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Agreements – Gentlemen ('s) (Verbal) or Legal – which may Interfere Integration of Georgia into NATO

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Abstract

Recently, Russia which has been so dangerously active near the Ukrainian border actually speaks into ultimate language to the West and requests from it to terminate enlargement to the East - again and again makes actual such agreements - both legal and gentlemen ('s) according to which likely the West immediately after collapse of the Soviet Union has promised to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to terminate the enlargement to the East. The task of the given article is to detect how the mentioned fact meets the reality and if there is existing the Legal or other any type of agreement signed between NATO-Russia, which really prohibits the Alliance from enlargement to the East and hinders the countries in the former Soviet Union (Georgia, Ukraine) to become full members of NATO.

Key Words: NATO, RUSSIA, GEORGIA.

Introduction

Against the former spheres of influence, especially Georgia and Ukraine, for justify the own aggressive actions and its attitude Russian federation often uses narrative, according to which after collapse of Soviet Union, NATO likely promised Russia, that it would terminate to deploy and enlarge bases to the East and to justify it quotes the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russia Federation”, however the reality is different – the West had not promised Russia, that it never would deploy permanent military bases in the former Warsaw Pact Countries and NATO-Russia Founding act of 1997, does not prohibit to deploy bases in the East Europe, what Russia is attempting to prove. Even no other legal documents can confirm that to think about integration into the North Atlantic Alliance is prohibited for Georgia, be it the Washington Treaty of 1949, or the document adopted by the Alliance in 1995 entitled "Study on NATO Enlargement", which will be discussed in details below.

Methodology

The mentioned study is more belonged to the qualitative method from the existing three main methodologies (qualitative, quantitate, mixed). In the process of collecting data, together with the secondary sources, there will be used the primary sources in particular, various strategic concepts. During empirical study, there will be used online sources as well, for instance NATO documents archive. In addition, the newspapers articles will be used as extra sources. The study is mainly based on the after period of 1990s and especially to analyze such documents which are created after collapse the Soviet Union - those documents had been received directly inside the Alliance, and between the alliance and the third countries as well.

NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997

Insistence proving by Russia, that immediately after collapse of the Soviet Union, the West had promised that the Alliance would not be enlarged to the East, what has been breached by NATO many times, is well-known as the narrative entitled "Broken promises of the West".

Even during the annexation of Crimea in 2014, President Putin returned to this narrative, noting how insulted Russia has been by the West repeatedly breaking its promises, including regarding NATO enlargement.

As Ruhle (2014) points out, this narrative is occasionally addressed by Russia and used to justify its own actions (including in connection with recent activities in Ukraine). As Ruhle points out, based on an analysis of old and even recent documentary material, only one fundamental conclusion can be drawn: there is no binding document of any political or legal force that prohibits NATO from enlargement beyond the borders of a united Germany.

Like Ruhle (2014), Coffey & Kochis (2016) mention as well, that the West had not promised Russia that it would never deploy permanent military bases in the former Warsaw Pact countries, and that NATO-Russia Act of 1997, had not prohibited the deployment of the bases in Eastern Europe, as Russia attempts to prove.

The present document, which is often described as the most mentioned, but the least read (thought) document, emphasizes the following facts:

NATO reiterates that under the current security environment, the Alliance will carry out its collective defence and other missions by ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces. Accordingly, it will have to rely on adequate infrastructure commensurate with the above tasks. In this context, reinforcement may take place, when necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of aggression and missions in support of peace consistent with the United Nations Charter and the OSCE governing principles, as well as for exercises consistent with the adapted CFE Treaty, the provisions of the Vienna Document 1994 and mutually agreed transparency measures. Russia will exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe.

Almost 25 years have passed since the signature of this Act, and the "current security environment", as stated in the document, has long since ceased to exist; the attitude Moscow towards Euro-Atlantic security has changed significantly over these years, what can be proved by a number of examples, including:

In 1999, Russia promised to withdraw its troops from Moldova by 2002, although there are still about 2,000 Russian soldiers in Transnistria.

In 2006, Russia cut off natural gas supply to Ukraine, reduced gas supply to European countries that are also members of NATO.

In 2007, Russia stood behind a cyber-attack against Estonia in retaliation for destroy of a Soviet-era war memorial in Tallinn.

In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia and there were a few kilometers away the capital city of Georgia. Russia currently occupies 20 percent of Georgia's territory and often violates the agreement of 2008 about ceasefire.

Russia illegally annexed Crimea in 2014 and continues to support and assist separatists in the Donbas region (and not only here). The subject of a separate article is the ongoing military exercises and the increase of military forces near Ukrainian border in the given period and the game initiated by Russia in this context.

At least, these events are enough to prove that the "current security environment" in Europe no longer exists and has changed dramatically since 1997, and that only this fact is enough to justify the permanent presence of NATO troops in the Central and Eastern Europe.

As the Coffey & Kochis (2016) have pointed out, it is important that the myth of the deployment of the permanent troops in Europe be ended once and for all and that America openly states, that agreement of 1997 does not prohibit the deployment of NATO permanent troops in the Eastern and Central Europe. The authors also point to the misinterpretation of this act by some NATO member states (for instance Germany), which use the document of 1997 to justify their opposite mind to the permanent deployment of NATO forces in the Eastern and Central Europe.

As Dannreuther (1999-2000) writes, Russia expressed one of its first discontent about NATO enlargement in the early 1990s. When in 1993, President Boris Yeltsin wrote a letter to his American counterpart Bill Clinton talking about the illegality of enlargement, as evidenced by the agreement of 1990 on German reunification. Belief that German reunification would prevent further NATO enlargement was widespread among the Russian elite. For example, Russian analyst Sergei Karaganov writes: "In 1990, we were told quite clearly that German reunification would not lead to NATO enlargement. We did not ask for written guarantees, because in the euphoric situation created at that time, it would have seemed unacceptable action. "

Dannreuther (1999-2000) mentions, that this proving by Russia is quite doubtful, since it refers to 1990, when the main issue of the negotiations was the reunification of Germany and there was no specific evidence that the leaders of the West and the Soviet Union were interested with the issue on further enlargement of NATO. Dannreuther (1999-2000) believes that the main source of heartache for Russia towards NATO is the perception that initially NATO allies made a promise on the issue of enlargement, which was later violated. This understanding is the result of a widespread consensus in Moscow that NATO's attempt to cooperate with Russia cannot be reliable, as the main goal of the Alliance is to marginalize Russia and exclude it from European and international affairs.

