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# ***The Policy Advocacy Milieu and its Impact on Advocacy Results in Georgia***

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*“Understanding advocacy impact requires more than counting policy wins and losses”.*  
Organizational Resource Service website

**Abstract:** *Evaluations of advocacy outcomes are, in most cases, limited to assessments of the capacity of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to implement advocacy; they are commonly linked to advocacy project timeframes, and are therefore of a limited nature. With this in mind, this paper focuses on the advocacy milieu that affects advocacy outcomes, to a greater or lesser extent. The impact components or conditions reviewed in this paper are: a) state and political conditions, b) the impact of wider acceptance of advocacy issues, and c) the “motivational effect” and “theory of change” of CSOs to initiate an organization and/or policy advocacy.*

*The article concludes that neither the unstable political environment of Georgia nor the wider acceptance of an issue by the public have an impact on policy advocacy. Instead, success of advocacy is related to the motivation to initiate civic organization and comprehension of the “theory of change.” In addition, the article reveals that in Georgia’s context it is not a concrete long-term and formalized strategy that is linked to the “theory of change” that matters for successful advocacy, but constantly maintaining critical issues on the agenda.*

## **Introduction**

Social scientists studying social movements, interest groups, nonprofits, and democratic politics share common intellectual questions about the causes and consequences of collective action in pursuit of social and political change (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). Theoretical debates and empirical research on advocacy organizations started in the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century and have gradually shifted into micro-level questions of individual participation and identity on the one hand, and to macro-level questions regarding political institutions and culture on the other. Thus, middle range analysis of group political behavior and ongoing policy dynamics is underdeveloped within contemporary political sociology (Andrews & Edwards, 2004). The same is true for Georgia. Assessments generally analyze the Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) established in the 1990s and their achievements and shortfalls; however, they almost never focus on either CSOs’ behavior or the reasons for it. This sector, supported by the West in the form of financial and technical support, with the goal of civil society development, became synonymous with civil society and de facto monopolized civil society discourse, leaving wider society and other non-institutional forms of citizens’ engagement behind (Ekiert & Kubik, 2014). CSOs’ political behavior thus heavily depends on the mode that has been “approved” by westernized neo-Tocquevillian actors (Seligman, 1995).

Despite the fact that the term “advocacy” was introduced to Georgia by international organizations as early as 2003, policy advocacy and its many forms—be it direct lobbying or indirect education and agenda setting—has become an important activity for the non-governmental sector. Donors’ support of advocacy projects has broadened the scope of development assistance and has upgraded it to the public policy

influence level. When assessing their efforts, Georgian CSOs confirm that social or political change, reached through advocacy endeavors within a particular sectoral mandate, often occurs over many years of consistent effort. Despite the fact that CSOs view their work in the context of a large-scale activity oriented towards social or political change, experts evaluating advocacy outcomes often focus solely on the advocacy capacity of an organization over a concrete period of time. It is perceived that “good organization” yields “good advocacy outcomes”; yet this formula is of limited application for Georgia, where advocacy campaigns by civil society organizations are conducted amid complex and chaotic political processes (Barkhorn, Hutter & Blau, 2013).

Various advocacy implementation guides and assessment manuals focus on variables such as the *significance of an advocacy issue*, *CSO’s adherence to formalized strategy*, and the inevitability of *wide acceptance of the issue by the population* for advocacy success. In the Georgian context, the first two variables are linked to CSOs’ “motivational effect” and “theory of change” to start an organization and/or initiate an advocacy campaign, while the latter differentiates population segments, such as beneficiaries, decision makers, counterparts, wider constituents, etc. In order to address an issue, CSOs have to ensure that the organization, network, or coalition is accepted by those segments and activates leverages that widely promote the issue of concern (ICCO, 2010).

This paper is based on research conducted in 2015-2016, during which up to 30 Georgian CSOs and informal civic groups of a large spectrum were interviewed. It should be noted that informal civic groups were not the focus of this paper. The CSO part of the research focuses on organizations that have been conducting policy advocacy for at least ten years. The research considers existing evaluation methodologies to be of a limited nature. Advocacy outcomes may be dependent not only on an organization’s capacity to conduct a campaign, or on the wide public acknowledgment of the acuteness of an issue, but also on other factors that construct the milieu of advocacy to a greater or lesser extent. The impact factors reviewed in this article are: a) state and political conditions; b) the impact of wide acceptance of an advocacy issue; and c) the “motivational effect” and “theory of change” of CSOs to initiate an organization and/or policy advocacy.

## Research Methodology

### Theoretical Basis

The research conducted in 2015-2016 examines various global theoretical frameworks, which both explain and define the existence and maintenance of balance in society with regard to state-people relations. The most common theoretical analyses include, but are not limited to, the “tyranny of the majority”, “open society”, and “deliberative democracy” frameworks. The theoretical literature also elaborates on the origins of civil society, both in the West and post-Soviet environment, and on the factors that underline the dissimilar actions of contemporary civil societies in different parts of the world. Special attention is given to inter-society relations, as these are defined by Georgian social capital, and the outcomes of those relations with regard to public participation.

This research evaluates the importance of “localization” of public policies and analyzes the mechanisms and approaches used by society to influence them. The difference in behaviors of societies with different historical experience is analyzed, highlighting a wide spectrum of civil society activism, such as street actions, civic monitoring, and participatory budgeting. Special focus is devoted to civic advocacy, as an active process through which citizens try to influence public policies or implement social change.

### Technical Approach

During the research, more than 20 methodologies for the evaluation and assessment of advocacy and the political environment were examined and analyzed. As a result, taking into consideration research needs, one universal approach was developed to assess both advocacy and the political environment. The assessment of various methodologies and approaches has revealed that the process of civic advocacy and its outcomes are mainly evaluated through four main dimensions: a) the advocacy capacity of the organization; b) advocacy tactics; c) the funding sources of the campaign, and d) the advocacy campaign outcome. With regard to advocacy outcomes, in addition to a specific change in policy, contemporary sources underline a “shift in social norms” as an imperative condition for successful advocacy. The political environment that accompanied a particular campaign was also evaluated in order to consider additional factors influencing the success or failure of a particular advocacy campaign.

The main target of the research was up to 30 civil society organizations and informal civic groups, though these groups were not the focus of the research, from Tbilisi and other regions of Georgia, which were selected based on formalized criteria. Information was collected through in-depth interviews, based on the above four-component framework. For research purposes, some of the four components mentioned above were split into sub-categories, which were evaluated based on a 1-5 grading system, where 1 was the lowest and 5 the highest score. The sub-categories were later averaged in order to get a single score for each of the four categories. The final scores were also assessed using a 1-5 grading system, where 1 was the lowest and 5 the highest score.

The score for the *political environment* variable is an average of the following sub-categories: a) basic guarantees of freedom (violation of constitutional and other rights) from improper interference in an organization’s work, etc.); b) acknowledgement of the issue by decision makers; c) acceptability of decision makers during advocacy; d) change in the government’s attitude as a result of advocacy; and e) access to public information.

The score for the *wide acknowledgment of an advocacy issue* variable derives from concrete examples, stories, or other evidence, as acknowledged/presented by individual CSOs. Response categories varied from “vague evidence” to “clear, quantitative evidence”, based on a 1-5 grading system. Factors associated with CSOs’ efforts to widely promote an advocacy issue, such as creating alliances, strengthening the base of support, messaging, media involvement, maintenance of the issue on the agenda, awareness raising and/or involvement of beneficiaries in advocacy, etc., were evaluated separately, as sub-categories, based on a 1-5 grading system.

*Motivational effects* and *theory of change* were evaluated separately and averaged into a single score, based on a 1-5 grading system. The motivational effects of forming a civil society organization were scored in four main categories (ascending): a) founded by donor; b) accumulated knowledge and experience gained through a donor; c) convergence in professionalism and donor support; and d) informal civic groups of active citizens as part of the oppositional culture. A CSO would score lowest for theory of change when it was unable to elaborate on political or social change planned within the frames of a particular campaign, and highest when an organization had a well-thought-out and clear vision of its long-term goals and the strategies to be used in order to achieve particular policy change.

For research purposes, *advocacy outcome* was evaluated based on the Advocacy Outcome Categories in Annie E. Casey’s “Guide to Measuring Advocacy and Policy” (2008), which includes five variables: *shift in social norms*, *strengthening alliances*, *strengthening base of support*, *improved policies*, and *advocacy effect*. Each of these variables was split into sub-variables and evaluated individually based on a 1-5

grading system, and were then averaged to derive a single score for each of the five variables. The average of the *shift in social norms, strengthening alliances, strengthening base of support, improved policies, and advocacy effect* variables represents the score for “advocacy outcome” for individual organizations.

### The Non-Governmental Sector and the State

Identifying, evaluating, and understanding nonprofit-government relationships are “important to help meet the challenges confronting both rich and poor countries” (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 1999, cited by Brinkerhoff, 2002). Nevertheless, these relationships are still largely unexplored, and there are no generally accepted concepts, models, theories, or paradigms for research (Gidron, Kramer, & Salmon 1992). At the same time, there is wide recognition that “political systems... are important determinants of both the character of civil society and of the uses to which whatever social capital exists might be put” (Foley & Edwards, 1996, cited in Sander, 2015).

Taking into consideration the fact that “public policy includes the laws, regulations, programs, and practices of government that meet social needs and problems and disburse public funds” (W.K. Kellogg Foundation, 2008), and that “civic advocacy is an attempt to inform or influence local, state, or federal decision making” (Weiss, 2007, cited in McCracken, 2010), taking a deeper look into the governance landscape will explain the connections and linkages between the two sectors, and emphasize their interrelationships. In addition, moving beyond stereotypes and simplified prescriptions is required to enhance understanding of how governments and nonprofits interact, and whether their interactions provide responsive, accountable and efficient solutions to societal problems that no single sector can address independently (Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff, 2002).

Beginning in the 1990s, since the establishment of the third sector, civil society organizations, with support of international partners, have worked for improvement of an “enabling environment” for civil society. Experts outline that despite minor shortcomings, the environment is traditionally rather attractive. Legislative and regulatory acts aimed at supporting civil society have been developed and improved for many years and this process continues.

Registration of nonprofit, non-commercial legal entities<sup>1</sup> in Georgia is an easy and non-bureaucratic process. No administrative barriers exist for their functioning. Studies show that the political and institutional conditions for the increased role of the third sector in public policy dialogue are generally supportive. Civil society organizations currently function without interference from the state (including tax authorities), irrespective of their scope of activities, declared views, or political preferences.

The principles of civil society participation<sup>2</sup> in local self-governance are quite democratic. Meetings of local councils are open, the population has a right to request public information, to get information on draft legislation and participate in their review, to request local council meetings, to file petitions, etc. Further, in order to maintain financial independence, Georgian CSOs are not prohibited from conducting commercial/economic activities. However, if gaining a profit, they are taxed in the same way as businesses.

In 2012-2015, important steps were made to diversify the funding of CSOs and to support their working relations. In 2013, changes to the tax code were enforced, making CSOs exempt from profit tax in the case of non-monetary contributions. In December 2015, the Law on Volunteering was adopted that aimed

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<sup>1</sup> Official legal status of civil society organizations in Georgia.

<sup>2</sup> Regulated by the Organic Law on Local Government and the Law on the Capital of Georgia-Tbilisi.

at the development of volunteerism in Georgia. It defined the status of volunteers and regulated working relations between volunteers and employers, as well as defining employers' responsibilities.

In addition, beginning in 2012, legislative changes were enacted that allowed state organizations to give grants to CSOs. To date, only the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs, and the Central Election Commission have used this opportunity. For example, in 2013 the Ministry of Sports and Youth Affairs allocated GEL 300,000 (USD 160,000) for a grant program. In 2014, this figure rose to GEL 1,200,000 (USD 645,000). The law also indicates that this process needs to be localized, which means giving grant-issuing authority to local governments as well.

According to the EU Civic Engagement Guide (2014-2017), many CSOs refrain from participating in state grant programs because of a fear of losing independence in their activities and/or damaging public perception of their independence (EU 2014). Nevertheless, almost one third of the organizations interviewed within the frames of this research have received state grants or provide permanent or temporary services to the state, which means getting state funding in various forms (e.g., voucher system, grants, or direct funding).

There are many cases in which representatives of CSOs in the region have become involved in the work of local government commissions and councils. In general, these structures are established as a result of CSO's advocacy for the purpose of providing social services. In some cases, CSOs successfully participate and have a voice in those governmental bodies, but sometimes they just formally present. For example, as a result of the activities of CSOs operating in Marneuli, one representative of a CSO, Democratic Women of Marneuli, became a member of the Social Service Commission of the Municipality. However, according to the organization's representative, the commission has not yet agreed on an action plan and joint activities have not yet started. Another CSO, Young Economists Association, operating in western Georgia, had a different experience in this respect. In 2007-2012, representatives of the organization actively participated in the sectoral commissions of the local municipality and gained success in both the fair distribution of social assistance and the development of the Kutaisi municipal budget.

It is clear that the Georgian legal environment provides opportunities to both individual citizens and CSOs to get involved in the policy formation process. However, experts identify several shortfalls in the legal framework that hinders better activation of civil society and the development of alternative sources of finance. In particular,

- Despite the existence of the main principles that condition civil society's involvement in decision making, detailed legal mechanisms, such as forms and procedures for civil engagement or alternative mechanisms of participation, do not exist.
- Despite certain efforts to decentralize local government (based on the new 2014 Local Government Code), more authority should still be given to the regions of Georgia and their municipalities (local governments). Experts also consider greater financial independence to be important.
- Lack of legal mechanisms encouraging philanthropy has a negative impact on cooperation between the nongovernmental sector and businesses.
- The lack of certain tax benefits on expenses of employers related to the engagement of volunteers (e.g. transportation and accommodation) has a negative financial impact on CSOs.

Beyond the attractive “enabling environment”, the relationship between the state and the third sector is quite complex.

Established in the 1990s, the so-called non-governmental sector was “alien” for the state and thus posed many questions. In the initial stages, the state did not pay attention to these organizations, but at the beginning of the 2000s, several attempts were made to control money coming into the country through development assistance. These attempts were opposed by civil society itself and, with donors’ support, CSOs successfully advocated and lobbied against them.

One of the examples of such a success is the campaign against efforts to limit the civil sector that was conducted in 2001-2004. In this period, the government made several attempts to limit the civil sector’s activities via legislative mechanisms. Among those was a 2001 draft law of the Ministry of Finance that proposed that donor grants aimed at civil society development should be disbursed through the state treasury, a move which would have given the government the possibility of having full control over donor money. Even more alarming was the draft law of the Ministry of Security dated 18 February 2003 on “Termination, Liquidation and Abolishment of Extremist Organizations’ Activities Controlled from Abroad,” according to which the list of “activities controlled from abroad” included organizations that received funding from foreign donors or international organizations. Therefore, in the wording of that draft legislation, any type of CSO could be considered a terrorist organization.

Despite this, the vast majority of surveyed organizations acknowledged they have never experienced pressure or illegal interference in their work from the government, including tax authorities. Certain cases are mentioned when “interference” was made not institutionally but through individual and verbal communication with organizations’ founders. One such case occurred in the Autonomous Republic of Adjara, under the leadership of Aslan Abashidze in 2003. At that time, the establishment of a CSO required a court decision and the founder of a CSO First Step operating in Batumi (in Adjara) recalls the skepticism of a judge who suspected that the organization was being founded for the purpose of espionage on the territory of Georgia. The Ozurgeti case is also noteworthy (1990-2002), when, after open disclosure of corruption by students of the Ozurgeti “Leaders School”, the local government directly confronted the youth and the CSO had to get involved to settle the issue.

