in decision making process. This was certainly not the case before October elections.

Attitude of managers towards decision making process has changed since 2012. The managers more openly and freely speak about the shortcomings in the practice of so-called 'previous Government' (Ghonghadze, Dolidze 2014). Civil servants emphasize lack of initiatives by the employees of low, mid and top level and consider it legacy of the previous Government (Ghonghadze, Dolidze 2014).

Decision making process in civil service is related with lack of competence and initiatives as well as fear of sanctions. According to the statement of leading public officials, employees often avoid to make decision 'they do not know how to make decision, they do not know how to evaluate alternatives' (Ghonghadze, Dolidze 2014). Often reason is lack of competence as well as lack of practical and professional experience.

Top managers noted that centralization trend has decreased with the new Government and many decisions are made at the level of the Ministries. Moreover, it is not necessary to get consent of the Minister for all decisions within the Ministry. There are decisions made by the heads of departments.

It is interesting to hear opinion of the top manager who believes that initiation of the process to make decisions should start from low level and they should be filtered and enhanced on the top. However, whether decision making process should be centralized or decentralized, depends of strategic and political importance of the issue concerned. (Shubladze, Mghebrishvili, Tsotskolauri 2008)

There is Pressure on civil servants in civil service, absence of effective decision making system and bureaucratic procedures. There is no proper system that would make decision making process effective and would make it clear who is responsible on what. Absence of properly functioning internal systems and procedures are considered as key factors causing difficulties in decision making process. They believe it is not clearly defined who is decision maker and who makes decision and when; who is involved in the process. Thus, decisions are practically made by one or two persons (Ghonghadze, Dolidze 2014).

Analyzing data of empirical studies we can conclude that centralized decision making process was more common for civil service before 2012. Although civil service is hierarchical system, decentralization requires decision making within specific discretion. Decentralized civil service is directly related to the establishment of effective reciprocal control mechanisms, as well as specialization in distributing tasks – assigning specialists in order to receive better outcome on certain goals. High officials speak much more openly on the shortcomings of decision making process in practice since 2012 Parliamentary elections. They openly criticize existing situation and show better readiness and will to change this process and make decentralize decision making process.

Need to create more effective system of decision making procedures is common for both periods, as well as turning this system into effective instrument and its implementation. Each civil servant has to contribute to the decision making process within own discretion and competence. Ensuring proper functioning of the formal procedures in decision making process is one of the preconditions for effective functioning of the system. Proper system will become non functional in case there is lack of qualification and experience.

Sum up of the Results and Discussion

Presented Article shows that public management in Georgia faces various challenges. First and utmost this is getting rid of soviet traditions in public administration. Regardless ongoing change, state institutions still maintain 'soviet autocratic governance features' by its form and nature. This is extremely harmful

especially today when state institutions are being formed and it is critical to form modern structures, applying creative public management methods and making relevant decision.

Practices of misusing resources related with positions and power remain to be critical and define functioning of bureaucracy. This leads to inadequate separation of public and private interests. Therefore, several practices had been identified in South – East Europe and Eurasia bureaucracies (Handelman 1995; Waller and Yasmann 1995; Shelley 1999; Bebler 2001; Favarel-Garrigues 2003; Taylor 2011; Gerber and Mendelson 2008; Kolennikova et al. 2008). Post Soviet version of the public management is distinguished with formal installations of modern state features (Parliament and multiparty, election mechanisms and modern Constitutions), they serve as legitimate system façade whereas their internal functioning often follows non-democratic logic.

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