As Kroenig (2015) was writing, one might think that actions of NATO in the Baltic States and Poland, which are linked to defense of these countries, violate the promises made in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, however, the author notes that "Putin himself has entered us into a new era", which in turn has broken many of the most important promises made to the West, including the attack on Georgia and Ukraine - There is indicated in the above-mentioned act, that Russia should refrain from threatening or using force against any country, as well as from any actions that would threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another country.

The Washington Treaty and the Study on NATO Enlargement

According to a widely spread view, the main obstacles to get member of the North Atlantic Alliance for Georgia are the separated territories from Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As Latvian Ambassador to NATO Janis Eichmanis (2010) mentioned in an interview with the newspaper "24 Hours" years ago, it is quite difficult to prove that the occupied territories are hindering the process of NATO integration for Georgia, whereas according to the diplomat, for example, the issue of the border between Latvia and Russia was resolved and completed only after Latvia became a member of NATO. It should be also mentioned the example of Germany - in 1955, the western part of Germany, which was split in two, joined NATO.

According to the main charters and documents of NATO, despite the occupied territories, the possibility of membership in NATO for Georgia's remains. Washington Agreement of 1949 and

Study on NATO Enlargement adopted by the Alliance in 1995 are considered in the first place among these documents.

According to Article 10, of the Treaty of Washington, in order to join such treaty "The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area."

This article indicates that getting of a new member to the Alliance takes place in the result of consensus of the member states, in accordance with the decision of the North Atlantic Council, and the third party (a non-NATO country) has no right to influence the decision-making process in any way.

Regarding the "Study on NATO Enlargement", this document lists the main requirements that the country will have to meet, which aspires to join the Alliance and which is important for Georgia, it can be said that the country meets the main requirements, including:

The membership applicants shall agree to and help to promote the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the safeguarding of the freedom, common heritage and civilization of all Alliance members and their people, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. New members will need to conform to these basic principles;

Accord strictly with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty which states that "the parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty ...";

Be on the basis that new members will enjoy all the rights and assume all obligations of membership under the Washington Treaty; and accept and conform with the principles, policies and procedures adopted by all members of the Alliance at the time that new members join;

Strengthen the Alliance's effectiveness and cohesion; and preserve the Alliance's political and military capability to perform its core functions of common defence as well as to undertake peacekeeping and other new missions;

Be part of a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe. It would threaten no-one; and enhance stability and security for all of Europe;

Take account of the continuing important role of PfP, which will both help prepare interested partners, through their participation in PfP activities, for the benefits and responsibilities of eventual membership and serve as a means to strengthen relations with partner countries which may be unlikely to join the Alliance early or at all. Active participation in the Partnership for Peace will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the enlargement of NATO;

Complement the enlargement of the European Union, a parallel process which also, for its part, contributes significantly to extending security and stability to the new democracies in the East.

New members, at the time that they join, must commit themselves, as all current Allies do on the basis of the Washington Treaty, to:

Unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security; settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

Contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being;

Maintain the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits of assuring common security goals and objectives.

As it turned out, despite insistence proving by Russia that the alliance had promised it after the collapse of the Soviet Union that enlargement to the East would no longer take place, behind all of these there is no document with any legal force that proves that such agreement/treaty really took place and an in-depth study of the issue reveals, that the Alliance has not broken its promises of enlargement to the East or any kind of agreement. In fact, there is no legal barrier - both inside and outside the country - that would prevent a country from joining the organization. This applies as the domestic legislation of the country and the legal instruments of the Alliance itself, the agreements concluded between the Alliance and third countries as well.

Probably that is why, that especially recently, Russia, which has become so dangerously active near the border of Ukraine, is directly seeking guarantees from the West, without any disguise - Guarantees that the Alliance will stop enlargement and Ukraine will never become a member of the Alliance, there is not spoken about Georgia, to which it mentions less. However, it is hopeful (perhaps no one else had other expectations) US officials and NATO diplomats respond to the rude demands of Russia - they have once again observed the unacceptability of the ultimatum - that a third country could not intervene before and cannot now decide the enlargement fate of the North Atlantic Alliance, and that it is only a choice of NATO member states and the partner country itself. However, to avoid remain words just as words, it is high time to take unfavorable concrete steps for Russia from the side of the West, to convince Russia that the time to speak in the language of threats, blackmail, ultimatums is over and it can no longer interfere in the choice of its "backyard" countries to determine their own vector.

Conclusion

As it was mentioned, there is no gentlemen(s) agreement or legal barrier that would prevent Georgia from joining the Alliance, as evidenced by the key NATO documents that speak of getting new members to the Alliance, including - "Study on NATO enlargement of 1995" and Washington Treaty of 1949 - In this document there is directly mentioned, that the third state could not make a decision the issue of enlargement the Alliance, only Alliance member states participate in this process. Regarding the "Study on NATO Enlargement" - here are the requirements that must be met by the candidate country, and it can be said that if we take the example of Georgia, a country desiring and pending to join, Georgia can actually meet the main listed criteria.

Normally, Russia should be more wary of its loud statements that the Alliance promised Russia to terminate its eastward enlargement under the NATO-Russia treaty of 1997, which it subsequently broke - When it comes to enforcing the treaty and adhering to its terms - Russia is the one who undermined the 1997 agreement and violated its main records - whether it be deploying bases or launching cyber and armed attacks on neighboring, former Soviet Union countries.

In the context of Georgia, all this may give the impression that if a country meets the legal requirements for membership in the Alliance, the main obstacles to the country integration into

NATO, for example, are political barriers, which are difficult for the country to overcome - be it the serious challenges to the country's electoral system or the rule of law. However, the reality and comparative analysis (this is the subject of another thesis) show that in this respect the situation in the country is subjected to correction and compared to other countries (which have already passed the path to NATO membership) does not lag behind them in the terms of these criteria, what makes it possible to conclude that this criteria, like the legal barriers, can be considered satisfactory and removed from the list of serious, decisive obstacles on the path to NATO membership.