According to the surveyed organizations, the state’s attitude towards the sector has certain dynamics, in particular,

- In the 1990s, the state’s attitude was neutral or positive, supposedly because of the fact that, on the one hand, the state was busy with post-independence activities and, on the other, the sector was involved in humanitarian assistance, or filled an economic niche that could not be filled by the state.
- At the post-development stage (at the beginning of the 2000s) the sector was purposefully referred to as “grant-eaters.” Although CSO representatives acknowledged certain mistakes of the sector, they unambiguously state that labeling them “grant-eaters” was caused by the state’s lack of awareness about the sector’s activities, on the one hand, and their intention to discredit an “oppositional sector” on the other.
- In 2003-2012, during the United National Movement’s governance, the government did not pressure the sector. However, it almost fully suppressed the sector’s voice through media control. According to the Executive Director of a CSO working on elections and

human rights issues, 2003-2004 were years of silence. Any kind of constructive criticism from CSOs was a problem, because they could not reach out to people. A representative of another CSO, that usually lobbies for improvement of the legislative environment for the third sector, described the United National Movement as “monolithic”, where if the issue was politically acceptable, the issue was promptly addressed. The government of that period openly acknowledged the importance of the sector, but would discredit its critical representatives. This was not done in public, but with donors and international organizations, attempting to assure them that the third sector was not impartial. In 2004-2007, the policy of donors in relation to the sector also changed; an outflow of the CSOs cadre to the public sector and a decrease of donor funding had an impact on the government’s attitude towards the sector. According to organizations working on policy advocacy, the government did not respond to any CSO initiatives during 2007-2012.

- The government that came into power in 2012 actively cooperated with the sector in the initial stages. However, after some time the “open door” was closed. Respondents characterize the government of 2012-2016 as “reactive and afraid of new initiatives.” Currently, the term “grant-eaters” is no longer used, nor has the practice of discrediting the sector with international organizations continued. The media is also open for the civil sector. However, with an aim of discrediting the sector, the government attempts to label them as “against religion” or “the sector protecting the rights solely of sexual minorities.”<sup>3</sup>

The majority of CSOs state that in recent years the sector, intentionally or unintentionally, has gained the image of a political actor. This in itself is linked with increased public recognition of the sector through the media. Despite the fact that the majority of government officials publicly acknowledge the importance of the civil sector, its active representatives and leaders are often criticized and blamed for only supporting oppositional views (and oppositional political parties). Therefore, the government’s rhetoric has today replaced “opposition” with the “civil sector”. Gross interference is not observed. However, the sector perceives public criticism as attack and pressure. This is reflected in both the general dissatisfaction towards the sector observed in the speeches of former Prime Minister Ivanishvili, who openly tried to discredit active leaders of the sector, and the periodic campaigns of the ruling party’s active supporters, who try to accuse the sector of unfounded financial manipulations. This has a negative impact on citizens, irrespective of their loyalty to or distrust in the government.

In terms of relations with the state, the organizations mention the following important conditions that support or hinder policy advocacy.

- In general, there has been noncompliance with policy objectives and a lack of statesmanship among government officials. Both the existence and the non-existence of a clear political agenda pose problems for the process of policy advocacy.
- There has been a constant changing of the political environment making it necessary for CSOs to make political choices during political processes or changes. This poses special problems for organizations working on social issues that do not want to either take sides in the case of opposing forces or to make political choices. In this case, organizations have to modify their work and spend energy on issues that lie beyond addressing social problems.

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<sup>3</sup> From an interview with CSO International Foundation for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), February 2016.

- There have been instances of inflexible “monolithic teams,” a general lack of teams, and an inability to make decisions pose problems for the process of policy advocacy.
- There have been issues related to the competence of the government. According to CSOs, the process of policy advocacy requires explanation and justification of basic thematic issues. Therefore, more time is often spent on the education of government officials than on solving the issue at hand or satisfying beneficiaries. This is true for a wide spectrum of issues ranging from human rights to the concepts of volunteering and environmental protection. In situations of insufficient competence, the government chooses either a defensive position or is confrontational and aggressive towards the CSO in order to mask its incompetence.
- There have been problems associated with institutional cooperation. In policy advocacy there is a necessity for personal contacts to facilitate access to both resources and government representatives. In addition, cooperation with the government is often directly linked to the reputation of an organization’s leader. The higher the level of confidence in a CSO’s leadership (especially on a local level), the greater are the chances for successful cooperation.
- Some CSOs have had difficulties in identifying the target, timing, situation, and issue in the right way and have not always found the ability to communicate this in order to assure decision makers of the benefits of an issue, in both general and political terms.




Figure 1 Political Environment – Advocacy Outcome Relations, below shows the relationship of political environment to advocacy outcomes for 20 individual CSOs. The horizontal axis represents notation keys for the organizations’ titles (capital letters), while the vertical axis shows the scores for a) advocacy outcome and b) political environment during a particular advocacy campaign, as assessed by individual CSOs.

The vast majority of surveyed organizations acknowledged that despite uneven support/acceptance by the government, they have never encountered problems on political grounds and that it was possible to find common interests with every government and achieve success in policy advocacy. The research thus

emphasized that, despite the complex and chaotic political processes over the last 20 years, the indicator of political environment in Georgia's context has a lesser impact on overall advocacy outcomes.

### **Wide Public Acknowledgement of Advocacy Issues**

The evaluation criteria of international experts and researchers attach significant importance to the acknowledgement of an issue of concern by the wider public. This is generally related to building relationships, which is intrinsic to any successful advocacy effort and should commence at an early stage. On the other hand, the credibility of the organization, partnership, or coalition that is advocating change is likely to be a key factor in its success (Buckley, 2014). It is generally considered that if an organization does not put significant effort into this, positive changes of public policy do not occur. In order to achieve this, CSOs are expected to form and *strengthen alliances* for presenting common messages and pursuing common goals, as well as *strengthening their base of support* (Organizational Research Service, 2008).

In order to strengthen alliances, CSOs need to increase the number of partners supporting an issue and enhance the level of collaboration, share priorities and goals, and create strategic alliances with important partners (including bipartisan alliances and unlikely allies). Strengthened alliances are more of a structural change in community and institutional relationships at every level of the advocacy process. It is accepted that these structural changes in community and institutional relationships and alliances are essential forces for presenting common messages, pursuing common goals, enforcing policy changes and insuring the protection of policy "wins" in the event that they are threatened (Organizational Research Service, 2008).

In order to *strengthen the base of support*, CSOs are expected to gain grassroots, leadership, and institutional support for particular policy changes to ensure cultural and societal engagement, including civic participation and activism; "allied voices" among informal and formal groups; the coalescence of dissimilar interest groups; actions of opinion-leader champions and positive media attention. It also requires policy analyses, debate and the development of policy impact statements (Organizational Research Service, 2008).

The above steps, taken either separately or concurrently to get a positive advocacy outcome, are in agreement with the Coalition theory as developed by Paul Sabatier and Hank Jenkins-Smith (cited in Stachowiak, n.d.). The theory is commonly known as the Advocacy Coalition Framework and proposes that individuals should have core beliefs about policy areas, acknowledge the critical nature of a problem, and explore its causes. In addition, society should have an ability to solve problems and find solutions for addressing them. Advocates who operate on the basis of this theory believe that policy change happens through coordinated activity among individuals with the same core policy beliefs (Sabatier & Weible, 2014).

According to various cross-national surveys, such as USAID's NGO Sustainability Index, the World Values Survey, and other cross-European attitude polls, donor-driven CSOs and networks do not work, or are operational only within the framework of a particular project. In addition, critics emphasize the general inability of Georgian CSOs to cooperate with each other as well as with other interested parties.

The majority of surveyed organizations admit that because of the specific history of establishment- and donor-dependence, routine cooperation is rather challenging—CSOs compete over both funding and authority. All of the surveyed organizations cooperate with, or are members of, local or international thematic civic networks or platforms. This cooperation at most covers common forums and the sharing of experience, but there are also cases where local or international partners get involved in advocacy. It

should also be mentioned that if in the past CSOs were often criticized for a lack of cooperation within the sector, today the majority of experienced CSOs seek advocacy partners and cooperate on an issue basis with organizations having different mandates. According to the CSOs, these are often cases when organizations unite together not to solve, but stand against or protest an issue.

Another case is those CSOs that declare that their advocacy efforts do not require cooperation, because they work to create knowledge (e.g., through surveys and information provided by the population) and promote the issue through negotiations and lobbying. As a general rule, Georgian CSOs are successful in developing formalized advocacy strategies, holding surveys, mapping decision makers and cooperating with them, developing policy options, identifying and assisting beneficiaries, pursuing lawsuits and lobbying. CSOs raise awareness and educate their beneficiaries, and use them as a source of evidence and information; however, in advocacy they act unilaterally, on behalf of the population, and almost never involve them in advocacy in classical ways of involvement, such as forms of collective action, media campaigns, public speeches, collecting signatures and filing petitions, street actions, etc.

The survey revealed a couple of organizations who appeared to be successful in creating informal alliances with opinion leaders or political parties. Nevertheless, there are no cases among the surveyed organizations where institutions changed their attitudes as a result of CSOs' efforts, shared a social mission, or put effort into a common approach.




Figure 2 (Issue Acceptance – Advocacy Outcome Relationship) above shows the relationship of wide acceptance of an issue to advocacy outcomes for 20 individual CSOs. The horizontal axis represents notation keys for organizations' titles (capital letters), while the vertical axis shows scores for a) advocacy outcomes and b) wide acceptance of an issue for a particular advocacy campaign related to an individual CSO.

Media relations are also challenging. According to CSOs, the sector is less popular in terms of media attention, therefore information about CSO activities and achievements are hardly heard by the population. Leaders of CSOs working on domestic and international politics or economic issues take part in national television talk shows, but the population sees them as individual experts unassociated with a particular sector. CSOs note that due to extreme politicization of the media they are often forced to go

beyond the CSOs' mandate and comment on any political topic since failure to do so places them at risk of falling out of the media's attention.

Despite uneven score results for examples and evidence of change in attitudes and wider acceptance of an issue by the community, at both the beneficiaries' and decision makers' level and at any stage of advocacy, the research revealed that in Georgia's context wide acknowledgement of an issue is a lesser factor in advocacy outcomes.

### **Initiation of an Organization – Theory of Change**

Because Georgian society in the 1990s had no information on civil society as a phenomenon, the first NGOs were established and developed by donors through their advice, encouragement and support. There were many organizations in Georgia initiated in this way in the 1990s that implemented a couple of small projects, but which subsequently closed after the donor programs ended. Nevertheless, there are several strong organizations in the sector that remained devoted to their social mission and developed despite their donors' exit and the resulting gap in institutional or financial support. Since then, various types of civil society organizations have gradually entered the sector. As a general rule, involvement with the third sector is closely related to both the initial motivation to initiate an organization and the existence of the theory of change among organizations' founders.

The motivational effects of forming a civil society organization vary and can be categorized into three identifiable conditional groupings.

#### **1) Established by donor**

The number of organizations established directly by donors is low. The establishment of such organizations was conditioned by the intention to have a prompt positive impact on a concrete sector of public policy. In 1996, for example, USAID established the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) for the improvement of election systems and processes in Georgia. Later, in 2006, the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF) established a secretariat (headquarters) for the Harm Reduction Network aimed at pulling together all organizations working on drug policy. The motivation for the latter, according to the donor, was that competition and lack of coordination had prevented individual organizations from achieving desired results. The Eurasia Partnership Foundation<sup>4</sup> also belongs to the category of donor-established organizations. In 1996, it was initially established as the South Caucasus branch of the U.S. non-for-profit organization the Eurasia Foundation and in 2007 was localized and developed as a local CSO. The purpose of the establishment of the Eurasia Foundation in Georgia was to provide services to USAID in terms of proper distribution of grant resources for the development of civil society in the South Caucasus.

#### **2) Accumulated knowledge and gained experience through donors**

There are cases in which CSOs were established as a result of grant competitions announced by a donor. Organizations included in this category were initiated to satisfy needs of donors' programs, where the founders utilized resources that became available through grants. There are instances here where the issue of public policy concern was either unknown by the founders or did not fall under their scope of interest before the donor's call. Nevertheless, after the project's completion better informed, more competent and better motivated people (i.e., organization members) continued activities in the same direction once they had become personally "involved" in the lives of their beneficiaries.

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<sup>4</sup> In 2016, the Eurasia Partnership Foundation was renamed the Europe Foundation.

The CSO Step Forward initiative operating in Batumi falls under this category. The CSO is staffed with doctors and social workers and nowadays is one of the leading organizations in the Autonomous Republic of Adjara working on the problem of children with hearing impairments. The CSO was founded in 2003 with the advice and institutional support of a donor organization that was looking for a local partner in the region in order to implement a project supporting IDPs. This cooperation had a motivational effect not only for the establishment of an organization, but also for further extending its activities in the direction familiar to the organization's members. Supporting persons with hearing impairments is the mandate of the organization today and represents its unique, exclusive theme.

There are many instances in which members of today's organizations were, in various forms, involved with humanitarian or other donor-supported, quasi-state programs in the 1990s and who, as a group, subsequently decided to act in the format of an organization to better explore their professional expertise. One example is the CSO Biliki, the founders of which identified certain issues while working in Gori city government, through which a French donor organization had implemented a humanitarian assistance program. The department of the city government was tasked to identify homeless and orphaned children, register them, and allocate and distribute humanitarian assistance. During the program's implementation, the organization's founders realized the true nature and scale of the problem of vulnerable children. Therefore, after the humanitarian assistance program was formally over, a group of people who had participated in the program inherited the registered children. This is a case in which, despite an initial total lack of awareness of the issue, information served as a motivational effect for the establishment of a CSO and the continuation of activities in this direction. Today, in addition to funding secured through donors' calls, this organization provides services to the state in the form of operating and maintaining daycare centers and family-type houses for children from vulnerable families and those included in the state protection program in Shida Kartli.

### 3) Convergence in professionalism and donor support

There are many cases when a CSO's establishment and development was made possible through donors' financial resources, but the organizational mandate was not conditioned by the donor and was rather a result of the founder's professional experience. In such cases, the motivational effect for professionals of public or social policy to establish an organization was utilizing their individual experience and knowledge, which became possible through donor support.

An example of the above is the Union of Young Teachers, which was established in Ozurgeti in 1996 based on the common professional interest and professionalism of its founders. The organization started its activities in the form of an informal union, the Club of Young Teachers, with the aim of holding discussions and dialogues regarding the challenges facing the education system and proving an opportunity for schools to respond to them. Despite their lack of finances, the team of professionals also initiated the Club of Scientists and their open discussions got the attention of the Ozurgeti community and the media. Only later did the founders become aware that there was a donor assistance opportunity in Georgia for supporting civil society development, so they drafted their first grant proposal and received funding for the teachers' newspaper, *Step*.

Another CSO, the Economic Policy Research Center (EPRC), founded in 2002, was established with the belief that political change should have an analytical basis. The founders of the organization had experience working on the reforms package in the Anti-Corruption Council of Georgia and in state modernization projects. Upon leaving the Anti-Corruption Council, the group of young, western-educated

professionals established an organization to create evidence-based knowledge (Personal interview with Nino Evgenidze, EPRC Executive Director. February 2016).

The following examples outline successful cases of organizations that had been established in the 1990s and that managed to keep their path and maintain a social mission over the years, despite uneven availability of funding.

### **The Greens.**

This group was quite an active political union in the 1990s, and the Greens' Movement affiliated with it, created ground for the start of several CSOs. Experience gained in the political union and movement, as well as the desire to be distanced from politics and implement a social mission, played an important role in the establishment of the Elkana and Green Alternative organizations.

The founders of Elkana, established in 1994, state that the main motivational effect for the start of their organization was the belief that Georgia's future was in agriculture, in particular biological agriculture. However, when going into the field, the founders encountered many problems that, at that stage, made it impossible to work on biological farming. They thus temporarily postponed this direction and started to assist the rural population. They visited rural areas, studied their needs and, together with farmers, analyzed the ways and possibilities of addressing existing problems. Initially, the organization provided services to farmers and peasants, largely through legal consultations and modernization advice. At the present time, Elkana provides fee-based services and runs a pilot bio-farm. The organization also conducts policy advocacy to support the development of bio-agriculture.

The Association Green Alternative, established in 2000, was initiated by four leading campaigners of the Greens' Movement in order to avoid the political impact on the Greens' Party. After completing free organizational development courses, which were popular in Georgia in the 1990s, and winning a donor grant, their CSO was established to pursue new ideas and opportunities in the sphere of environmental protection. From the date of establishment, the organization has monitored the activities of international financial institutions in Georgia. It also works on the issues of biodiversity, energy, climate change and poverty elimination and considers that the "protection of the environment equals development, as such" (Personal interview with Ketevan Gujaraidze, Green Alternative, Executive Director, March 2016).

Very rare but important exceptions are those organizations whose founders came together because of their innovative ideas for the country and decided to start a CSO. As a result of identifying concrete needs for the country, they did not follow donors' directives, but suggested their own themes and programs. There were moments when financial crises (e.g., 1996-1998 and 2004-2007) forced the organizations to dissolve, and their founders had to find other occupations in order to survive. Nevertheless, they remained loyal to their social mission and ultimately not only "survived" but also substantially developed.