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Terrorism as a means for the radical groups to achieve secession: the cases of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country

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Abstract

Terrorism, which has become an important phenomenon in today's world, has its roots in many historical events that have negatively affected the welfare of certain nations. Throughout many years, several nationalist groups have found terrorist acts and methods useful in order to provoke fear in people and achieve their goals. The examples of such groups include the ones operating in Northern Ireland of the United Kingdom and the Basque Country of Spain. It is remarkable that they have made a significant effort to utilize the terrorist means for the separatist ends.

The purpose of this paper is to study the terrorist acts that were carried out by the radical groups in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country and find out whether they managed to fulfil their intentions on secession by depending on these violent measures. First and foremost, the paper is oriented on the brief description of the two cases and the essence of the thesis in the introduction. After describing research methods and reviewing the scientific sources, the focus is mainly on analyzing the cases in details in order to find out whether the terrorist activities were useful or useless for the secession. Finally, the major findings are discussed in the conclusion.

Keywords

ETA; IRA; Northern Ireland; Terrorism; the Basque Country.

Introduction

The terrorist activities in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country still require a careful in-depth analysis by social and humanitarian scientists. The history of each region shows that both of them were negatively influenced by the precedents of violence on their territories. In case of Northern

Ireland, one of such circumstances was the drastic Irish uprising in 1919 becoming a prerequisite for the territorial divisions. The Basques were afraid of the linguistic and cultural oppression after the end of the Royalist War (1820-1823) and the two Carlist Wars (1833 and 1873-1876) which were the major events of the civil tensions in Spain (Turner, 2015). According to Bartlett and Miller (2012), the radical actions of certain groups/minorities may frequently lead to prevalence of the terrorist tendencies. It appears that these two cases were not the exceptions. The miserable murders of 832 persons were carried out by the ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatusna, meaning “the Basque Homeland and Freedom”) members in the Basque Country between 1968 and 2003. The situation was almost the same in Northern Ireland, as between the years of 1970 and 2000, PIRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army which became independent of Irish Republican Army in 1969 (Turner, 2015)) managed to kill 1 961 civilians with the help of armed groups, sharing the same worldviews (De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). In essence, the evident similarity between the two minorities is their radical attitude towards the central authorities, leading to secession.

Taking into consideration the aforementioned facts, it is remarkable that many scientific works have been written on Northern Ireland and the Basque Country but only few authors have analyzed terrorism as a helpful or on the contrary, an inefficient mechanism for the the violent groups of these minorities to reach success in implementing their final plans. Thereafter, it is interesting to study whether the Irish and the Basque ethnic minorities achieved their goals by using such violent and troublesome methods which caused the deaths of dozens of innocent people (De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006).

Literature Review

The scientific sources about Northern Ireland and the Basque Country are vitally important to understand the essence of the paper. It is remarkable that many authors describe and analyze the nationalist groups within these regions but the usefulness/uselessness of terrorist acts for their separatist plans is not comprehensively studied.

Rogelio Alonso compares ETA and IRA’s activities and the central governments’ policies towards their radicalism. He reckons that it was hard to cope with Basques’ violence while the situation was different in Northern Ireland. The escalation of tensions by the Basque terrorists spoiled the ground for achieving peace while the Irish case appeared to be opposite. Alonso emphasizes the Basques insufficient political will to reach an agreement and their sympathy towards ETA’s violent

activities. Nevertheless, author does not assess the importance of terrorism for the secession of the regions (Alonso, 2004). Luis de la Calle and Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca's paper is also about the terrorist acts in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. The Authors pay attention to the ethnic nationalism and provide a broad picture of terrorism in both regions. To their mind, it is hard to obtain the precise information of the murders committed during the activities of ETA, IRA and their different branches. They focus on the separatist goals of the Irish and the Basques and also the number of deaths during the terror. They concentrate on the different kinds of murders and also analyze the terrorists' motivational factors for choosing potential victims but do not much assess the essence of terrorism for secession (De la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). Jerrold M. Post analyzes the historical aspects and the important factors of both Basque and Irish nationalism, too. His research is dedicated to the flow of events and the final stages of peacemaking in both cases. The significant difference between the two regions, found by the author, is almost the same as Rogelio Alonso's opinion: the peace process was firmer in Northern Ireland than in the Basque Country. Post's work is beneficial as it shows the decrease of dynamics of violence after a certain period of time but the author does not precisely summarize whether terrorism was useful or not for the secessionist groups in both regions (Post, 2007). The Basque Country and the Northern Ireland as well as Corsica are the cases studied by Carl Peter Turner as well. The author pays attention to the fundamental historical aspects of violence and similar to Rogelio Alonso and Jerrold M. Post, presents the change of the dramatic bloodshed by more or less a peaceful process. He analyzes the violent groups' activities in the frames of their secessionist approaches. Turner also reviews diverse researches on terrorist and conflictual issues and looks at the circumstances, approaches and practical steps of actors, involved in the cases. Turner's judgements are one of the few analytical works showing the essence of violence for the separatist perceptions (Turner, 2015). Rogelio Alonso's another study is fully dedicated to ETA. He analyzes the organization's violent attitudes as a means to accomplish the goals and concentrates on the foreign impact on its progress. The author also emphasizes ETA's links with the global terrorist world. To his mind, it alienated from those groups that quit the bloody activities. He sees a huge difference between the legal radical steps of the Spanish government and the Basque terrorists' unjustifiable merciless attitudes. Alonso mentions ETA's plans on secession but terrorism is not analyzed as a facilitator or an obstructive factor for accomplishing these plans (Alonso, 2011). Sezai Özçelik's work is about ETA's radical activities. He describes the Basque violent nationalism and draws readers' attention

to Miguel Angel Blanco's murder. He focuses both on cultural and conflictual aspects of the case and emphasizes the necessity of negotiations between the central government and the Basques. The source is valuable due to its analysis of changing circumstances in the Basque case. However, Özçelik is not oriented on the usefulness of terrorism for separatism, either (Özçelik, 2017). Jamie Bartlett and Carl Miller focus on the dramatization of the events that lead to terrorist acts. They argue that radicalism does not a priori foresee bloodshed and killing, as it may only refer to opposing the existing conditions. The authors emphasize tendencies of violence and non-violence and assume that the first has an affiliation with extremism and terrorism which is almost excluded in case of the latter. Although the paper shows the contrast between terrorists and peaceful demonstrators, it is not oriented on analyzing how useful the terrorist acts may be to achieve separatism (Bartlett, & Miller, 2012).

The above-analyzed scientific literature shows that the meaning of terrorist activities for the secessionist groups is not sufficiently studied in the social sciences, despite many works, devoted to the Basque Country and Northern Ireland's cases. Therefore, studying the essence of the terrorist tendencies of the Basque and Irish separatists may provide interesting results.

Methodology

The subject of the research is the use of terrorist attacks as a means for the certain organizations in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country to fulfil their plans to secede. The research question of the paper is: what impact did the terrorist activities, strongly influenced by the historical roots of violence, have on the processes in order to facilitate separatism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country? In other words, I want to analyze if terrorism was a helpful tool in the hands of these groups to accomplish their ends.

According to Van Evera's (1997) explanations, the above analysis and the research question show that the independent variable is the roots of violence on the territories of Northern Ireland and the Basque Country, the intervening variable is the influence of terrorist groups and the dependent variable - the secession of the regions.

The research is carried out by both qualitative and quantitative methods. The main emphasis is on the case study method (Babbie, 2016) which provides an opportunity to analyze the situations caused by the terrorist acts in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. The textual analysis (Carley, 1997) is also important to find out the essence of official statements and academic authors'

opinions on the aforementioned cases. The statistical data (Babbie, 2016) is also used in order to find out the numbers of wounded, injured and murdered people during the terrorist acts in the regions.

The conceptualization of the main terms, used in variables is important to understand the essence of the thesis (Babbie, 2016). One of such terms is the roots of violence. As discussed above, this term refers to severe events, causing trouble on the territories of the aforementioned regions (e. g. Irish riot in 1919, Royalist War of 1820-1823, the Carlist Wars of 1833 and 1873-1876, etc.) and becoming antecedents of more radical circumstances in future (Turner, 2015). The other concept which is important for the research is terrorism. The most suitable meaning of this term for my paper is the one provided by the researchers of these two cases, De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2006): the authors describe terrorism as a form of “...violence which is the outcome of terrorist organizations pursuing certain goals. Terrorists are constrained materially by the resources they have, and ideologically by the preferences of their supporters.” (p. 2). According to them, the bloody attacks and merciless killings were committed “by Republican terrorist organizations in Northern Ireland and by nationalist ones in the Basque Country” (Abstract page). Furthermore, the plans for the secession of the Irish and Basque radical groups also needs to be explained. It is remarkable that the Basques were in favor of establishing a sovereign state and the Irish, living in Northern Ireland, strived towards becoming the part of the Republic of Ireland by leaving the United Kingdom (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006).

The operationalization of the variables is an essential part of the paper as well (Babbie, 2016). The roots of violence are observed through the historical tensions and dramatic circumstances in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country (Turner, 2015). Terrorism is measured by the essence and the results of the terrorist acts which were carried out by the terrorist groups in both regions. The statistical information on the people who suffered from those acts is also a helpful aspect in order to have a perfect understanding of the phenomenon. Concerning the major goals of the minorities, the focus is on the facts which illustrate whether the regions finally achieved the separation from their states or if the bloody steps were taken by the radicals inside the regions in order to fulfil their plans (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). The statements and main messages will also be analyzed to realize the essence of violent activities. All of these indicators help to identify the cause-and-effect relationship between the given variables.

The given methodology is pivotal to analyze the subject of the research. In my view, they are helpful to assess the importance of the terrorist campaign of their separatist groups in both regions.

Analysis

The case of Northern Ireland

The historical roots of violence

“Historical precedents provide the foundations for later conflict and the historical experience of Ireland was domination by the British over centuries...” – says Turner (2015, p. 185). The historical circumstances around the Irish people contributed to the drastic situations that developed later. They had the intrinsic clashes in the Middle Ages, resulting in the separation of the ethnos. This was followed by the spread of English rule on their territory during the second half of the 12th century. Due to the fact that the British did not have a wide impact on the island, they decided to impose their norms on the Irish which became an antecedent to the violent confrontations (Turner, 2015). It seems that the Irish were under a cultural and an ethnic pressure of the British which would most probably result in their protest.

It is remarkable that the Irish Wars lasted till 1603 when Hugh O’Neil’s riot was suppressed by Queen Elizabeth I. The rapid spread of Protestantism between the English and the Scots, facilitated by the Reformation process, did not lead to the same success between the Irish (Turner, 2015). It can be said that such events prepared the ground for serious future tensions. During the struggle of Williamites and Jacobites in the 1600s, the English strived towards increasing their influence on Ireland which resulted in the opposite situation. An important nationalist union, the Society of United Irishmen, was formed which was later linked to a political entity, “the Defenders”, in the 1700s. The activities of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, including the assassination of the Permanent Under-Secretary, the formation of the radical Irish political platform Sinn Fein and the unsuccessful riot campaign of the Irish groups in 1917, resulting in the tragic deaths of their leaders, also made a remarkable impact on the flow of processes. At the beginning of the following century, the Catholic Association stood up for the rights of the followers of Catholicism. The nationalist tendencies were accelerated by the killing of an influential figure, Theobald Wolfe Tone and the Great Potato Famine as the number of people living on the territory of Ireland fell to less than 5 million in the 1910s (Turner, 2015). It is obvious that the Irish feelings of hatred and incompatibility with the English were intensified. The crucial point was the transformation of the

Irish Republican Brotherhood into the Irish Republican army (IRA) which was followed by a fierce uprising against the English in 1919. The island itself was divided into the Northern part with the vast majority of the population, following Protestantism and the Southern one with the adherents of the Catholic religion (Turner, 2015).

The analyzed facts show that the precedents of violence made a significant contribution to the spread of radicalism between the Irish and to the rise of IRA. It is interesting how the radical tendencies continued and whether they had a beneficial effect on the violent groups to achieve the secession.

The emergence of terrorism

As De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca (2006) reckon, “violence may generate radicalism and support endogenously... Violence may bring about more radical preferences for violence and more support for the terrorists (and therefore more resources)” (p. 7). Thereafter, the terrorist groups may create an environment for the oppressive affairs and may even take the steps which the central government of the country is constrained to take. Such situation was developed in Northern Ireland. It should be noted that various organizations, having links with IRA, were responsible for the terrorist activities in the region: the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) and the Republican Action Force (RAF) were established under PIRA. There also existed the Official IRA which created the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) and which had many branches (e. g. Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO)). PIRA, for instance, started a campaign of ruthless struggle against the drugs by murdering lots of people, involved in this affair. Despite not being an ultimate aim of the organization, PIRA used this campaign as a means to persuade ordinary citizens in having power to make the critical decisions which the state was inept to make (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). It appears that the terrorists focused on the sensitive issues to increase their popularity and the number of followers.