The Civil Society Institute (CSI) belongs to the above category. The organization was founded by lawyers in the period when no legislative body even existed in Georgia. The founders of the organization worked in the Department of Economic Reforms, where, because of the non-existence of parliament, laws were often developed in the form of decrees and statutes. The terms and contents related to institutions, such as limited liability company (LTD) and joint stock company were developed in that period. Based on the experience gained in that capacity, in 1994 the group of lawyers established Georgia's Economic Reforms and Development Center based of the Business Law Department. In 1995, the center separated from the department and in 1996 was registered as Georgia's Business Law Center. The organization commenced

operations in an environment where an operational legal framework did not exist. In 2002, because of the substantial expansion of the scope of the organization and the need for management optimization, the CSO's Board developed a one-year plan for reorganization. As a result of this, beginning on 25 June 2003, the Business Law Center was transferred into the Civil Society Institute. Up until now, this is the only organization that works on improvement of the "enabling environment" of the civil sector and gains important outcomes.

### **Informal civic groups of active citizens.**

Unions of active people interested in a particular theme belong to this category. These unions represent the oppositional culture of Georgia. For years, such unions have been getting together to advocate certain public policy issues, and this is what caused their unification and the formation of organizations. These groups are outside the scope of this paper.

*Theory of change* is defined as a "research base or roadmap of a belief system (e.g. assumptions, "best practices", experience, etc.) and strategies to provide a clear expression of the relationship between action and desired results" (Organizational Research Services, n. d). This in itself requires comprehension of a social mission and concrete, thoughtful objectives to make positive contributions to the lives of people or communities. Various social scientists have defined and summarized different theories of change, which aids analysis and the construction of logical models for advocacy campaigns and policy change efforts.

The advocacy activities of Georgian CSOs, intentionally or unintentionally, utilize measures and leverages that have been defined by theory of change scholars. We see cases where, though random, important changes in public policy and political institutions, where this has happened given the right conditions. This coincides with the large leaps theory of Baumgartner and Jones (1983), according to which "changes can happen in sudden large bursts that represent significant departures from the past, as opposed to small incremental changes that usually do not radically change the status quo."

Most of the CSOs interviewed regularly use opportunities that arise, or policy windows, which most of the time fall on pre-election periods in Georgia. The policy window theory by John Kingdon (1985) is a classic theory of agenda setting, which states that the way problems are defined, makes a difference in whether and where they are placed on the agenda. In the case of Georgia, based on the essence of a problem, Georgian CSOs often *identify* and *raise* issues, or *get involved* with processes that have an impact on solving a relevant problem at a certain moment in time.

Most of the advocacy campaigns examined are based on a combination of theories of change, such as power politics and grassroots or community organizing. It is worth mentioning that despite the fact that donor-driven CSOs are expected to be more community organizing, they tend to better utilize power politics theory. Grassroots or community organizing theory views power as changeable and dynamic, not something held exclusively by elites. They believe groups can create power by taking mutual action to achieve social change. This approach assumes that power exists when people cooperate, it can be shifted through actions and events; it requires building the capacity of those affected and organizing efforts should reflect the wishes of the people directly affected by the problem (Alinsky, 1971, as cited in Stachowiak, n. d.). On the other hand, C. W. Mills' power politics implies that in order to achieve results, CSOs use strategies that include relationship development and communication with those who have influence. In this case, advocacy efforts are focused on the few, not the many and it is critical to identify who has influence related to the specific policy issue or area being addressed and to develop relationships with them (Mills, 1956, as cited in Stachowiak, n. d.).

On the way to achieving social objectives, theories of change frameworks are highly distinct for individual organizations. Therefore, organizations were assessed in terms of having a clear vision of what they want to achieve as result of their activities, what their long-term goals were, and what the unique needs and priorities of people or the community were. In general, while posing questions on the theory of change, the leaders of the surveyed organizations named extracts of mission statements and told stories about implemented projects, but did not elaborate on the theory of change as such. However, it should be mentioned that looking into the policy advocacy process in more detail, it becomes clear that the majority of surveyed organizations have a clear vision of what they want to achieve or change.

According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), CSOs' advocacy messaging is also rather weak and insufficiently used for supporting the development of different preferences among the community, based on the ways in which options are presented or framed. Organizations' mission statements (similar to campaign materials) are developed as a result of donors' requirements/assistance, and cases in which a CSO is able to prove that their messaging/materials reached their audience and contributed to advocacy success are rare. The majority of these mission statements are long and general, and organizational representatives can hardly recall them, despite their being publicized through websites and print materials. Many mission statements include phrases such as democracy development, improvement of human rights conditions in Georgia, awareness raising and protection of rights, achievement of positive and sustainable changes, elimination of marginalization, poverty and injustice, to list only a few. It is noteworthy that the mission statements of organizations that focus on public policy changes tend to be vaguer than those aiming at social change. The latter are better at focusing on their specific organization's mandate, such as "assist all children, irrespective of religion and ethnicity in order to ensure their psychosocial and educational support" as in the case of Biliki, "development of rural areas" espoused by CIVITAS Georgia, and "we hear each other" stated by Step Forward, the CSO working on rehabilitation of children with hearing impairments. Normally, both mission statements and "theories of change" include people, raising awareness, development, capacity building, empowerment, engagement, mobilization, etc.

Organizations in both Tbilisi and the regions of Georgia have in place well-developed advocacy strategies in order to solve critical problems through advocacy. Nevertheless, they are generally of a short-term nature and are developed for a particular project, due to donor requirements. Advocacy processes rarely follow the developed strategic plans, or apply acknowledged stages and norms of advocacy. However, this does not impede organizations from identifying beneficiaries and decision makers, organizing necessary meetings with them and implementing other programmatic activities. In addition, it is noteworthy that positive changes as a result of policy advocacy have been achieved through both multi-year targeted efforts and ad hoc initiatives. The research identified several cases when advocacy campaigns started and finished along with a particular donor-funded project. In such cases, because of funding or institutional challenges, organizations may have overlooked the relevant moment or people for solving the problem or having a positive impact on the advocacy outcome. Nevertheless, the majority of surveyed organizations successfully manage to keep the issue on the agenda using various methods. They apply both intellectual (constant monitoring) and financial mechanisms (inclusion of the advocacy issue as small component in various projects), which ensures the continuation of policy advocacy. The research identified that long-term advocacy success is conditioned not by the existence of a long-term strategy, which is often not present and/or followed by CSOs, but rather by constantly maintaining the issue on the agenda, meaning closely watching and following all conditions or changes taking place around the issue. This is closely related to the motivational effect to initiate an organization and the existence of theory of change, which is also related to an organization's advocacy outcomes. Organizations that were better able to maintain the issue on the agenda have better advocacy outcomes.




Figure 3 (Maintaining Agenda – Advocacy Outcome Relations) above shows the relationship of maintaining the agenda to advocacy outcomes for 20 individual CSOs. The horizontal axis represents notation keys for organizations’ titles (capital letters), while the vertical axis shows scores for a) advocacy outcome and b) wide acceptance of the issue for a particular advocacy campaign, related to an individual CSO. The same is true for motivational effect and theory of change: CSOs who have higher scores for motivation/theory of change have better advocacy outcomes




Figure 4 (Motivation/Theory of Change - Advocacy Outcomes relation) below shows the relationship of motivation/theory of change to advocacy outcomes for 20 individual CSOs. The horizontal axis represents notation keys for organizations’ titles (capital letters), while the vertical axis shows scores for a) advocacy outcome and b) averaged motivation/theory of change, evaluated on a 1-5 grading system, for individual CSOs.

Now, after more than 20 years of effort, strong and experienced CSOs pose two questions. The first is what are the successes of the sector in terms of policy advocacy, changing social welfare and social norms? This is followed by what are the actual changes made by the sector beyond achieving short-term results and/or implementation of certain programmatic logical frameworks and indicators that, according to CSOs, are of a temporary nature?

The research conducted in 2015-2016 assumed that the traditional assessment of policy advocacy outcomes was fragmented and, therefore, did not fully define the milieu affecting the success or failure of advocacy campaigns. The research thus considered that advocacy outcomes may be dependent not only on an organization's capacity to conduct a campaign, or on wide public acknowledgment of the acuteness of an issue, but also on other factors that create a setting for, or accompany, the advocacy process. These factors include a) an "enabling environment" for civil society and political conditions; b) wide public acceptance of the advocacy issue; and c) motivational effect and theory of change to establish a CSO and/or initiate the process of advocacy.

The tools and methods used by Georgian CSOs highly depend on the context and cultural setting in which they are operating. Because the "enabling environment" of civil society is rather attractive in Georgia, the research focused on the *political environment* accompanying particular advocacy campaigns. It also focused on the problems that CSOs encounter while working with national and local governments. The research showed that despite the fact that advocacy campaigns in Georgia are implemented in a complex and chaotic political setting, this does not have much impact on advocacy outcomes.

Similar results were drawn in relation to *wide public acceptance of an advocacy issue*, despite the fact that experts and researchers attach much importance to this condition. CSOs accept that routine cooperation is rather challenging, but the majority of them are in coalitions with local or international networks (though these are not sufficiently utilized in advocacy). Nevertheless, if in the past CSOs were often criticized for the lack of cooperation within the sector, today the majority of experienced CSOs seek advocacy partners and cooperate on an issue basis with organizations having a different mandate. Despite the fact that many CSOs are rather successful in creating informal alliances with opinion leaders, developing formalized advocacy strategies, holding surveys, mapping and orchestrating cooperation with decision makers, developing policy options, and assisting beneficiaries, there are cases when CSOs intentionally do not cooperate, never involve beneficiaries into advocacy, act as experts and promote issue through lawsuits, negotiations and lobbying. Media relations are also challenging and are rarely used for advocacy.

### Conclusion

Such varying uneven efforts of CSOs in the promotion of an issue, so that it gains supporters and extends the base of support, resulted in uneven scores for change in attitudes and wide acceptance of an issue by the community, both at the beneficiaries' and decision makers' level at any stage of advocacy. Nevertheless, the research revealed that in the Georgian context, wide acceptance of an issue by the public is a lesser factor in advocacy outcomes.

In contrast to the abovementioned variables, *motivational effect* for initiating an organization and *theory of change* are found to be related to advocacy outcomes. In spite of the fact that during their lifetimes, the surveyed organizations encountered a number of financial or institutional challenges that caused some to stop or suspend their activities, many of them survived and have continued to implement their social mission. The component of motivation has thus naturally appeared in the survey as a decisive factor for an organization's success. This was linked with the existence of theory of change in advocacy, that

includes both a clear advocacy strategy and a reasonable vision of what needs to be achieved as a result of advocacy. Interestingly, despite the commonly accepted understanding of the importance of a well-developed strategy for positive outcomes of advocacy, the research showed that it is not a formalized strategy per se, but rather the constant maintaining of the issue on the agenda that is more related to successful advocacy. This approach to maintaining the issue on the agenda is backed by motivation and existence of theory of change that ensures close observation of the issue in the long-term perspective, targeting activities, and constant communication with interested parties.

Today, after more than 20 years of development, experienced Georgian CSOs act as experts and public defenders at the national level and also individually. Conditioned by their donor-driven origins (in various ways), the sector often does not satisfy the requirements of the classical Tocquevillian theory. The sector is less affected by the political environment than expected; CSOs often advocate issues that are identified and raised by them rather than the people. On the way to achieving long-term and sustainable goals, they face a number of challenges and their advocacy strategies often show inconsistencies with commonly accepted standards. Nevertheless, in terms of achieving advocacy success, Georgian CSOs do act as active citizen units, with a self-imposed responsibility to identify and correct gaps in public policy. CSOs with stronger motives are better at implementing various progressive changes that have a real impact on people and state structures.

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# ***Boko Haram: Diverging Approaches to Fighting Insurgency***

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**Abstract:** *This essay argues that Nigeria's continued democratization is crucial to limiting the appeal of and damage caused by insurgencies such as the Islamist movement commonly known as Boko Haram. The popularity of insurgent groups can be mitigated with an emphasis on good governance measures, particularly those emphasizing local and national government transparency, emphasis on development and education, and strong links with civil society and the public (especially with regard to police and military operations).*

*In achieving the above, the essay analyzes and dissects two key ongoing processes in Nigeria that have sometimes been conflated with each other; namely, the change of presidential administrations in 2015 and the fight against the Boko Haram insurgency based in the country's northeast. It seeks to establish that while the current Buhari administration has launched several relevant successes in fighting the group, some of the key factors allowing for a more successful push against the insurgency in 2015-16 were underway even before the change of administration, in a large part due to pressure from regional and international actors and internal fracturing within the group, itself partly a result of this regional coalition's success. The recent rising of instability again in the Niger Delta demonstrates that dramatic political promises and their implementation may still not be touching on Nigeria's underlying security concerns.*

**Key Words:** Boko Haram, Insurgency, Corruption

## **Introduction**

Nigeria's interrupted but persistent democratic experiment reached an important milestone on 29 May 2015 with the first peaceful transition of power between elected leaders in the country's history, as former general and military dictator Muhammadu Buhari's victory denied Goodluck Jonathan a second full presidential term. The election focused on multiple issues, but the destruction and terror the Boko Haram insurgency had launched across the country up to this period was an overriding security concern at the time. The radical Salafist organization had turned to violence before the Jonathan administration came to office in 2010 upon the death of President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. Nevertheless, the 2011-2015 period saw its ability to cause chaos reach something of a crescendo. At its high point, Boko Haram was estimated to have between 9,000 and 15,000 members of varying degrees of effectiveness and loyalty. The movement is known to conscript unwilling recruits, including children (Amnesty International, 2015; Blanchard, 2016).

A broad consensus exists that the movement rose in part due to the marginalization inhabitants of the underdeveloped northeast corner of the country have experienced (Olojo, 2013; Rosen, 2015; Downie, 2014). The security dimension has also been examined, in particular the heavy-handed approach of

police and security forces in subduing organized violence, often carelessly and at the cost of civilian life (Baker, 2015). However, the intersection of national politics and the differing political strategies of presidents Jonathan and Buhari to resolving and or exacerbating these problems while dealing with the ongoing crisis have not sufficiently been examined in detail outside of political campaigning or editorializing.

This paper seeks to establish the political handling of the group by the Jonathan and Buhari governments during the 2011-16 period. It will first provide a general background of the group's rise, then review the handling of the insurgency by both administrations. It will discuss regional and international involvement in counteracting the group, and the internal dynamics of the group often ignored in larger political analysis.

Assessing the manner in which democratically elected Nigerian leaders approach the Boko Haram problem is a crucial—if only partial—method of assessing the health of Nigerian democracy overall. A democratic leader must balance responsibilities regarding security with respect for human rights, the rule of law, relations with neighbors and patrons, and other political realities. While it is too soon for a complete examination of how the Jonathan and Buhari administrations have juggled these responsibilities with relation to each other, over a year of the Buhari administration's governance allows for some contrast between approaches.

### Review of Literature

Humphreys and others have reviewed the role poverty often plays in war, particularly civil wars (Humphreys, 2002; Cramer 2010). While Nigeria's wealth in oil and natural gas has certainly contributed to organized conflict in the past, it is not as clearly connected to the rise of the Boko Haram conflict as it is to, for example, the revived hostilities occurring in the Niger Delta as of 2016. Nor does Boko Haram have clear political objectives such as separation or reform within the national government (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Insurgencies are a common byproduct of the neoliberal reforms associated with attempts to improve economic efficiency (Humphreys, 2002) but Boko Haram did not result from any such government attempts, at least in an immediate or identifiable way. Consistent marginalization of the northeast region has led to a desperate economic base for the insurgency, however. The economic imbalance is therefore certainly a consideration. Cramer has stressed that links between labor markets and political violence are often not clear (2010). Their relations cannot be examined without reference to other economic activity and indeed other political characteristics altogether. Northeastern instability ultimately cannot be understood without the political, social, cultural, and ethnic context of which this study hopes to provide an outline.