The emergence of IRA brought the Irish Civil war in the 1920s in which the victory was gained by the group being in favor of the Irish independence. The IRA members had intended to start the political activity under the Fianna Fail party but IRA itself was announced as an outlawed entity in 1936. It became mainly interested in struggling against the English in Northern Ireland and protecting the adherents of Catholicism during the separation of the island by using violent measures (Turner, 2015). It is remarkable that the terrorists in Northern Ireland assassinated the

Protestant citizens in the region at some point by their religious beliefs which actually facilitated the discriminatory violence (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). After the division of the Irish territory into two parts in 1921, the population of the region became skeptical to the English. That's why, IRA focused on using arms against the British in order to achieve its goals but the 1956-1962 violent "Operation Harvest" was so unsuccessful due to the strict response of central and local opposing forces that it even started thinking about changing its style of behavior (Turner, 2015). It can be said that the radicals were moving towards the secession of the region by the bloody means.

It appears that terrorism was at first used by certain groups in Northern Ireland as an instrument against the central government but then they decided to modify their strategies and methods. The reasons and results of this decision are analyzed in the next section.

The profitability of Terrorism for secession

Terrorist attacks made a negative effect on the welfare of many innocent people in Northern Ireland. The paramilitary groups killed citizens in the following order: 1 644 people were killed by PIRA, 24 – by RAF, 49 – by OIRA, 126 – by INLA, 23 – by IPLO, 31 – by the Real IRA, 64 – by the unidentified Republican terrorists. Such murders were committed during the severe activities such as Omagh explosion of machines. Most of the activities were carried out between the 1970s and the 1990s (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). The "Bloody Sunday" was one of the most drastic events in 1972: 13 people were murdered and 27 were severely hurt during the clash of the police and military forces with "Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association" demonstrators in Londonderry. The explosions in Woolwich and Birmingham in 1974 were the continuation of the dramatic period (Turner, 2015). Bearing in mind these facts, the general situation can be emphasized as vulnerable because it gained the violent manner. Therefore, it is noteworthy that the British responded not only by the police forces but by certain peaceful steps, too: one of them was the 1973 Sunningdale Agreement about the Council of Ireland and the conditions for the coalition rule of Social Democratic and Labor and Unionist parties (Turner, 2015). Despite so many drastic cases, the terrorist groups in Northern Ireland did not succeed in achieving their main goal of secession from the British territory by such violent means (De la Calle and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). It was already apparent that the existing horrific environment had to be modified. Therefore, the 1994 peace agreement was initiated which assisted the normalization

of the dramatic conditions and led to talks involving various parties. In comparison with the 1990s, IRA and its followers were more radicals in the 1970s in spite of not being confident in the usefulness of coercive measures. In the 1960s, the central British government's agenda to Northern Ireland comprised of the following criteria: 1. Integration of Northern Ireland with South in case the population of the region was in favor of this process; 2. Foreseeing the Ireland's position about the rule of Northern Ireland; 3. Efficient local coalition government of the Northern Ireland. Those principles were actually envisaged during the peace talks in the 1990s (Alonso, 2004). Most members of IRA's Army Council and its Chief of Staff found their traditional methods useless and instead started thinking of setting up workers' unions with Protestants and Catholics working together (Turner, 2015). Therefore, the 1998 Belfast Agreement, acceptable for IRA as well as Sinn Fein, facilitated the process (Alonso, 2004), despite RIRA's protests towards it (Post, 2007). This was followed by the critical decision of IRA on rejecting the violent measures in 2001. In essence, peace gained victory on terrorism, as the radicals understood that violence was no longer a reliable tool for the realization of their plans (Alonso, 2004).

In sum, the change of events in Northern Ireland proved that the terrorist acts were useless for the radical groups in order to achieve the secession of the region. In my opinion, the essence of this section can best be described by Alonso's (2004) words:

“In fact, the redefinition of traditional Irish nationalism experienced by the main nationalist formations in the island has been a key factor in the IRA's decision to abandon its terrorist campaign. Previous to the IRA's 1994 ceasefire and contrary to what the Irish terrorist group would have desired, constitutional nationalism in the North and the South of Ireland rejected a pan-nationalist front which would have included Sinn Fein as an exchange for the IRA's cessation. Had republicans been successful in their attempts, a peace process with the Unionist community would have been impossible to develop. This factor, together with the defeat of the IRA, is the basis of the peace process in Northern Ireland. ...Many academics and politicians have defined the Northern Ireland peace process as a model in conflict resolution that should be used around the world...” (p. 708).

The case of the Basque Country

The historical roots of violence

The Basques represent the ethnos which was frequently involved in battles and became familiar with the military affairs. The Spanish well-off tradesmen discriminated against the Basque lower class. After the penetration of the French into the Basque territory in the 19th century, they gained control on several lands but had to overcome the severe attacks from Basques in Navarra. After the French were driven out of the territory in 1813, the civil unrest burst in Spain, having phases of the Royalist War of 1820-1823) and the two Carlist Wars of 1833 and 1873-1876 (Turner, 2015). Presumably, such a national disorder prepared the ground for the violent circumstances in the state, concerning the Basques as well.

After the end of the Carlist Wars, the Basques were worried about the possible oppression from First Republic of Spain. Sabino de Arana y Goiri, who founded the party “Centro Vasco” (then “Partido Nacionalista Vasco” – PNV), came up with fundamental principles of the Basque Nationalism in the 19th century. He developed the radical approach by concentrating on the chauvinist aspects. The Basque Country achieved huge success under PNV before General Primo de Rivera’s rule. PNV regained power after the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic and assisted in obtaining the Basque autonomy. After the Civil War ended in 1939 and General Franco’s regime was established, the Basques suffered from the serious pressure by the central authorities of the state. The Basques’ nationalist perceptions were created by their struggle against the conquerors and the oppressors. This made an important psychological impact on them to blame the Spanish for violence. The activities of PNV against the Franco rule led to a stricter pressure on Basques. As a result, several leaders of PNV had to leave Spain in the 1950s which caused the weakening of the organization. Many Basques were murdered and arrested, many – fled from the country. The active Basque youth unions were founded during the 1940s and the 1950s. Such was the organization “To begin” (Ekin) which started lobbying radicalism together with the PNV youngsters’ platform, EGI and set up ETA in 1959 (Turner, 2015). “The nationalism of Arana, whose idea is to consider Euskadi an occupied country, and Francoism, which makes that occupation real”, - Turner’s (2015) description of the ETA’s primary views shows that it was a nationalist group created during the Basques’ major political drawbacks (p. 242). It was the initiator of the violent campaign against the dictatorial central government and committed its initial murder in 1960. Thus, it began the terrorist activities which it saw as a mechanism to achieve its

goal (Alonso, 2011). “There is perhaps no Biscayan of pure race that deep down does not sympathize with the separatist doctrine”, - the careful observation of Arana’s words creates an impression that the Basque nationalists mainly strived towards secession (Post, 2007, p. 57).

It can be assumed that at the early stage of their nationalist approaches Basques were willing to depend on the violent measure. Thus, at first the ETA policy strongly depended on the violent measures. Therefore, it is important to look at the development of circumstances after the 1960s.

The emergence of terrorism

As Alonso (2011) expresses, “International Perceptions of ETA’s violence have also decisively influenced its campaign in parallel with the evolution of the most recent wave of international terrorism.” (p. 184). Thereafter, the increasing terrorist tendencies of ETA is an interesting topic to analyze. It is true that the organization undertook many troublesome steps during the 1960s but in 1968 it resolved to be mainly oriented on killing the people. Such approach was strongly influenced by the Basques’ perceptions of radicalism and Franco’s brutal regime. The nationalist wave, driven by ETA, generated the violent background and gathered many adherents (Alonso, 2011). It can be emphasized that violence became a pivotal part of the group’s activities but still it has to be studied how the organization gained popularity and what kind of damage it caused.

The Basque nationalist attitudes were linked to coercion and provided the justifications for ETA towards murders and terrorist acts. All this bred in Basque’s the desire to combat the Spanish which itself became a motivational factor for their secessionist beliefs (Alonso, 2011). Keeping in mind the fact that Franco oppressed the Basque identity by banning their language, depriving them of their basic rights and blaming them for betrayal, it might not be surprising that the Basque ethnic nationalists were drowned in a terrorist whirlpool (Post, 2007). This can best be seen in Dodeca Salegi’s words: “Franco made us nationalists by his persecution” (Post, 2007, p. 57). The functional characteristics and development history of ETA also have an important meaning to realize all the aforementioned circumstances. Its followers’ number grew from 70 to 300 in the 1959-1960 period (Turner, 2015). The men would join the group more because of ideology and the women – because of social factors. The ordinary social demonstrators became the radicals in the 1960s and started the campaign of mass murders (Post, 2007). ETA’s violent tactics was disguised by the short-term goal of manipulating the Franco’s regime to strengthen the pressure on the Basques which would be a good reason to start fulfilling the long-term aim of secession.

Nevertheless, it was really hard to resist the central authorities, as the dictatorial police and military forces were powerful enough to stop the ETA followers (Turner, 2015). One of the most drastic circumstances was the explosion of the Prime Minister of the state, Admiral Luis Carerro Blanco in 1973. All this, in fact, demonstrates the wicked nature of the Basque radicals that step by step were flaring the fire of terror. After Franco's rule was changed by the democratic system, the new central government increased the Basques' self-governing rights. However, ETA continued striving towards separatism (Post, 2007). It is also important that during the 6th of the several ETA assemblies the intrinsic fragmentation bred three different branches – ETA-V, ETA-VI and the Red Cells – that became ideologically distant from each other. Afterwards, two separate fractions were created from ETA-V: ETA-pm (arms race and politics intertwined) and ETA-m (denying political change and supporting radicalization). The terrorists appeared to be more impulsive (Turner, 2015).

The given analysis portrays terrorism as a reliable tool for the Basques in the beginning. Therefore, it is interesting to find out how helpful the violent campaign was for ETA to achieve the major goal of secession.

The profitability of Terrorism for secession

“We want a Basque Country that is free, united and socialist”; “we will not lay down arms and achieve it” - These words of two different distinguished figures of ETA of 1973 paved the way for violence (Post, 2007, p. 60). More than 600 people were killed by ETA in the 1968-1991 period. Surprisingly, a vast majority of these deaths were committed after the end of the dictatorial regime in Spain (Post, 2007). From the nowadays' perspective, the organization murdered more than 850 people (Alonso, 2011). Influenced by such famous Basque figures as Txillardegi, the Basque nationalists carried on the militant activities more dynamically and they even attacked the train which was transporting the former Civil War warriors (Turner, 2015). The attack on the Basque statesman, Miguel Angel Blanco, who was then severely murdered, was also the illustration of ETA's cruel face. In general, ETA was involved in explosions, attacks, captivities, tortures and killings (Özçelik, 2017).

One might argue that such activities would contribute to the serious rise of ETA's authority. Nevertheless, the state's response (Turner, 2015) and counter-terrorist measures (Post, 2007) as

well as the organization's above-mentioned internal fragmentations (Turner, 2015) and the Basque political parties' unified antagonism towards ETA in the 1980s (Özçelik, 2017) showed the other results. The jailing of ETA's leader Santacristina in 1992 and the youngsters' joining of the organization led to softening of attitudes. Santacristina himself wrote a letter from the prison to his followers, emphasizing the need for the rejection of violence. Due to the failure of 1998 agreement, the Spanish central government outlawed ETA's political unit Herri Batasuna's activities and strengthened foreign and domestic measures against the terrorists (Post, 2007). It would be logical if many separatists did not see the prospects for fulfilling their plans. The evolving civic engagement against ETA's violent approaches led to the decrease of its followers. The general situation altered the opinion of those people who were in favor of the secession. Instead, they started advocating the broad self-governing rights for Basques within the Spanish state. As Post (2007) says, ETA itself expressed readiness to establish peace in 2006:

“We call on the Spanish and French authorities to respond in a positive way to this new situation and to remove the obstacles or limitations in the way of the democratic process, by ceasing their repression and attitude of denial, and by displaying a willingness to resolve the conflict through negotiation.” (p. 64).