Fearon and Laitin's review of conditions under which insurgencies are likely to form relates directly to the Nigerian experience regarding Boko Haram. "Poverty and slow growth, which favor rebel recruitment and mark financially and bureaucratically weak states, rough terrain, and large populations" is their assessment of such violence-prone states (2003). All of these characteristics pertain to the Nigerian climate in which Boko Haram operates and most are discussed in this essay (a review of population density being addressed more in terms of urban-rural dichotomy in the interests of brevity and direct relevance). The conclusion of that study—that economic considerations allowing a "recruitment base" and creating conditions of poverty are superior indicators than a lack of democratic rights of countries prone to civil war—is an incomplete fit for as large and diverse a country as Nigeria (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). As this study indicates, political and cultural context help explain why insurgencies may rise and

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fall in one area of a country and not another.

Bhavnani also reviews the cycle of scarcity and abundance prevalent in many developing countries. It is questionable whether this dynamic characterizes the northeast region, though Bhavnani correctly identifies it as a historic trend in Nigeria at a national level. Lack of political representation, services, and employment opportunities for certain ethnicities—the Kanuri in this instance—may indeed be a motivating force of insurgency. This model works well for an analysis of insurgency in the Niger Delta, and indeed that is a region Bhavnani focuses on in this study (Bhavnani, 2009).

What are the motives for rebellion? Ballentine and Nitzschke (2009) discuss how objectives can change over time, beginning with “purer” ideological objectives and transforming into campaigns waged in the pursuit of “short-term economic benefits.” Boko Haram has almost certainly struggled to finance itself in recent years, and there is indication it has altered its message in part due to this reality. The loose construction of the group, however, makes it difficult reach any sweeping conclusion on this point. The lack of access to resources has ensured an increasingly predatory and opportunistic relationship against the civilian population of northeast states from the outset of its transformation into a violent insurgency during 2009-2010. Perceived shifts in “mission” (such as the declared affiliation with Islamic State in 2015) have not been inconsistent with an overall jihadi mission, though they have been somewhat dependent on events outside the affected region. Boko Haram's promise of opportunity to young men not realized with the existing order remains a key component of its attraction.

Ardo references Ted Gurr's version of the Relative Deprivation Theory as it relates to the Nigerian north and “Middle Belt”, and to democratic rule since 1999 (Ardo, 2013). Highly relevant to the Boko Haram crisis would appear to be the northern discontent that resulted from unrealistic expectations and promises regarding the effects of democracy on standards of living. A continued study of political promises, strategies, and changes of policy is ultimately important not only when assessing what contributions the failure of the democratic process has had upon the rise of groups like Boko Haram, but also in assessing how a government's success or failure to act against these groups affects the faith of the public in the benefits of democracy. Nigeria, as a country that is perpetually “on the brink” of stable democracy, must therefore be examined in these terms.

In analyzing the ability of insurgents to work partisan divisions within an affected democracy, Hamilton discusses the importance of unity with regard to the Northern Ireland conflict of the 1970s and 1980s (2011). By contrast, the Nigerian situation is rather complex. While political opponents may rarely have been fully opportunistic in their approach to ending the conflict in the northeast, it is fair to say that the attitudes and approaches to insurgency of presidential candidate and outsider Mohammadu Buhari changed substantially with his promotion to president and insider. Characteristic of many violent political groups before them, Boko Haram may not have maximized their ability to manipulate partisan divisions in a state still new to democracy.

Large concludes in her work that the “overriding principle” of a democracy countering insurgency must be “a commitment to uphold and maintain constitutional systems of legal authority” (2005). A state which fails to adhere to this dictum in suppressing insurgencies runs the risk of delegitimizing itself by ignoring the very laws it professes to defend. Particularly in a state like Nigeria, where large corners of the population feel marginalized in regions such as the northeast, this is crucial. The overbearing history of security forces throughout the country requires substantive and consistent attempts to change the professional culture of security with an eye towards establishing the trust and cooperation of the public

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and civil society.

### **Background to Insurgency**

The basis of the group popularly known as Boko Haram as a distinct branch of Nigerian Salafism originated from the preaching of Mohammed Yusuf, a young cleric who became active sometime in the mid-1990s in Maiduguri, the capital city of Borno state. The cleric's followers practiced a rigid interpretation of Sunni Islam with few roots in northeast Nigeria, and its earliest incarnation was dedicated to detachment rather than engagement with society. By 2002, the group began adopting a more adversarial profile, especially with government authorities and law enforcement. In December 2003 it coordinated several attacks on regional police stations and other targets in Yobe State (Feyyaz, 2015). Yusuf may not have been involved in these attacks, but he accepted that its perpetrators were putting his philosophy into action.

The insurgency's early organization was not strong and remained deeply provincial. It continued a focus on local targets in northeast states, particularly police, military, and traditional Islamic elites. The government, however, viewed the new Islamist group wholly as a security threat. By 2009, a government task force called Operation Flush II was enacted in Maiduguri against the group. In retaliation, the increasingly militant Yusuf called on followers to protect themselves and strike back at law enforcement. After his apprehension by the army he was turned over to the police, where he died in custody, likely in an impromptu execution (Duodu, 2010). Yusuf's death led the group to step up its violence, and the revolt he inspired took on a life of its own. His martyrdom galvanized the core of the group ideologically even as it had been dealt major setbacks militarily. Its demands of the federal government became increasingly maximalist.

Yusuf deputy Abubakr Shakau, took control of the group after his death but the new leadership was fragile during the remainder of 2009, a period which saw another swell of group adherents to North African and Sahelian states. The movement resumed its violent campaign with gusto in 2010 and began its sustained menace to federal and state governments. From this violent incarnation until 2016, Boko Haram is estimated to be responsible for 20,000 deaths (Kazeem, 2016). By 2015, the U.S. Institute for Economics and Peace listed it as the deadliest terror group in the world, outpacing even Islamic State in fatalities due to terrorist activity (Global Terrorism Index, 2015).

Success altering the movement's agenda would become a theme. From this early period until the militancy that followed Yusuf's killing, the movement slowly began gaining steam and expanding its aspirations, in part due to the lack of resistance it met from weak local institutions, particularly in the realms of politics and security. Borno governor Ali Modu was considered a particularly ineffective link in fighting against the group before his leaving power in 2011 (Baca, 2015). The departure of Nigerian Islamists to Mali, Algeria, and elsewhere during this time to train with the insurgencies that would eventually morph into Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) expanded the appeal and ability of the movement to turn to violence in pursuit of its agenda, and opened up a supply of arms from the emerging trafficking routes there that would later prove useful (Smith, 2014; Chothia, 2015).

### **The Jonathan Administration (2010-2015)**

The presidency of Goodluck Jonathan saw the first attempt at a national strategy towards the growing insurgency. Jonathan's May 2010 assumption of the office following his predecessor's death, and his

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election a year later coincided with a major uptick in Boko Haram activity nationally. The group began expanding its operations out from the northeast region. On 16 June 2011, mere weeks after Jonathan's election, it launched the first suicide attack in Nigerian history at the police headquarters in the federal capital of Abuja. Another suicide car bomb attack in Abuja followed on 26 August 2011 at the UN compound. The December 2011 to February 2012 period saw the group recommit to a focus on Christian churches, attempting to stoke the fires of sectarian conflict.

Boko Haram was able to support itself through various coercive methods, including bank raids, the extortion of local businessmen, and government officials throughout 2012. Occasionally high profile kidnapping cases, generated revenue, as in 2013 when a French family in Cameroon was returned for a \$3 million ransom. Supply of weaponry was a similarly improvised affair. Raids on construction sites allowed for detonation material used in improvised explosive devices. Material such as RPGs, assault rifles, trucks, and other material was acquired from overrun government facilities. After the dissolution of the Libyan government in 2011, the availability of small arms and other weaponry increased significantly (Chothia, 2015; Hiribarren, 2016). The group sought ways to broaden its appeal among Nigeria's Muslims. Expanded attacks on Christian targets were an attempt to nationalize the group by stirring up existing tensions between religious communities. Growing sectarian violence between Muslim and Christian communities in the "Middle Belt" of Nigeria, particularly in Jos and elsewhere in Plateau state. The Christian religion of the new president and his Ijaw southern heritage were also features of the group's rhetoric.

In 2013, Jonathan finally began taking substantive legal measures in fighting back against Boko Haram, ordering a military crackdown on the movement that June. A state of emergency was declared in the northern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa (Botelho, 2013). The group relied on alienation from heavy-handed government tactics to secure a base of support. The killing of hundreds of detained civilians by soldiers after the 14 March 2014 Boko Haram attack on a barracks in Maiduguri was a typical example of how the government continued to alienate locals throughout Borno State in particular, allowing for the mistrust of the federal government and general insecurity which the group would take advantage of throughout the course of that year.

In 2014 Boko Haram boosted its international recognition as a terrorist organization with the April abduction of 276 girls from a secondary school in the village of Chibok, killing hundreds in the attack. Soon after, group leader Abubakr Shakau announced that the mostly Christian captives would convert to Islam and become wives for the group (Thurston, 2015; Sieff, 2016; Bloom & Matfess, 2016). The attack launched an international campaign for the girls' release, and Western governments such as the US and UK promised additional troops to help.

Based upon the understanding that people in the under serviced northeast had legitimate grievances that could not be addressed in the current dangerous climate, and in an effort to retrieve the Chibok girls, negotiations were seen by the government as a viable if undesirable option. On 17 October 2014, the Jonathan government announced it had reached a ceasefire with Boko Haram. An insurgent attack in Borno state the next day killing eight indicated the tenuousness of this claim. On 31 October 2014, the group's leader Shakau released a video denying any such ceasefire had been agreed to. The Shakau statement and violence to follow led many cynical members of the media and public to conclude the "ceasefire" was either an incompetent attempt to deal with one of Boko Haram's more marginal factions or a ploy to score a "breakthrough" in advance of the 2015 presidential election (Soyombo 2014). Attacks continued throughout the rest of the year across the north, the capital, and elsewhere in the

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country (Nossiter, 2014).

In the lead up to the anticipated election, Boko Haram launched devastating assaults against a variety of Nigerian targets and extended its presence across international borders. The January 2015 attack and countermeasures around the town of Baga, on the Chad border killed up to 2000, though the exact amount is disputed (Rosen, 2015). The group followed this by extending its presence into southern Niger in February 2015 and pledging its allegiance to Islamic State in March 2015 (Gaffey, 2016). The military's early inability to subdue the insurgency led the Jonathan administration to supply local vigilante groups in the region, which remain active under his successor.

The pervasive federal corruption that continued under the Jonathan Administration sapped at the effectiveness of the fight against Boko Haram. Sambo Dasuki had been brought on in 2012 as National Security Adviser by Jonathan, in part to deal with the crisis. However, in 2014 he was implicated in a scandal involving cash diverted from weapons to fight Boko Haram. In May 2016, key Jonathan aide Hassan Tukur was arrested for stealing \$40 million designated to pay ransoms for kidnapped Chibok girls. Other former members of his cabinet are also under investigation, such as petroleum minister Diezani Alison-Madueke with regard to a missing \$6 billion. In June 2016, Jonathan revealed that he personally was under investigation by the Buhari Administration regarding corruption (Vanguard, 2016).

Corruption has been a feature of Nigerian politics for decades, but its pervasiveness has allowed Boko Haram in particular to gain strength, both due to the opaqueness it creates in everyday society and the hostility this engenders. As Forest (2012) writes, the "shadow economy" developed within such a state allows for the creation of a terrorist infrastructure to take advantage of lax enforcement of law and the regular trade of illicit goods to superimpose its own trade routes and patronage networks that thrive from a lack of transparency.

Corruption has taken its toll in other ways on Nigerian security. The Nigerian Police Force is chronically under budgeted, and money is frequently stolen along the line of the chain of supply. Police reform committees have been an initiative of successive administrations, but of debatable effectiveness. Earlier committees were set up in 2006 and 2008 by the Obasanjo and Yar'Adua administrations. Jonathan's attempt at a third one in February 2012 has had limited impact. The panel submitted a final report in September 2012, but very little has been done to enact reforms. The widespread domestic allegations of corruption and ineffectiveness during this period were buttressed by the concerns of Nigeria's international partners. U.S. officials became wary of extending cooperation to the Jonathan administration by 2014, charging that much of the \$2.1 billion in aid sent to the Nigerian military to respond to Boko Haram was not accounted for.

Jonathan's efforts against Boko Haram were hindered by such problems and the insurgency's wave of activity in the months immediately preceding the election. By election day, the group had seized one third of the north. Only one road was left linking Borno State with the rest of Nigeria (Ishiekwene, 2016). Over two million Nigerians were IDPs or refugees.

### **Buhari Administration (2015 - )**

The 2015 campaign for president was hard fought on both sides and, though often ugly, fought over substantive issues. In March 2015, Goodluck Jonathan became the first sitting Nigerian president to be defeated in a peaceful election widely regarded as legitimate. The victor, Mohammedu Buhari, was a

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retired major-general who had run a military dictatorship for twenty months in the mid-1980s. As a candidate, he relied upon his reputation as an incorruptible, no-nonsense martinet who put patriotism before personal gain. This image was used to his advantage in the face of the corruption and regional mayhem the country experienced as of early 2015.

A key issue in the campaign was the nature of the fight against Boko Haram. In the years following his 2011 electoral defeat at the hands of Jonathan, Buhari intimated that the oppressive nature of the Jonathan administration had turned the disenfranchised youth of the northeast to a wayward, misguided, radical doctrine of Islam. As Jonathan had earlier, Buhari routinely putting forward the possibility of discussing a cease fire with the group. The incentives for negotiation remained practical: providing long-term security remained as difficult within the region after Boko Haram as it was before the group's rise. As Buhari explained, little point existed to sending the army there to clear areas that could not be held. Upon assuming the presidency, he declared he would negotiate "without preconditions" regarding the release of the girls kidnapped at Chibok, providing a "credible leader" of the group could be identified (Dupraz-Dobias, 2016; BBC, 2015b).

After his election, President Buhari continued to stress the need for drastic military reform, removing top military commanders considered corrupt, incompetent, or unprofessional in an attempt to raise the morale of poorly equipped and poorly led troops. In January 2016, Buhari declared that he believed corruption in the military was a key reason for its unpreparedness in quashing the insurgency during the Jonathan Administration, particularly as it resulted in the loss of fourteen local government areas to the insurgency during 2015 (Nwabughiguo, 2016).

In addition to the immediate replacement of many general officers, Buhari moved the Nigerian Military Command Center from the federal capital of Abuja to Maiduguri. The general appointed to lead the international task force working against Boko Haram, Major-General Buratai, was a native of Borno State. This measure was seen as enacted to increase local confidence that the federal government was taking its obligation to enforce security while taking the needs of the local community into account more seriously.

Buhari's governance reforms have not simply been driven at improving the effectiveness of the police and the military, but renewing the confidence in Nigeria of allies and business interests. To end government graft, Buhari promised to simplify "the books" in Nigeria so that a single account would be used at the treasury, rather than the elaborate network that has allowed for patronage and blatant corruption in the past. The Treasury Single Account was enacted to close the multiple accounts in the various ministries and agencies of the federal government. Revenue generating agencies in particular were called on to close illegal revenue accounts.

As with earlier administrations, police reform was on the agenda. Buhari's assumption of office coincided with the dismissal of the Inspector General of Police, Suleiman Abba. A Jonathan appointee, Abba was widely considered to be mired in corruption during his tenure. A drive to recruit an additional 10,000 police was also put in motion; Buhari speculated that such a program would not only curb crime but address the challenge of youth unemployment (Premium Times, 2016a).

Buhari's vow at the outset of his presidency to defeat Boko Haram completely by the end of 2015 year was flamboyant, but not entirely unrealistic. As a former general, he was more familiar to soldiers in temperament and reputation than President Jonathan. As a northerner and a Muslim, he could

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convincingly argue he was able to buoy support against the group in the affected states. Reason existed for Buhari's confidence by December, even if the ultimate objective remained out of reach. The governor of Borno, after most of the state was retaken, proudly announced that month that Boko Haram had lost its ability to collect "taxes", and that the Nigerian constitution was once again being enforced throughout the country (Salem, 2016).

As noted, Boko Haram's slow decline was an ongoing process by the time of Buhari's inauguration. The group had already retreated mainly to primarily rural areas where it was more directly in competition with traditionally conservative Muslim orders that saw the group as alien. Boko Haram remains inflexible regarding its theology, and an inability to deviate to accommodate conservative peasants has led to an increased reliance on coercion. Conscripted and threats against the families of those who will not join are also reported (Baca, 2015). Nevertheless, Buhari had to couch his December 2015 victory announcement by specifying that Boko Haram could no longer launch "conventional" attacks. As of 2016, Chief Defense Staff Olonisakin argued that the movement could no longer launch coordinated attacks. Attorney General and Minister of Justice Malami declared that Boko Haram was no longer able to hold territory (Nwosu, 2016; Bello, 2016).

While the movement remains on the back foot, it is far from defeated. As of April 2016 it has launched a campaign of suicide attacks in towns throughout the northeast in proximity to Maiduguri. In early February 2016, a refugee camp in Borno suffered twin suicide attacks killing over seventy people (Al Jazeera, 2016a). A 10 February attack on a refugee camp near Maiduguri killed 58. Despite its setbacks, the insurgency remains capable of killing hundreds. The movement has become ever more reliant on suicide attacks, and roughly one and five of these are conducted by children (Al Jazeera, 2016b).

### **Regional Coordination Against Boko Haram**

Ultimately a commitment from other actors in the region was vital to the 2015-2016 coordination against Boko Haram. The group's increasingly millenarian approach to "foreign policy", which allows for no clear distinction between "other" and "enemy", has led to a more effective international response than Abuja ever could have devised on its own. Stepped up regional involvement preceded the Buhari Administration. Following the January 2015 carnage on the Chadian border, the AU called for a summit of the five-nation regional force of 7500 troops (later increased to 8700). Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Benin came together to form a Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) under a single command.

Buhari nevertheless made international cooperation against Boko Haram a priority. His first visit internationally was to the US to seek support for the war. Buhari sought to reaffirm international confidence in Nigeria's leadership. In addition to meeting with G7 heads and other international figures, Nigeria hosted a Regional Security Summit in May 2016 to advocate for advancing military operations against the Boko Haram insurgency and to seek international support for developing states affected by the insurgency, as well as to rehabilitate internally displaced persons (Al Jazeera, 2016c). At the meeting, Buhari impressed the difficulty of the challenges to come.

Increased coordination meant 2015 saw regular cross-border attacks on Boko Haram sites inside Nigeria by neighboring states. February of that year marked Boko Haram's first incursion into Cameroon, Niger, and Chad (BBC, 2015a). The federal government assured the public that these countermeasures by regional governments were not a compromise of the country's sovereignty. Chad's successful efforts to

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kick Boko Haram out of the Nigerian town of Gaboru that month also saw retaliation, with the insurgency's crossing into Cameroon and destroying a mosque in Fotokol before being repelled by a joint Cameroonian/Chadian force. The MNJTF based out of N'Djamena was deployed by 30 July 2015 to move against Boko Haram.

Buhari saw a restructuring of the military as a good not just in itself, but for broader strategic purposes. The Nigerian military's "cleansing" was a way Nigeria could reaffirm to skeptical allies such as the United States, France, and the United Kingdom that it was committed to renewed efforts at internal security. These states in turn pledged their support again and promised to share intelligence. The U.S. and the UK have each sent about 300 troops to train and advise local forces. In 2016, the Obama administration agreed to sell light attack aircraft to Abuja two years after intervening against such a sale of US helicopters in 2014 (Cooper & Searcey, 2016; Coughlin, 2016). The UK assured Abuja it would step up its coordination with Nigeria via contributions in increased intelligence sharing, military hardware, and training of troops in counter-terrorism tactics. London has pledged to spend £860 million in foreign aid largely devoted to this project, but concerns have been raised in the media that much of the money devoted to this project is being instead used to target Buhari's opponents in the defeated People's Democratic Party (Coughlin, 2016).

The coalition of regional countries had almost succeeded in pushing Boko Haram out of most urban centers even before Buhari's electoral victory, but almost immediately upon assuming the presidency Buhari's army began intensifying its operations, particularly with regard to taking back terrain Boko Haram had claimed or been able to occupy. This retreat led to a renewed Boko Haram focus on non-military "soft" targets both to demonstrate a continued presence and to indicate to the people that the army could not protect them. This is indicative of the group's ever more coercive relationship with people as it struggles to connect its message with them, no longer able to make good on the promises of security, piety, and social advancement that initially gained it popularity (MercyCorps, 2016).

### **The Internal Dynamics of Boko Haram from 2010 To 2015**

While the transition of administrations is worth taking into account when examining how democratizing states combat insurgency, it cannot be expected to subsume all other contributing factors. The Boko Haram insurgency balanced and modified its objectives both due to the influence of international currents in jihadism and because of coalitions dedicated to resisting it. Kydd and Walter (as cited in Forest, 2012) note that terrorist organizations rely on adhering to the specific political objectives of disaffected locals. Five key ones are: "regime change, territorial change, policy change, social control, and status quo maintenance". The group's inability to expand its territory by 2015 may have given it added incentive to declare itself loyal to Islamic State in the hopes that attaching itself to the higher profile, more successful insurgency might prove lucrative. The March 2015 Boko Haram *baya* (religious pledge of loyalty) was specifically to "caliph" Abubakr Al-Baghdadi. The group changed its name to IS West African Province (ISWAP) but no clear operational link appeared for the following year to exist between the groups. By August 2016, the affiliation with Islamic State appears to have contributed to a factional leadership contest within Boko Haram (Withnall, 2016).

Boko Haram gained strength as it was responsive to the perceived marginalization of much of the public in the northeast in the absence of strong, representative government and institutions of civil society. Much of its internal ideological confusion has been a result of its confused message as it has abandoned local causes for wider jihadism. The early Boko Haram movement had an exclusive Nigerian context,

with an emphasis on policy change and social control as its primary themes under the Kydd and Walter criteria. The decision to move away from this founding premise has been shaped by the perceived need to gain international Islamist allies and legitimacy. Though the group claims an austere form of Sunni Islam not represented nationally, or even regionally, it is subject to the same ethnic attachments seen throughout the rest of Nigeria and the resulting pressures of social control. While Boko Haram's increasingly acephalous nature makes it hard to determine if its transformation is in keeping with Ballentine and Nitzschke's (2003) theory of insurgent movements abandoning loftier aspirations for short-term economic gain, it demonstrates the group's early willingness to alter itself as required.

The decline of government services provided in the remote corners of the north has continued for decades, and by the turn of the century this resentment had begun to fuse with the common tendency for Salafists religious movements to form in that region. Despite its current militant projection, Boko Haram began as one of many civil society organizations struggling to fill the need for education in the region with a philosophy stemming from the group's Salafi form of Islam (Forest, 2012; Matfess, 2016). Early paramilitary squads associated with the movement primarily attacked competing Salafi groups before graduating to law enforcement targets. This transformation during the 2000s, especially noticeable after Yusuf's death, demonstrated how the movement slowly made the federal government its target.

The ability of Boko Haram to drive openly in massive convoys across the northeast had been nearly eradicated by mid-2016, but it has retained the ability to launch suicide attacks that can destabilize the region. Such attacks are cheap, require relatively little training or coordination, and are good for intimidation even while as the group becomes weaker. In discouraging public congregation where they are active, Boko Haram have been able to tear at the fabric of civil society and have traditionally encouraged overreaction by authorities. Holding territory and civilian populations are key to the movement's ability to provide wives and slaves for members, and even for further military operations. Counterterrorism experts in the U.S. estimate at least 105 of these suicide attacks from June 2014 to April 2016 have been perpetrated by women and girls (Coughlin, 2016). Two female suicide bombers killed 58 in 2015 at a Nigerian refugee camp. International pressures therefore have led the group to alter its internal practices, even while rationalizing them via the same unyielding interpretation of Salafi doctrine as before.

Boko Haram has been weakened, focusing on soft targets more often in recent months. But even with the loss of its more valuable territory the group can still launch devastating attacks. The primary remaining stronghold of the group is the Sambisa Forest an optimal retreat for insurgencies of any kind. The sprawling wilderness stretches across four Nigerian states, with dense trees and few roads making the territory nearly impenetrable by land or air. This terrain has proved difficult for the federal government to penetrate. After its initial April 2015 attempts, the army was forced to retreat and regroup after mines and other traps led to casualties among some of the paramilitary units assisting the government.

The large majority of Boko Haram fighters are Kanuri by ethnicity, though the movement claims no ethnic objectives in regard to its overall mission and indeed most of its victims have also been Kanuri. The Kanuri had been represented at the executive level via the military dictatorship of Sani Abacha during the 1990s, but had seen a drastic reversal of fortune by the early 2010s. While wary of regional and national adversaries—the election of a southern president in Goodluck Jonathan, for example—there is no open support among northern elites for Boko Haram. It has gained less of a following among

young non-Kanuri men, even those with concerns about employment and education (Forest,2012). Abuja has attempted to use this ethnic dominance in the group to its advantage, intimidating through propaganda in 2012 that the group's Kanuri leadership use members of other ethnicities as suicide bombers. The movement's foundation among Kanuri may limit its appeal to those of other ethnicities in Northern Nigeria, who for the most part are loyal to much older traditions of Islam.

Boko Haram's early radicalism convinced many disenfranchised Kanuri, especially young men, that the group planned to upend the socioeconomic order which they had been shut out of. Its attacks on civil society were seen as attacks on the establishment, the corruption it represented, and the grossly inequitable distribution of wealth in the region. The group thrived in urban areas initially, where landless young men would congregate, but always had a hostile relationship with rural communities uninterested in the "purer" Salafi variant of Islam the group espoused over traditional Maliki Islam.

State authorities allowed themselves to be made an easy villain by the group. The Nigerian military has a history of human rights abuses, nationally and in the northeast region in particular. The tendency to quash any perceived challenge to state authority with brutal force has engendered distrust among local communities (Smith, 2014; Thurston, 2015). The heavy-handed approach of military, security, and police forces towards the insurgent group since 2009 is generally agreed to have been counterproductive, allowing Boko Haram to benefit from the complete alienation of local citizens from the Nigerian state.

Despite their 2015 pledge to Islamic State, Buhari said there is no solid evidence that Boko Haram have been getting a weapons supply from the Levantine insurgency. Rather, Boko Haram's best weaponry likely came from the military and police facilities the group accessed during the early years of the insurgency (Premium Times, 2016b). Freed hostages have reported that the group is running low on weapons due to renewed multinational efforts to cut off supplies. In return, Boko Haram has little to offer Islamic State except the token of its loyalty in a noncontiguous part of the world. The regional grievances which helped it recruit fighters initially do not make it an effective vessel by which men can be regularly recruited for operations in the Levant or even Libya. The Nigerian group also lacks Islamic State's relatively polished propaganda capabilities, or ability to draw in the West and its enemies by attacking their interests. Boko Haram remains focused on attacking the Nigerian government and its allies, disrupting its nation-building efforts.

### **Discussion of Findings**

It is the civil society dimension of democratic governance that Nigerian elites have found most difficult to respect, and to protect. The decline of prominent civil society organizations such as trade unions and professional guilds in the northeast states has been cited as helping Boko Haram to early prominence. In recent years, however, a reinvigorated civil society has gotten involved in the fight as well. As of June 2016, a civil society umbrella group known as the Coalition for a New Nigeria has assisted a government board of inquiry to determine the identities of those involved in the continuing attacks in the northeast of the country.

The military and federal police have faced difficulty strengthening ties with civil society. Both have a widespread reputation for corruption and brutality that has been difficult to overcome. Buhari is under pressure to increase their effectiveness while he simultaneously reduces the size of government. Violent attacks on the part of law enforcement and military units have led to international accusations of human rights abuses. The army is relatively small compared to other West African states considering Nigeria's

size. It has also been involved in much regional peacekeeping.

Corruption's prevalence has made it a way of life in many parts of Nigeria, particularly for low-level officials such as policemen who are underpaid and often work in harsh conditions with little training or equipment. The colonial-era policy of housing police officers in barracks prevents them from living in and establishing relationships with local peoples. Police reform is crucial for Nigeria's immediate future regarding ending insurgencies. Police recruitment is often prone to political tampering and favoritism, the result of which is an unprepared force. The rapid turnover of Inspectors General of the Police (IGPs) caused by new administrations and corruption has led to varying, inconsistent agendas and levels of professionalism at the top levels.

Grassroots militias dedicated to providing local security have become crucial to the federal government's response. The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF or JTF, of no direct connection to the MNJTF) is an umbrella vigilante organization in the northeast that partially compensates its lack of training with a strong knowledge of local terrain and society. Most of its fighters are poorly armed, with daggers, swords, bows, and guns, but they have been useful in that they provide information and links with local civil society. In May 2016, President Buhari noted that the JTF were of "tremendous help to the military because they are from here, they have local intelligence and some of them are retired military or retired policemen" (Odeyemi, 2016). In an effort to counteract the detachment and isolation most military and police often feel in these areas, President Buhari suggested the federal government could integrate individuals from the civilian JTF in the northeast into the Nigerian military and police after the conclusion of the campaign against Boko Haram. The integration process began in earnest by July 2016 with the absorption of 250 JTF fighters into the army (Oche, 2016; Sahara Reporters, 2016).

A key problem facing both administrations has been how to resolve the underlying economic problems in the region. Like other parts of Nigeria prone to instability and violence, the northeast has long been neglected by the national government. It is the most underdeveloped and illiterate area of the country, with little formal education among either men or women in the areas most affected by insurgency. Even with education, there are few career prospects in the region. In keeping with Fearon and Laitin's theory, bomb makers recruited by Boko Haram have often been identified as often unemployed university graduates with skills to build explosives but no regional employment prospects (Chothia, 2015).

The movement's initial appeal to recruits was in providing the social opportunities the Nigerian state could not guarantee and seemed increasingly less interested in advancing. The abduction of young women is part of this process, as increasing the availability of brides would have appeal among young Kanuri men, for whom marriage is an important element of social advancement (Matfess, 2016).

Both presidents have recognized the role a lack of education played in the rise of Boko Haram. Jonathan stressed, "they were more active in two states, Borno and Yobe. If you relate this with the issue of education, you will discover that these two states have the worst cases in terms of children's school drop-out rate with more than 50 percent drop-out rate. So you can see that this high rate of out-of-school children speaks to the issue of the prevalence of insurgency in these states" (Anaba, 2016). Northerners are generally less educated than southerners. Buhari has sought to address education with a national program but the necessary focus on the north is sensitive to the president, himself a northerner, for political reasons. There are many marginalized communities throughout Nigeria, the rationale for focusing on the north is unclear to citizens elsewhere. That these areas continue to flounder while oil resources are used to fund development throughout other parts of the country

supports the application of Gurr's relative deprivation at a national level, but also demonstrate the intricate political balance politicians must play in addressing marginalization nationally.

A degree of stability is fundamental when establishing fragile democratic frameworks within a state, but a vicious cycle is created when rural livelihoods are disrupted by Boko Haram. Peasants flee or are killed, their land is untended, crops rot in the fields. As the north produces less food, it is increasingly reliant on aid and faces more malnutrition. Agriculture is 40% of the Nigerian GDP and employs 70% of the population. Most farmers work small plots of land without access to irrigation and are solely reliant on rain. The lack of irrigation or infrastructure generally has served to isolate these communities, making them alien to urban centered law enforcement and easy prey for insurgents and criminals. With no easy access to roads it is difficult to get crops to market even during stable periods.

### Conclusion

In Nigeria's halting democratic experience, elected officials have potential to be seen less as proponents of good governance than as proponents of patronage, corruption, ethnic and sectarian rivalry, and inconsistent or ineffective plans for security. Boko Haram has receded from the headlines and the revolt is on the back foot. There are myriad issues to concern Nigerians in its place: the effect of low oil prices internationally on a collapsing Nigerian economy and the renewed rebellion in the Niger Delta being only two of them. Nevertheless, the Salafi insurgency has touched on many underlying tensions within the Nigerian political realm.

The election of 2015 is a significant one for Nigerians. Not only was it the first time a Nigerian head of state stepped down after being defeated in a peacefully contested election, but the choice between the two candidates was substantive. The approach to dealing with Boko Haram was but one of many issues hashed out over the course of the campaign, and the election delved not just into the personalities of the leading candidates, but fundamental differences at the party level between the PDP and the APC. The approaches between the two candidates are measurably distinct from each other and, while there is almost certainly some scapegoating of the previous Jonathan administration, it is clear that his government had fundamental flaws in addressing systemic causes for Boko Haram. These include an inability to stop the pervasive corruption of Nigerian politics, which contributed to a corrosive cynicism toward electoral procedures and governing that damages the broader Nigerian faith in democracy.