It can be assumed that the majority of Basques found terrorism as an insufficient tool for the realization of their plans. Although ETA carried out several violent activities even after this agreement (e. g. 2 murdered and 19 traumatized people in the airport in 2006), separatism was no longer a popular idea in Basques (Post, 2007).

Conclusion

The findings of the analysis show that the main research question of the paper may be responded by the following theory: The terrorist acts did not become a catalyst of separatism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country. As a result, the representatives of both regions significantly decreased the violent actions and almost abandoned the idea of secession.

The research shows that due to the historical precedents, the Basques as well as the Irish were engaged in the wave of violence. IRA's terrorist acts dramatized the environment in Northern Ireland and made a negative influence on health and life of many innocent citizens (De la Calle

and Sánchez-Cuenca, 2006). The situation appeared to be the same in ETA's case, as it also had a traumatic effect on each people, suffering from its radical actions (Alonso, 2011). However, the above analysis shows that the circumstances started changing as the terrorist groups were fragmented and also after a specific period of time certain radicals realized the lack of prospects in their methods. In spite of some disagreement between diverse units on establishing peace (e. g. RIRA's protests towards the Belfast Agreement (Post, 2007) and the ETA's split up into several subsets, having different worldviews (Turner, 2015)), the central government managed to agree with peripheral actors on certain criteria. It is true that peaceful situation appeared to be more stable in Northern Ireland in comparison with the Basque Country (as ETA members post factum continued violence in 2006 (Post, 2007)) but separatism turned out to be an unreachable dream for the radicals in both cases.

In sum, it seems that terrorism was not a useful tool for the Basque and the Irish nationalists to separate their regions from the states. It is evident that the violent campaigns of the radical groups, involving murders and severe attacks, did not deliver the applicable results for them

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Local and Regional outcomes of the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war

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Abstract

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is one of the main international fallout of the former Soviet Union. With the exception of the warring parties - Armenia and Azerbaijan - Turkey, Russia and Iran were indirectly involved in the conflict. Beyond them, strong international acts such as the United States and France were also parts of negotiations, although their objectivity towards warring parties was questionable, especially in Baku. It was the stalemate in the negotiations that created the militaristic environment and the preparation for a new large-scale conflict. The Second Karabakh War of 2020 completely changed the reality on the ground. Azerbaijan, with the help of Turkish weapons, not only managed to retake six of the seven regions around Karabakh but also occupied the city of Shusha, which was perceived to be the cultural centre of Karabakh. However, Russia also benefited from the military-political consequences, as it legally managed to deploy military forces not only in Armenia but directly in Azerbaijan as well. All this makes the situation on the ground quite complex. The paper discusses the post-war political and military situation in Karabakh and the region.

Keywords: Azerbaijan; Armenia; Karabakh; Russia; Minks Group; Second Karabakh war;

Introduction

1992-1994 turned out to be crucial for the first Karabakh war - the Armenian militia in Karabakh, indirectly supported by the Kremlin and Yerevan, managed to occupy not only most of the territory of the autonomous province of Karabakh but even seven adjacent Azerbaijani districts. With this, the Armenian separatists tried to create a paramilitary defensive shield or buffer around Karabakh. The so-called "Line of contact", should be as far as possible from the populated cities, in the depths of Azerbaijan. The victorious Armenians of the Artsakh Republic declared independence and some political factions of Yerevan considered Karabakh as a part of Armenia.

The conflict in Karabakh began in 1988. Although hotbeds of confrontation between Azerbaijan and Armenia have existed since 1918 and clashes have been taking place in Nagorno-Karabakh, the mixed population of Karabakh in the Soviet Union still manages to coexist relatively peacefully. Peace in the region lasted until 1988 when a local government of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) appeals to the USSR Supreme Soviet to transfer the NKAO from the Azerbaijani SSR to the Armenian SSR (Martin, 2001 p. 594). This failed attempt was not supported by the Soviet authorities as a fear of potential precedent was set, which could lead to separatist and irredentist movements throughout the Soviet Union. All of this resulted in massive demonstrations in both Armenia and Azerbaijan (Lee, 1988). The demonstrations were gradually followed by radical rhetoric, ethnic slurs, and finally pogroms. The conflict remained in a relatively passive phase until the end of 1991 when the NKAO held an independence referendum, followed the abolition of the autonomy status by official Baku. All of the above-ensued full-scale war in 1992.

Despite several attempts, the ceasefire failed until 1994, when the Russian-initiated Bishkek Protocol was signed. In addition to a ceasefire, the document stated the demilitarization of Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh and the withdrawal of foreign troops, while the IDPs had to return home. Despite the signing of a document it was only partially enforced. The ceasefire was fragile, the refugees and IDPs did not return, and the seven districts around Karabakh were not demilitarized and did not leave by foreign or NKAO troops (Papazian, 2008). On the contrary - militarization even more intensified after 1994. However, the agreement was still the first tangible attempt to stop the military phase of the conflict, which should pave the way for peace talks and solutions.

Despite international efforts to resolve the conflict peacefully, it ended in failure. On the one hand, the victorious side - Armenia - did not want to make significant concessions, including some territorial exchange (“Caucasus Report,” 10:32:10Z). On the other hand, there was no consensus in Azerbaijan on Nagorno-Karabakh's political status. However, it was also important to note that there were no peacekeepers between the warring parties, resulting in several skirmishes each year, resulting in casualties on both sides. In 2016, the clashes took on such a massive scale that there was a chance for a full-scale renewal of the conflict. The line of contact was changed for the first time as a result of the clashes (Simão, 2016).

Since then Azerbaijan has been critical of the peace process, especially when every offer from the OSCE rebuffed. As a result of intensive militarization and the border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2020, the citizens of Azerbaijan demanded from the authorities to resolve the conflict by any means (Eurasianet, 2020).

Methodology

This article is an analytical review and report on the military and political situation in Karabakh. In order to thoroughly assess the pre-war period and unsuccessful attempts at peace talks and the aftermath of confrontation, it is necessary to analyze the secondary sources and data, including the documents and positions of the parties. The failed peace proposals and the ceasefire agreement reached at the end of the 2020 Karabakh war contains key information to successfully review the established political environment on the ground. In addition, I will use a comparison method in the paper to carefully analyze what has changed in time and space in terms of political outcomes.