Buhari's approach to fighting the insurgency has met with some success, but also shows potential weaknesses. Nigeria is a country fractured at a national level. The recent rising of political violence again in the Niger Delta after six years of relative peace demonstrates that such activity is not limited to the northeast, and that grievances neglected can reemerge anywhere. Moving the military headquarters to the northeast may be useful in the fight against Boko Haram, but what of the resurgent violence in this region? Will Buhari now move the campaign headquarters once again? These problems fundamentally require solutions that can only be realized at a national level.

Many suspect an opportunity to defuse the escalating violence was lost after the initial eruptions of 2009 and Yusuf's death, when the government could have opened up talks with the group to de-escalate tensions but chose a military solution. This pattern appears to be repeating again in Kaduna State, where a December 2015 massacre of adherents to the Islamic Movement of Nigeria Shia sect resembles in some respects the approach taken to Boko Haram seven years ago. This indicates that leaders may rotate but institutional psychology is more difficult to change.

While Nigeria's underlying problems are national, Boko Haram has not succeeded in making itself a national movement. Its efforts to stoke sectarian conflict have had been of limited success, no doubt in part because the majority of its victims continue to be Muslim. It has not been able to seize lucrative oil facilities in the manner of Islamic State, the group it has attempted both to serve and emulate. It has managed to spread its carnage across the Nigerian and Chadian international borders, but has absolutely no message that might appeal to the peoples of those countries. The group's drift away from its original appeal—the resentment of poor people towards a government perceived as brutal, corrupt, and derelict—may damage it as much as any regional coalition formed to dismantle it.

In interviews following his exit from the presidency, Jonathan underscored that the fanaticism of the movement had made it qualitatively different than other insurgencies the country had faced, such as the armed groups in the Niger Delta. Boko Haram's objectives were more disparate and often fanatical. Jonathan stresses that his administration set up the framework to deal with such a movement and that current president Buhari is reaping the rewards of his policy.

While it is reasonable to note the impact of the Buhari administration on pushing back against Boko Haram in the past year, the group's decline is also the result of multiple processes at the regional and local level. The new administration was pivotal in coordinating a regional and international response to Boko Haram, persuading the U.S. to sell arms to Nigeria again and working closely with regional states now involved in the fight.

A combined approach involving Nigeria's neighbors has demonstrated an impact on the group's ability to destabilize the area, though long-term causes for Boko Haram's decline are not only due to government policy, but its own practices.

Addressing the concerns of the people—development, civil society, job opportunity, education—is key. These concerns are interrelated and fundamental. The Buhari government's success in securing international assistance in the fight against Boko Haram is significant, but does not address the underlying issues which allowed the group to gain such international prominence in the first place.

Neither is democratic reform alone enough to combat problems related to development, corruption, and police/military brutality. Still, it is at least crucial to the success of democracy that Nigerians feel empowered in resolving their problems, and that government reform is part of this process.

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# ***A Qualitative Comparison of Anti-Corruption Measures in Guatemala and Brazil***

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**Abstract:** *The purpose of this research is to compare recent initiatives aimed at addressing corruption within the public sector in Guatemala and Brazil. Political unrest in the last two decades, charges of bribery and financial mismanagement by leaders, instances of electoral mismanagement, and other actions by national and local government officials in both countries have highlighted what has become almost commonplace throughout many areas in Latin America. Guatemala and Brazil represent countries that have taken different philosophical approaches to dealing with the recent corrupt acts and thus offer a good case for comparison. What remains to be seen is whether one approach is more effective than the other.*

**Key Words:** Anti-Corruption Initiatives, Latin America

## **Introduction**

In September, 2015 Otto Perez Molina resigned as president of Guatemala following a series of credible accusations that he had played a major role in a multimillion-dollar fraud scheme (Ahmed and Malkin, 2015). When Molina was first accused, Guatemalans came out in large numbers to protest his actions and demand his resignation. The demands voiced by the people continued to the point that the president could no longer ignore their persistence. Because protests are common occurrences in Guatemala, it was no surprise that crowds gathered when they discovered Molina's corruption, but the results of their protests were unexpected. Not only did Molina step down, but he went on trial, was found guilty, and was ultimately jailed, becoming the first president in Guatemala's history to resign due to a corruption scandal. This was in marked contrast to similar situations occurring earlier in Guatemala, long known for the impunity of its political establishment (Ahmed & Malkin, 2015).

In another part of Latin America, Brazil was in the middle of similar political unrest resulting from political scandal. President Dilma Rousseff was accused of corruption and large crowds of Brazilians demanded her impeachment. She was accused of taking kick-backs from PETROBRAS, Brazil's state owned energy company, while also attempting to shield her mentor, the former President da Silva, by appointing him to a cabinet position. Finally, she was accused of manipulating fiscal budgets to improve her image before the 2014 presidential elections. Rousseff was adamantly fighting the allegations and refused to step down. Brazil's Lower Congress voted on impeachment and decided it would be the direction the country

would take in the near future (Park, 2016). The daily news updates echoed those feelings by strongly suggesting that Rousseff may be looking for a new job sooner than she would like.

The possibilities of politicians being corrupt are almost an expectation in both Guatemala and Brazil. In fact, political corruption is all too common throughout Latin America (Husted, 2002). Stories abound recounting how political officials abused positions of authority to make personal gain at the expense of those they were sworn into office to serve. Political corruption erodes away at society and can lead to instability in a government. Citizens lose faith in the public and private institutions that make up society and things only continue to deteriorate from there (Husted, 2002). Unfortunately, Brazil and Guatemala offer prime examples of how state level government is affected by this type of erosion. This is not something that occurred only, but instead has developed throughout a long history.

Guatemala and Brazil have histories of dictatorial regimes and they both share a history of colonization. Aspects of these shared experiences seem to influence and impact the ways that these governments function. In many ways, much of the corruption found in politics ties to these historical characteristics. Mejia (1999) describes Guatemala as “the land of eternal impunity” (p. 56). He cites numerous examples of human rights violations occurring after which individuals committing them did not face consequences for their actions. Impunity afforded them a way around the legal system that would normally punish them for their crimes. While incidences of human rights violations are only one area where corruption is an important factor, this single example clearly highlights the failure of public servants and institutions to hold national leaders and those who work under them accountable for their actions.

Brazilians have a saying that, when translated into English, means “anything for friends; for enemies, the law” (Husted, 2002, p. 417). This phrase represents an unwritten rule for Brazilians that rules and laws apply differently to those with whom they have a personal relationship. This motivates the development of relationships with those who make or enforce rules or laws in order to find ways around them. Analysis of various cultural aspects may provide insight into why this occurs and further analysis of how corruption has emerged and continues in these environments offers some explanation of the nature of the problem and what policy responses may be necessary for improving the situation.

This study aims to analyze the current level of corruption in Brazil and Guatemala and to begin to consider the extent to which it may be able to be reduced. This study conducts a comparative analysis to increase understanding of how each of the two nations has addressed its corruption problem. To that end, the study qualitatively evaluates the political environments of Brazil and Guatemala to look for explanations of how they arrived where they are now. Further, analysis is focused on how each country is dealing with corruption through the public policies, and how this affects democratic values and practices. Finally, the study examines how specific anti-corruption policies in each country were developed, evaluates the effectiveness of those policies, and concludes with some speculation on the direction of future anti-corruption policy for each country. The goal is that new insights will surface about corruption policy, that the insight gained will increase understanding of the measures needed to diminish the levels of corruption in Brazil and Guatemala, and that any future negative impact on democracy in each country can be minimized.

### **Literature Review**

Corruption stems from many sources and is an endemic problem in a host of countries throughout the world. In order to compare the policy responses of Guatemala and Brazil to their own corruption problems, it is first necessary to characterize corruption’s nature and scope in those two countries.

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Transparency International provides annual rankings of the perceived level of public sector corruption for 168 countries. In its most recent index on a scale of 0 to 100, (0 indicating high levels of corruption and 100 no corruption), Guatemala was rated 28 and Brazil 38. The index also includes a ranking of the countries to facilitate comparison of corruption levels between nations. A review of the rankings reveals that Brazil was ranked 76<sup>th</sup> and Guatemala 123<sup>rd</sup>, with 168<sup>th</sup> being the most corrupt. Transparency International also includes trend identification, and this provided interesting insight. Among all of the countries listed, three were identified as having the greatest decline on the corruption perception index, with Brazil and Guatemala being two of the three (Transparency International, 2016). High levels of corruption are an unfortunate reality for both nations, creating a serious challenge for decision makers trying to address it.

The annual survey from Transparency International provides clear evidence that whatever policy exists to combat corruption in these two nations does not appear to be working. However, citizens seem to be more empowered than they were before, as suggested by the results of the presidential ouster in Guatemala and highly likely impeachment proceedings in Brazil. Protests have actually produced positive results and impunity seems to be declining, at least in the case of the few public figures being held accountable for their actions. But there is much still to be examined in order to fully understand what is going on in these countries and what the future holds.

The simple fact is that corrupt politicians have infiltrated and invaded government and institutions in countries throughout the world through a variety of means. Klitgaard shares that “corruption is an outcome of weak state administration that comes forward when an individual or organization has monopoly power over a good or service, discretion over making decisions, limited or no accountability, and low level of income” (Shabbir & Anwar, 2007, p. 753). This offers many suggestions of how corruption develops and persists within politics. Klitgaard’s perspective also may shed light on where policy needs to be enacted to resolve these issues. Fortunately, policy for combating corruption in Brazil and Guatemala does exist, although its effectiveness may not be as obvious or is debatable. Research indicates that the policies currently being shaped or those that have been enacted in these countries are fairly new.

In order to begin a comparative analysis, it is first necessary to identify anti-corruption policies developed in these countries. However, prior to leaping into the policy analysis and comparison, one more important question must be addressed. What is the point of comparing these policies? Cox, Mann, and Samson (1997) explain that comparison leads to a form of benchmarking or competition among nations that are compared. It may not be that Brazil and Guatemala are looking directly at one another to make any comparison, but organizations like Transparency International are. These countries are being compared based on a corruption perception index and therefore, it seems somewhat reasonable to think that a study of them will increase understanding of what is going on there, whether any movement is positive or negative, especially regarding efforts by either country to do something about its perception ratings. It is important to note that both countries were affected by a recent dramatic dive in index rating (Transparency International, 2016). Perhaps further insight is needed to understand what is causing this change and applying a comparative analysis seems to be movement in the right direction. Dodds (2013) justifies the use of comparative analysis since, in this case, it could change the level of understanding held by those who study corruption with respect to the nature of certain phenomena as well as their views on how and why those phenomena arise.

Another reason to compare the anti-corruption policies of these two nations is to determine how regional affects may be impacting the way policy is created and implemented. The world is growing increasingly

interconnected through commerce, international institutions, and other means. Jordan et al., (2003) suggested that international institutions, which represent committed participants in the processes of global good governance, are leading nations to the convergences of policies, and policy transfer is occurring across borders. While it may be a stretch to suggest that either country in this study is affecting the other's policies, it is still an interesting thought to consider that institutions may potentially be bringing nations together by either passively or actively promoting specific agendas.

### **Guatemalan Political Environment and Anti-Corruption Policy**

The purpose of this section is to discuss the anti-corruption policies enacted in Guatemala. Additional perspective is also included to understand what the policies do not include. It just as important to understand what laws or policies may have been omitted in order to capture the whole reality in the political environment. Sieder (as cited in Ruhl, 2011, p. 38) indicated that, "narcotics trafficking is particularly widespread in Guatemala, and traffickers have been successful in penetrating the highest Guatemalan government circles." This perhaps explains why corruption is so prevalent, but how does a country arrive to this point? Ruhl adds that Guatemala and other Central American countries exhibit two types of corruption, grand corruption and petty corruption. He suggests that each has different causes and the way to put them in check is by first focusing on petty corruption by cutting down on cumbersome bureaucratic procedures imposed by the government on its citizens. Many cases of petty corruption are caused by individuals bribing lower officials to avoid the bureaucratic red-tape often holding up dealings with the government (Ruhl, 2011).

Another factor that may contribute to the levels of corruption found in Guatemala is the way in which their political parties are established. Sanchez (2008) explains that Guatemalan political parties are shaped by their founders or leaders. The party follows whatever plans or agendas the leader has and if the leader fails politically, so too may the party. This model differs greatly from the way political parties are established in the U.S. The Republican, Democratic, and even Independent parties rest upon a base comprised of ideals, values, and morals. All of the parties seek to uphold the U.S. Constitution and espouse liberty, and the only major differences are political values (Independent Hall Association, 2014). On the other hand, "Guatemalan political parties evince a marked absence of ideological commitment, and most are bereft of any ideological orientation" (Sanchez, 2008, p. 141). This appears to be evidenced by Molina's ouster. What ideals was he following when he decided to commit fraud? This may suggest that Guatemala's political party culture can lead to inconsistencies in how government is run and the degree of difficulty associated with holding individuals accountable continues to increase. Perhaps this is why Sanchez adds that "...elections have not helped to legitimate democratic rule in the eyes of Guatemalans" (2008, p. 138). Guatemala's political environment appears to facilitate corruption, but there are at least a few policies enacted to help abate these issues.

All of the governments in Central America including Guatemala signed the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (IACAC), the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Guatemala Declaration for Region Free of Corruption (Ruhl, 2011). IACAC constitutes the world's first attempt to combat corruption at the international level and this policy was ratified to establish a legal framework to overcome transactional bribes that persist within government and government officials. This instrument was developed to serve as a source of guidance on how to combat corruption within state government and to promote the practice of states working together to enforce anti-corruption measures in the region (Altamirano, 2007). Although UNCAC involves additional measures to combat corruption, only IACAC will be discussed here because of its specificity to the region of interest for country

comparison.


Implementing IACAC represents a positive move for Guatemala, but some feel that it does not have the necessary means of enforcement. Additionally, those that should enforce the rules in the court system are accused of being corrupt (Mejia, 1999). Altamirano (2007) points out that IACAC leaves discretion to each state over how anti-corruption measures are enforced. This can greatly weaken the impact of the policy passed. McSherry and Molina (as cited in Mejia, 1999) offer insight to explain further why these policies may be difficult to enforce by asserting that Guatemala exhibits three types of impunity or means that serve to facilitate the exercise of power by abusers to avoid getting in trouble when they are obviously corrupt. They add that, in some cases, legalized measures are in place to allow impunity to continue despite its potential negative effects. A policy established to fight corruption is resistant to effective and successful enforcement as long as officials are able to find ways around the legal system through impunity.

However, despite the many setbacks and challenges discussed, Guatemala does have many measures in place and continues to pass new laws to address the corruption issue within its borders as a result of IACAC's enactment. Decision makers signed IACAC in 1996 and then ratified it in 2001. Prior to ratification and since then, Guatemala has created a special prosecution office to tackle and prosecute corrupt public officials. They created an Anti-Corruption Commission in 2002 that integrated legal officials to enable investigation. Further, they developed a decree that outlined norms and procedures to ensure public officials maintained transparency in their actions. Subsequently, a transparency and anticorruption commission was created by the Guatemalan Executive Branch and an appointee was placed over it to validate government transparency (Altamirano, 2007). Altamirano continues to outline other agreements and mechanisms put in place by Guatemala to ensure they abided by the terms put in place by IACAC. Perhaps this explains why Guatemala arrived to a point that the president was ousted and then held accountable by these actions. It also could be that IACAC enabled an environment that fostered anti-corruption norms or at least a culture of reprisal for corrupt acts.

On the other hand, as indicated earlier, there are researchers that perceive IACAC as ineffective. Some research analysis may support this conclusion. Individuals chose to utilize the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) to evaluate the effects on corruption in a country based on policies passed. The index ranks countries against each other and also identifies a score based on perception data collected. A low score on the index indicates that perception of corruption is very high whereas a high score indicates little or no perception of corruption (Transparency International, 2016). The same test is used to evaluate the effectiveness of IACAC in Guatemala through individuals' perceptions of corruption in the country. Figure 1 provides visual representation of a slight positive trend between the years 2001 and 2015 that indicates that there may be an improvement in the overall perception of corruption in Guatemala, but the change is very meager. However, this could indicate less than optimal effectiveness of IACAC as an accurate measurement in that a negative trend appears when data are excluded prior to 2009. This begs the question of whether perception serve as an adequate gauge of effectiveness or should there be other considerations.

Responding to that question requires perspective and an understanding that a complete evaluation must include more than just corruption policy. It must also involve consideration of the effects of democracy. Altamirano (2007) suggests that corruption is a secret act that those involved try to cover up and conceal. He also adds that, corruption in the past was accepted as a cultural norm rather than the illegal activity it is which IACAC was ratified to combat. Perceptions therefore may be affected by an increase in awareness rather than an actual increase in corruption. "The public is now informed of the problem and is

increasingly demanding greater government accountability and transparency” (Altamirano, 2007, p. 540). In the midst of Molina’s ouster, presidential candidates based their campaign platforms of transparency and promises of honesty. Jimmy Morales, a comedian with no political experience was voted into office following Molina’s ouster. One of his main slogans was “not corrupt and not a thief,” and this resonated with the public disillusioned by Molina’s corrupt regime (Partiow, 2015).



**Figure 1: CPI Scores, 2001-2015, Transparency International, 2016**

It appears as though IACAC facilitated the workings of a political environment that enforced the need to take action to stop corruption rather than overlook those seeking to break the rules with the hopes that they would not be caught. Not everyone wants corruption to persist. “Every country criminalizes corruption, and every culture and religion heavily discourages corruption” (Altamirano, 2007, p. 492). Now, it appears that IACAC led to corruption no longer being overlooked. Another positive is that Guatemala was able to sustain democracy through presidential election and enforce the need for transparency. However, only time will tell whether Guatemala’s new president will live up to his campaign slogan.

### **Policy Effects.**

Guatemala has the right idea in enacting policy that combats corruption and clearly politicians need to continue finding ways to improve government transparency. Although IACAC has done much to implement the means to combat corruption there is still a lot of work, and there is also the consideration of whether it is received well by current policy makers. One author points out that corruption amongst government officials exists when little is done to reign in the levels of discretionary power afforded to these individuals (Altamirano, 2007). But steps still need to be taken to promote a decision making process that allows for transparency. Many more challenges remain, in some cases due to what policy fails to include. There is also the challenge of what stems from pervasive corruption within government. Where corrupt practices continue as the norm, a negative cycle ensues that attracts individuals pursuing government positions to enable corrupt practices. Unfortunately, this eventually causes the system that is supposed to keep corruption in check to unravel (Altamirano, 2007).

There is some evidence of how this is happening in Guatemala despite policies being in place to combat these issues. Torres-Rivas and Aguilar (1998) explain that there are weaknesses in Guatemalan legislation that should ensure that campaign party finances are transparent, but do not. Dye (as cited in Sanchez, 2008, p. 141) adds that campaign donors are able to remain anonymous and there is no limit on what they

can donate. This enables private donors to promote self-interests and to do so without anyone knowing. There is evidence of drug money being used to fund political campaigns leading many to believe that Guatemala is becoming a narcodemocracy (Sanchez, 2008). Drug cartels are increasing contributions to campaigns as a result of their increased activity in Guatemala. "Their financing of candidates for public office includes mayors, deputies for congress, and even presidential candidates" (Sanchez, 2008, p. 141). It appears that Guatemala's attempts to promote an anti-corruption agenda through IACAC is not working. Democracy in Guatemala is being threatened by self-interested agendas. Somewhat surprisingly, research conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) indicated that over 54 percent of people surveyed in Latin America would support transition from a democratic government to an authoritarian government if it would resolve the issues they are facing as a result of corruption in democracy (Altamirano, 2007).

Although, this portrays a bleak picture of Guatemalan politics, and what appeared to be negative gains on IACAC's effects, Molina's ouster cannot be overlooked. This again suggests that despite additional corruption issues in the system, impunity for violators is beginning to waiver. Establishing a culture of transparency and accountability may require greater effort and more time, but at least Guatemalans are showing that they want to head in that direction.

### **Brazilian Political Environment and Anti-Corruption Policy**

Brazil is a much different country than Guatemala. Land mass comparison is one obvious difference, while economic strength, military size, and population are other factors that greatly differ. However, Brazil shares with Guatemala many similarities related to culture and regional characteristics. In many cases, the political environment appears to be similar and, therefore, it is no surprise that policies passed in Brazil are designed to address the same issues with corruption. One of Brazil's policies that stands out for combating corruption is its Brazilian Clean Companies Act (BCCA). This policy is likened to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the U.S. in terms of anti-corruption measures aimed at industry. The policy was enacted to put a stop to corrupt business transaction in Brazil (Richard, 2014). BCCA was passed in 2013 in the hopes that it would help improve the negative corruption perception that persists until today in Brazil.

Perception shapes reality and Brazilian policy makers understand that corruption must be attacked at all levels of government. Prior to BCCA, another anti-corruption measure was implemented in 2003 to encourage more transparency at the local government level. Although BCCA and the 2003 anticorruption measure are not all encompassing; they do provide good representation of the way Brazil actually handles corruption in government. The 2003 measure allows for the periodic selection of municipal governments for random audit to evaluate how federal funds are utilized and the results are made available to the public (Ferraz & Finan, 2008). This helps improve accountability of politicians and enables individuals to make informed decisions when deciding whether to vote for a politician to retain his office or replace him with another candidate. Ferraz and Finan (2008) discover that voters already perceive politicians as corrupt and only punish those by voting against them when they surpass a certain level of unacceptable corruption. This corruption threshold mentality seems strange, but may stem from Brazil's short experience with democracy. A brief summary of its recent history may shed light on this matter.

Brazil transitioned to democracy from a 20-year long dictatorship in 1985, bringing changes to all levels of society. Democracy included "more transparency of the governmental decision making process, greater freedom of the press, ideas and association, [and] more citizen participation in public life..." (Adorno, 2013). Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) share insight on how citizen participation improved as a result

of shifting to democracy. Through increased opportunity for participation, people were enabled to elect their government representation, whereas in the past, a dictatorship was unrestrained by the people. Elections put government officials in check by eventually pushing those out that did not garner public approval. Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005) asserted elections provided incentives for politicians to enact certain kinds of policies and placed constraints on politicians' malfeasance." Therefore, the move to democracy in Brazil set the stage for enacting policies against corruption.

However, at the beginning of the democratic process, Brazil was rocked by two consecutive corrupt presidents following its transition from dictatorship. Geddes and Ribeiro (1992) evaluate this time period and identify many contributing factors related to the political environment that caused corruption to continue in Brazil's political processes. One example given relates to the number of Brazilian political parties. In Brazil there is high number of parties and participants must be registered in order to engage in elections. However, the rules governing these parties frequently change the requirements for legal representation. This is caused by parties vying for more leverage over one another and has resulted in the number of different parties to grow (Geddes & Ribeiro, 1992). When Geddes and Ribeiro conducted their research, there were 37 political parties and today there are 32 (Mello, 2013). Why does knowing the number of political parties in a given country matter? It has been suggested that "in a two party system, most people can substitute a simple rule of thumb—vote against the party responsible for the outcome considered undesirable—for detailed knowledge" (Geddes & Ribeiro, 1992, p. 658). An excessive number of political parties makes it difficult for voters to keep track of values and ideologies, let alone the names of the individuals running for office or their political record. Perhaps this enables political officials to cover up illegal activity from the past. There is much more to discuss on this matter, but the judicial system also needs to be included.

Brazil's political environment, though democratic, still faces impediments to government transparency and enforceable licit ways for doing business. One author points out that "the prevailing image of the criminal justice system is that of a funnel: wide at the base and narrow at the bottleneck" (Adorno, 2013, p. 419). This means that Brazil's legal system leans more toward heavily punishing minority groups, the poor and other similar demographics, while overlooking crimes committed by those in the upper-class and those who are well connected. Adorno (2013) characterizes this as selective impunity and suggests that this is a serious issue for Brazil that complicates the political environment and slows anti-corruption measures. However, the democratic process allows for oversight. Geddes and Ribeiro (1992) offer that instruments for detecting and punishing corruption by the president and other politicians are the press, the Congress, and, ultimately, the public.

### **Policy Effects.**

Anti-corruption policy implemented in Brazil has led to ways to both discourage corruption while also encouraging accountability. However, Geddes and Ribeiro (1992) suggest that as long as there is a private sector dependence on the state, corrupt practices will continue. This appears to be the case for Brazil now. Although policy is supposed to be reducing corruption, the highest echelons of government in Brazil are still being filled with individuals who break the rules and expect impunity. A recent survey suggested that approximately "... 2.3 percent of Brazil's Gross Domestic Product or 57.5 billion [dollars] is misappropriated from the national accounts every year" (de Almeida, 2012, p. 53). Corruption appears to be well entrenched in the political system and thus difficult to stop. Perhaps policy is not carrying out its intended affect.

In Rouseff's first term as president, and partially into her second term her approval ratings were fairly

high despite some unsettling news that members of her regime, whom she appointed, were being investigated and removed after being accused of embezzlement and other fraudulent crimes. For example, her chief of staff had to be removed because he could not explain why his salary had gone up by twenty times over a four-year period (de Almeida, 2012). This begs the question, is something missing from the process? It has been suggested that what may be needed is “a strengthened follow-up mechanism and better national enforcement institutions [; these] are important components of an integrated anti-corruption strategy [needed] to prevent and fight corrupt practices” (Altamirano, 2007, p. 492). However, current events appear to be contradicting the perspective that Brazil is missing an enforcement mechanism in its policy. Rousseff will likely soon go on trial for her involvement in fraud. Yet, de Almeida (2007) suggests that perhaps policy may not be the reason for actions against Rousseff, but rather something else.

Collor, a former president of Brazil, faced impeachment in the early 1990s, because of similar circumstances as Rousseff. He was misappropriating funds, utilizing government funds to pay for personal expenditures and other illegal actions. Geddes and Ribeiro (1992) reveal that not necessarily anti-corruption policy, but other events led to public coming out against him. They indicated that “several unusual circumstances contributed to the effective public mobilization against Collor [the first example being] economic distress caused by Collor’s policies...” (1992, p. 644).

History appears to be repeating itself. Brazil faced several years of economic prosperity under Da Silva’s presidency and Rousseff carried that prosperity into her first term, but accusations and investigations soon began to surface. De Almeida (2012) explains that the levels of corruption found in the system did not necessarily change when the presidency passed hands from Da Silva to Rousseff, but instead what changed was how it was handled. Supposedly Da Silva was better at keeping internal issues from surfacing. However, ironically, de Almeida (2012) also points out that Rousseff’s ratings as president remained high despite the many corrupt individuals around her who had to be forced out. This does not seem to set the stage for Rousseff’s impending impeachment, but instead provides the illusion that politics would continue as they had in the past. Yet, other events came up that perhaps explain more effectively the actions against Rousseff.

Change occurred as Brazil’s economy declined. PETROBRAS, Brazil’s state owned oil company and center of Rousseff’s presidential scandal, saw a 60 percent decline in stock value (Gillespie, 2015). Just a few years prior to this, as was pointed out earlier, fraud was occurring in Rousseff’s regime, but the economy was on the upside. If anti-corruption policy were to explain Rousseff’s impending impeachment, why had it not occurred earlier? De Almeida (2012) explains that “... so long as Rousseff continue[d] to respond appropriately to corruption scandals, and economic news remain[ed] positive, Brazilians [would] likely maintain confidence in her government.” Although it may be easier to pass judgement on a situation when there are fewer unknowns (investigation revealed Rousseff’s involvement in scandal), it is hard to overlook the correlation between what is causing Rousseff’s impending impeachment and the dire economic circumstances of the Brazilian citizenry. The obvious question is whether it is really the effect of the BCCA or other anti-corruption policy leading to these outcomes, or could it just be that the people are no longer satisfied, and their lack of satisfaction leads to seeking out reasons to impeach.

### Methodology

Public policy shapes the lives of every person on the planet in some way or another. As a result, public policy is routinely studied using a multitude of methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative. When examining in a systematic manner differences that exist between nations and sectors in the creation and

delivery of public policies, the discovery process in general can lead to both expected and unexpected results. As clearly stated in the introduction, this study seeks to offer a comparative analysis of the current level of corruption in Brazil and Guatemala, and it is the comparative nature of the process that poses challenges for effectively drawing conclusions. However, these challenges can possibly be overcome by carefully engineering the actual comparison. This has led many researchers to establish some form of guide or framework in order to apply a systemic process.

Dodds (2013) discusses several approaches for comparative policy studies that have been used by researchers that include comparisons based on resources available to public policy actors as well as how those actors put those resources to use on policy instruments. Specific approaches include the degree to which policies ultimately developed involve government expenditure, are coercive and direct, or the degree to which they affect actors whether inside or outside government. Other approaches compare policies on the basis of outcomes produced. All of these methods are based on inductive reasoning, relying on what can be called reconstructive logic of policy analysts (Linder and Peters, 1989). Using these approaches, analysts effectively first collate information related to the use of policy instruments and then separate them on the basis of their key characteristics.

In contrast, other approaches rely on deductive reasoning using theories from other disciplines to specify certain dimensions of public policy on which policy instruments from different countries can vary. Perhaps the approach used most commonly used example is the NATO model. In that model, Hood (as cited in Dodds, 2013), draws on existing analytical categories from control theories used in disciplines such as cybernetics to posit that policy actors operate using four specific analytical categories. As depicted in Table 1, these categories include the use of information (Nodality), legal powers (Authority), financial resources (Treasure), and formal organizations (Organization).

This study uses a policy instruments approach modeled after that used by Dodds (2013), and based on the NATO model developed by Hood, to compare the anti-corruption policies of Guatemala and Brazil. It does not suggest that different policy instruments are easily chosen or adopted by either of these governments through a simple policy making process. Neither does the resulting comparison of policies imply that the resulting policies are equally available to both governments. The policies selected for the study are not discussed based on the policy design approach in which analysis included examining whether policy actors actually chose the most efficient and effective policies to deal with problems and facilitate strategic political planning.

The method of comparison in this study acknowledges, as did Dodds (2013), that the best policies do not always already exist so that policy makers can simply select them. Rather, it is often necessary to construct or develop the necessary policy instruments. In this way, policies are not merely a means toward achieving predetermined goals, but instead must be considered within their political context, which includes ideas and interests, with an eye toward determining their role as part of governing institutions. They are increasingly seen as being more directly linked to governance rather than to government.

As indicated earlier, there are many differences between Brazil and Guatemala that complicate comparison. In 2014 Guatemala's GDP was measured at USD 58.8 billion whereas a study conducted in Brazil revealed that approximately 2.3 percent or USD 57.5 billion of Brazil's GDP was funding corruption (de Almeida, 2012; World Bank, 2016). Obviously there is a resource difference, but that can be explained by the fact that there is a great distinction between population size and resources availability.

<b>Table 1</b>			
<b>NATO Model for Comparative Policy Analysis</b>			
<b>Public Actors Operate Through - Hood (1986)</b>			
<b><u>N</u>odality</b>	<b><u>A</u>uthority</b>	<b><u>T</u>reasure</b>	<b><u>O</u>rganization</b>
<i>Use of information they have acquired by being central actors</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Information provision and processing</li> <li>Advice</li> <li>Advertising</li> <li>Public information campaigns</li> <li>Policy inquiries</li> <li>Other research</li> </ul>	<i>Their legal powers</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Command and control regulation</li> <li>Regulated self-regulation</li> <li>Delegated regulation</li> <li>Consultation processes (creates insiders and outsiders among groups)</li> </ul>	<i>Their financial resources</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Taxes and fees</li> <li>Use of tax system for spending (tax credits or incentives)</li> <li>Grants and loans</li> <li>Funding of non- or quasi-governmental actors (e.g., interest groups)</li> </ul>	<i>Formal organizations they can use for their ends</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Direct use of state, non- and quasi-state bodies to promote or induce certain behaviors</li> </ul>
<b>N</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>T</b>	<b>O</b>

### **Guatemala and Brazil: Comparison of the Use of Financial Resources and Institutions**

In fact, very little was revealed in the literature about resources used in the furtherance of developing anti-corruption policy in either country. Yet, through inference one idea for comparison comes to mind. Guatemala worked through an institutional approach that motivated the development of these measures. IACAC included several countries from Central and South America (excluding Brazil) and it laid the framework for each country to develop its own anti-corruption measures. This effort relied on international partnerships, whereas the policies discussed in this analysis for Brazil did not require an external framework. Instead, Brazil created BCCA, perhaps through policy transfer. Dolowitz and Marsh describe policy transfer as “a process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, administrative arrangements, and institutions in another time and/or place” (1996, p. 344). Richard (2014) explained that it resembled the U.S. policy to stem corruption in the business sector. Where Brazil had the resources and capabilities to research and develop its own mechanism to fight corruption, Guatemala relied on a pooling of resources through IACAC. This is not to suggest that one method is better than the other, but rather to point out the limitations or resources available for each to develop an effective policy to respond to similar issues. In the next section, a comparison of the political climates in each country is analyzed.

### **Guatemala and Brazil: Comparison of the Use of Organization**

The discussion earlier about political parties pointed out that Brazil’s political system becomes construed with the number of political parties. This situation makes it difficult for voters to keep up with candidates’

political histories and therefore many may not even know anything about the candidate they are voting for (Geddes & Ribeiro, 1992). Guatemala has only 14 parties, less than half the number of political parties as Brazil, and is thus less construed than Brazil. However, this is still a very high number for a population of approximately 16 million (IFES, 2015; World Bank, 2016). The issue with Guatemala's political parties is not necessarily the number of parties, though that alone may offer challenges to voters similar to those experienced in Brazil. But perhaps even more important is that rules are not clearly defined about donor contributions and anonymity (Sanchez, 2008). In both cases, corrupt individuals appear to have a way to get into politics and a way to remain there. This appears to be true for both countries.

The policies discussed for Brazil and Guatemala are established essentially to fight the same issues. However, the means used to enact policies differ for each country. BCCA and Brazil's measure to enforce transparent use of federal funds at the municipal level were established internally. Though policy transfer may have influenced BCCA and Brazil's other anti-corruption measure, the literature did very little to discuss how governmental organization influences the establishment of these policies. Perhaps this is because Brazil stands out from the rest of Latin America possibly due to its population size and its economic prowess in comparison to neighboring countries. This may have influenced a decision to not be involved in organization based anti-corruption measures like what was accepted in Guatemala (IACAC) and other parts of Latin America.

IACAC outlined all of the measures Guatemala had to take as a signatory in the agreement. These measures caused Guatemala to develop oversight positions in government that would watch out for and handle corruption internal to the government. This provided accountability among government officials and this probably is one of the reasons why Guatemala was able to convict Molina and incarcerate him. For Brazilians, BCCA "provides for administrative and civil strict liability for foreign or domestic corporations that promise, offer, or give (directly or indirectly) any undue advantage to a public servant or a third person related to him or that fund efforts to use a third party to do so" (Coie, Reider-Gordon, & Funk, 2014, p. 12). This is the policy that allows for the punishment of those who decide to commit fraud in government and the private sector. However, it does not provide the details for the organization for enforcement similar to those provided by IACAC. It could be that this already relies upon an established judicial system that is set up to handle violators, which is most likely the case. Therefore, one major difference between policies is that IACAC outlines organization whereas BCCA relies on pre-existing organization.

### **Guatemala and Brazil: Comparison of the Use of Authority**

In Guatemala, one researcher described the political environment as a narcodemocracy, referring to the supposed or evidenced influence of drug trafficking organizations on the outcomes of elections and political agendas (Sanchez, 2008). This may also stem from Guatemala's history of offering impunity to high ranking officials and overlooking their actions. Similarly, Brazil has a history of impunity and the legal system is biased towards those with authority or position (Adorno, 2013). These elements make it difficult for anti-corruption policy to work effectively, because the institutions and infrastructure do not seem to be in place to encourage transparency and hold government accountable.

Earlier it was noted that IACAC provides direction for Guatemala to develop anti-corruption policy through its use of organization whereas BCCA serves as law to outline what is illegal. Where authority comes into play is in the enforcement of these measures. Brazil's BCCA is generally considered to take a tough stance, but if its judicial system is unable to enforce these measures then the policies' validity may fade. Adorno (2013) compares Brazil's legal system to a funnel in which certain aspects of society are punished more

often or more severely than others. It could be that the judicial system may exhibit certain levels of partiality and a high degree of impunity may still exist. Other than the legal system, there are additional examples of other ways by which authority may be subverting the policies' effects, even to the point of preventing passage of effective measures. Exchanges are used in Brazilian politics "to cement loyalties...and buy large numbers of legislative votes on key national issues" (Geddes & Ribeiro, 1992, p. 647). Use of authority has the potential to help or hinder Brazil's anti-corruption measures; essentially Brazilians law makers are buying others' votes. However, Rousseff's impending impeachment may suggest that things are moving in a more positive direction.

In Guatemala the IACAC is working to establish anti-corruption infrastructure and positions are created to enable accountability and transparency. These are all measures established to promote the institutionalization of anti-corruption initiatives across the region in Latin America. The idea seems sound, but as Altamirano (2007) suggests, IACAC may not be actively enforced at the level intended by the policy developers. Similar to Brazil, impunity continues to hamper the progress in Guatemala, because those who are holding others accountable in the government are not necessarily being held accountable themselves. Policies for both countries should in theory work as long as proper authority and the right level of authority is applied to their enforcement.

#### **Guatemala and Brazil: Comparison of the Use of Information**

Geddes and Ribeiro (1992) suggest that the media plays a significant role in making anti-corruption policy feasible. This feasibility comes from a fundamental of democracy, freedom of the press, which is, in fact, guaranteed by both governments. The media may be the only source by which the people can find out about political scandals. This most likely is the reason why the public has a perception of corruption in their governments, because, as Altamirano (2007) suggests, actors committing fraud usually do not want others to know about it.

The media is also typically the source of information individuals rely on to keep abreast of current events. This information also shapes perception, and is most likely the source for people's perceptions of corruption in a country. However, the media potentially can be manipulated into shaping the information that is shared and those with the means or position could have the power to do this. Kingdon (1995) suggests that policies are derived from policy groups promoting specific agendas and these agendas arise from what he calls policy streams. These groups shape the information that leads to the policy creation and through this they shape the environment of government practices. One example that appears in both countries is the election process.

Guatemala is known for having very few rules governing campaign donations and for still having a number of campaign parties that espouse campaign founder ideals rather than shared ideals (Sanchez, 2008). Similarly, Brazil has very few rules governing its campaign process and has many more campaign parties. Brazil dramatically increased the amount of money spent on campaigns in 2014. In 2002 only \$321 million was spent as compared to \$3 billion in 2014 for the same contested seats. Corporations are able to sway candidates to promote their agendas through the amounts they pay to fund their campaigns (Bevins, 2014). This occurs in other countries as well to include in the U.S. However, a point of clarity is added to explain that Brazil does not have an overall economy comparable to that of the U.S., so for Brazil, these expenses are excessive. Bevins adds, quoting Furtado, president of Brazil's Bar Association, that "the actual system (referring to campaign donations) is, in reality, a business investment strategy, in which large economic groups establish an extremely unhealthy relationship with democracy" (Bevins, 2014). This would suggest that enterprises are directly shaping the campaign process by promoting their own

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agendas and thereby shaping the information voters receive which leads to them voting for a particular candidate. Once these candidates are in office they are placed in a position of power to shape the policies that governs society and ultimately push the agendas of their campaign funders.

The reason for exploring this example was to indicate how government is being shaped by the way information is controlled in Brazil and Guatemala. Powerful special interest groups are able to pay large amounts of money to ensure a candidate is elected to office. These are the officials that should be upholding the law and promoting democracy through transparency and accountability. However, some may not uphold the law and their position could be giving them the ability to control information that distorts transparency and accountability. Additionally, if caught committing fraud, they can find ways around the law through political impunity. Unfortunately, Brazil's and Guatemala's election systems appear to promote unhealthy information control. Sanchez (2008) explains that this is turning Guatemala into a "narcodemocracy" and Bevins (2014) provided a few details about how this is affecting Brazil. Both countries have anti-corruption measures, a few were discussed earlier, but information sharing is hindering the effectiveness of these policies. More work is needed to shape the political environment before progress can be made towards anti-corruption. One more example is provided that may suggest future direction for Brazil.

Bremmer (2016) feels that though the scandal with Rouseff's involvement in a PETROBRAS kick-back scheme was unfortunate, it helped make a difference for Brazil. He refers to it as the crisis Brazil needed, because it will help the country work towards improving its governance. This perspective is interesting and may suggest that policy still needs to catch up to where it needs to be. Also, it may be that the country is beginning to understand that it can no longer tolerate corruption and in order to deal with it, the right policy is needed. Yet, Brazil comes from a tough past and seems to be gradually headed in the right direction. Molina's ouster and prison time appears to suggest the same for Guatemala. However, sources of corruption are multifaceted and require further analysis to fully understand it. Discussion of one last topic, cultural differences, is relevant to finding a more comprehensive comparison.

### **Guatemala & Brazil Comparison of Cultural Differences**

Differences between Brazil and Guatemala are further clarified through discussion about the countries' cultures and how they developed their respective anti-corruption policies. Although both countries are categorized as Latin American, there are several notable cultural differences. The research of Geert Hofstede (2011) is useful in decoding some of these differences and providing understanding. Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory is represented as a basic framework for cross-cultural communication. Simply stated, it describes the various effects that a society's culture has on the values of its members, in particular, how these values relate to behavior. Hofstede's original theory identified four dimensions along which to analyze cultural values. Table 2 summarizes the six dimensions of national culture that result from Hofstede's research.

Using Hofstede's (2011) model, it appears that both Brazil and Guatemala exhibit behavior which causes them to be labeled a high collectivist society. This type of society is one in which the goals of the group are more important than those of society (Husted, 2002). Brazil and Guatemala appear to exhibit this type of culture and that could explain to some extent why they are encountering similar issues with corruption. Brazilians place the value of relationships over rules and Guatemalans have a history of offering impunity to high ranking and otherwise powerful individuals. This perhaps explains some of the difficulties with implementing BCCA and IACAC.

<b>Table 2</b>	
<b>Hofstede's Six Dimensions of National Culture</b>	
<b>Dimension</b>	<b>Description</b>
Power Distance Index (PDI)	Defined as the extent to which less powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed unequally. A higher value indicates that a hierarchy is clearly established and executed in society. Lower values signify that people question authority
Individualism vs. Collectivism (IDV)	Explores the extent to which people in a society are grouped. Individualistic societies have loose ties that often only join individuals to the immediate family. Collectivism describes a society in which close relationships tie members into in-groups characterized by binding loyalty and support
Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI)	Defined as a society's tolerance for ambiguity. Societies with a high score in this index maintain rigid codes of behavior, guidelines, laws, and generally rely on the existence of an absolute truth that dictates everything and everyone knows what it is. Lower scores show more acceptance of opposing thoughts and ideas. The result is that society imposes fewer regulations and ambiguity is more tolerated.
Masculinity vs. Femininity (MAS)	Masculinity is defined as a preference for achievement, heroism, assertiveness and material rewards for success. Femininity represents a preference for cooperation, modesty, caring for the weak and quality of life. Women in different societies tend to display different values; in feminine societies, they share modest and caring views equally with men, while in more masculine societies, women are more emphatic and competitive, but notably less so than men. They still see a gap between male and female values.
Long-term vs. Short-term Orientation (LTO)	Associates the connection of the past with current and future actions and challenges. A lower score, indicating a short-term orientation, indicates that traditions are honored and kept, revealing value given to steadfastness. Societies with a high score, indicating a long-term orientation, views adaptation and pragmatic problem-solving required by circumstances as being necessary. Poor countries with a short-term view usually have little or no economic development; long-term oriented countries continue to develop.
Indulgence vs. Restraint (IND)	Essentially a measure of happiness. Indulgence refers to the extent to which a society allows relatively free gratification of basic and natural human desires related to enjoying life. Restraint describes a society that controls gratification of needs, regulating it by means of strict social norms. In indulgent societies, people believe they are in control of their own lives and emotions, whereas people in restrained societies believe other factors dictate them.

Guatemala and Brazil also exhibit higher levels of uncertainty avoidance, another cultural dimension from Hofstede's (2011) work. Guatemala's level of uncertainty avoidance is extremely high meaning that they embrace structure and rules, whereas Brazil is more moderate allowing them to be more comfortable with less structure and more room for creativity and flexibility (Husted, 2002). Although this reveals very little about the historical reasons why corruption has become so embedded in each country's politics, it

does add background in order to more fully understand the countries being compared. However, these differences add to the complexity of comparing the two countries, even though some contrast may help to explain policy formation for each.

Another point to consider is Husted's generalization about Latin American policy creation in states ranked higher in levels of certainty avoidance. He explains that where high uncertainty avoidance exists, countries pass stricter laws, thus increasing the chance that the general populous ignore the laws. Therefore, Husted feels that it is not a question about whether Brazil and Guatemala have anti-corruption policy in place, but rather instead what are the countries doing to enforce their laws. "The cultural tendency will be to break the laws in practice since they do not fit perceived reality" (Husted, 2002, p. 418).

There are also some obvious cultural similarities between Brazil and Guatemala. Their collective nature helps explain many reasons why certain individuals are able to get around the law through impunity, perhaps due to group membership or affiliation with individuals of position or power. However, one difference is the level of uncertainty avoidance and this may suggest the reason why Guatemala chose to go with IACAC and Brazil chose to develop its own policy.

Guatemala is rated high in uncertainty avoidance (Husted, 2002). This means that they need levels of solid and stable infrastructure to function, whereas Brazilians are considered more comfortable with uncertainty. Brazil came up with BCCA, possibly based on what it observed being implemented in other countries. Guatemala utilized a more structured approach by working with other countries and within institutions to develop its anti-corruption measures. There are very possibly more differences that should be explored in future research. However, this does offer a possible explanation for why Brazil chose not to participate in IACAC despite that fact that neighboring countries did. They possibly did not see the need for infrastructure like the Guatemalans. Overall, culture is a broad topic that could easily be explored in much more depth, so it is recommend that future research consider this topic further to expand on its implications for the anti-corruption policies and sustainability of democracy in Brazil and Guatemala.

### Conclusion

Many people around the world have already concluded that corruption is an unresolvable problem and will likely always exist in some form. But those who are more optimistic argue that, in fact, the likelihood of solving most problems undoubtedly increases with the depth of our understanding of them, to include their causes and effects, the cost of addressing them versus not addressing them, and approaches to bringing about change. While this study does not answer the question of how to solve the world's corruption problem, or even only the portion of the problem found in only two specific countries, it does increase our level of understanding of it through their experience.

Throughout this qualitative comparative analysis, many topics were discussed and insights uncovered by comparing anti-corruption policy approaches in Brazil and Guatemala. What seemed most apparent after reviewing several studies found in the literature and analyzing each country is that corruption is a serious problem for both of these nations. It is potentially threatening to democracy in both the near and long term. It was interesting to note that some preferred an alternative to democracy when considering the level of corruption facilitated by their governments (Altamirano, 2007). However, IACAC helped institutionalize anti-corruption initiatives for Guatemala and BCCA help raised the standard in Brazil. Yet, both countries need to improve their political environments by addressing problems in the campaign process through the introduction of higher levels of transparency and additional levels of rules.

Additionally, impunity needs to be eliminated from each nation. They can no longer afford to allow politicians to blatantly break the law without suffering the consequences. This requires a culture of transparency and accountability.

On another point, Brazil should consider signing IACAC or at least look into the measures it enforces for the nations who enacted it. This could facilitate some of the anti-corruption measures needed to clean up Brazil's government. Additionally, Brazil should not wait for another crisis to occur before it does anything about the issues it is facing right now. The same probably could be said about Guatemala. It seems as though new policies emerge in response to political corruption implosions rather than addressing issues before they arise. This is going to be a long process that requires continual change.

Corruption is still so embedded in each country's culture that they will need to continue developing policy, institutionalizing processes, and addressing the root causes of corruption within their respective governments if they hold any hope for sustaining and preserving their democracy. Since recent events in both countries have yet to become history that can be studied, only time will tell what will happen with the charges facing Rousseff and how Morales fares as the new president of Guatemala. Hopefully, each country will realize a brighter future as a result of these events. Brazil showed in the past that it has the potential to grow economically at a rapid rate, but this relies on a stable government clean of corruption. Guatemala has potential, but needs to make certain that special interest groups are placed in check by establishing rules to prevent excessive influence by interest groups in politics.

The qualitative approach used in this study makes it difficult to determine whether or not anti-corruption policy is really making any difference. Specifically, after comparing the cultures of Guatemala and Brazil, it does raise questions of how culture contributes to citizens' perception of and tolerance for corruption. While there is clearly some explanatory power to this study, many questions remain unanswered by it. Perhaps further research beyond the scope of this study, that is more quantitative in its approach, is needed to evaluate what shapes public perception, and what is involved in the public's tolerance threshold for overlooking corruption versus mobilizing to take action against it. It is only through continued study that a path to consistently successful anti-corruption initiatives can be forged.

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