Failed peace process

Since 1994, the OSCE’s Minsk Group has been actively trying to resolve the conflict and propose peace plans. In 1997-1998 and in 2007-2009 the group proposed four peace documents – “Package deal”, “Common state deal”, “Step-by-step deal”, “Madrid Principles” - which were never supported by both sides, the main reason for which was the mistrust between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Armenia was afraid of making any concessions. Official Yerevan perceives Baku as an

untrustworthy political actor and in the case of concession of some territories to Azerbaijan, a security dilemma would arise for Karabakh. In the absence of mutual trust, this dilemma would deepen and can lead the defensive or offensive actions. The second challenge was related to the existence of a precondition concerning the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan. Official Baku had previously stated that it would reject any proposal that violates Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. All the proposals put forward by the Minsk Group are intended to uphold the principle of territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, although it did not clearly define the legal status of the Nagorno-Karabakh and left room for speculation.

From the Armenian side, the main precondition on the effective negotiations was the determination of the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh and its international recognition. All of that should be acceptable to both Armenia and Karabakh. Without meeting this precondition, the Armenian and Karabakh armed forces refused to leave the seven occupied Azerbaijani districts around the NKAO.

The terms of the talks included granting broad autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh and deploying peacekeeping forces in the region. Although Karabakh remained part of Azerbaijan, it would have great political, administrative and cultural autonomy and the region would be demilitarized. (*Statement by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chair Countries*, n.d.)

All these preconditions made effective negotiations even more difficult. However, the chances of negotiations in 1997-1999 and 2007-2009 became tangible when proposals were put forward by the Minsk Group. Despite all the attempts and proposals every negotiation failed and went nowhere. During and after the war there was active militarization of both sides with several occurrences of rekindle fighting alongside the line of contact.

Azerbaijan does not have high confidence in the Minsk Group and its work. Several times there were statements from Baku regarded to the impartiality of the group co-chairs. As early as the first Karabakh war, Russia expressed indirect military support for Armenia, and since 1994, despite an internationally requested embargo, Russia has been supplying large quantities of arms to Armenia, most of which fall within the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia transferred weapons worth several billion dollars to Armenia in 1994-2018 (Anthony, I. 1997), (Cutler, 2020), (*Eurasianet*,

n.d.). However, the Kremlin also sold weapons to Azerbaijan, which increased the likelihood of the existing permanent tension and confrontation between the parties.

In 1999 possible Russian links appear during the political unrest in Armenia, when an armed group broke into the parliament building ensued killings of high profile political figures and contributed to the disruption of the peace process. In 2005, Alexander Litvinenko, a former member of the Russian Security Forces, accused the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) to conducting of facilitating this event (Danielyan, 2005).

Russia tried to prevent Azerbaijan and Armenia from withdrawing from its sphere of influence. Baku could deepen its ties with Turkey, and Armenia could get closer to the West. In the long run, Russia failed to foil Azerbaijan's plans to establish military and political relations with Ankara.

Besides, Russia has a military base in Armenia's city of Gyumri, which is the only legally established Russian military facility in the South Caucasus. At the same time, Armenia and Russia have political and military ties and the former always participate in military exercises planned by Russia. Moreover, due to Armenia's membership in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization, Russia's involvement in Armenia's security is particularly large. All this calls into question Russia's impartiality and makes it problematic for Baku.

Azerbaijan has demanded an increase or replacement of the Minsk Group co-chairs, due to a significant number of Armenian Diasporas in Russia, France and the United States, which have noticeable influences over the regional or national level within these countries. It is therefore difficult for any of these states to make a proposal that does not take into account the domestic political attitudes. At the theoretical level, Robert Putnam has well incorporated this reality into his two-level game theory. The theory asserts that every international negotiation also takes place in the context of the domestic political environment.

During and after the Second Karabakh war in 2020, the role of France as a mediator was also problematic. France has a particularly large population of more than half a million Armenians and their political influences are high. During the earlier phase of clashes, president Macron condemns Turkey's so-called "bellicose" stance on Nagorno-Karabakh, while both countries are members of the Minsk Group. Then the French Senate proclaimed and supported a non-binding resolution to call for recognition of the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenian: Artsakh), which gives

the president the right to make a final decision. Afterwards, the Azerbaijani government appealed to the OSCE for the withdrawal of France from the co-chairmanship of the Minsk Group. Questioning of impartiality diminishes the real effectiveness and potential of the Minsk Group.

There has been no significant response from the US Presidential Administration and the State Department to the renewed conflict in Karabakh. It was only on October 23 when the US began to talk about the importance of negotiations between the two warring sides and initiate bilateral and trilateral talks. A ceasefire agreement reached by the US on October 26 broke down within hours, to which President Trump assessed the disappointment. Also, it is important to note that before the negotiations Trump tweeted: "We're working with Armenia. We have a very good relationship with Armenia - they're very good people, they're so dedicated, they're incredible people, and we'll see what happens." Even though nothing wrong is within this statement the timing was not ideal, especially before the negotiations.

During the 2020 war, still presidential candidate Joe Biden criticized Azerbaijan for trying to resolve the conflict militarily and accused Turkey of inciting warmongering (*Joe Biden, 2020*). Moreover, Biden also made a statement against Russia, accusing it of supplying weapons and using mercenaries. And all this against the background that Turkey is a member of the Minsk Group, while Russia is a co-chair.

Finally, there is another important aspect - the conflict ended with the direct involvement of Russia and the deployment of its military units in Karabakh. The Lachin corridor is also controlled by Russia for at least five more years. All this gives Russia significant leverage against both Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Russian peacekeeping force was deployed in Karabakh not as part of the OSCE mission, but as a result of Russia-led negotiations. All this reduces the role of the Minsk Group in the conflict. At the same time, the representation of Turkey in the South Caucasus has increased, which completely changes the existing picture and the rules of the game. It is very likely that without the direct interest of Turkey and Russia, OSCE Minsk Group's effectiveness in conflict resolution would be more tangible.

Second Nagorno-Karabakh war and its consequences

On September 27, 2020, the renewed conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh completely changed the existing order in the South Caucasus. In terms of military Azerbaijan have managed and waged 21st-century modern warfare, destroying the part of the Armenian army based in Karabakh, and inflicted up to two billion dollars military equipment losses to Armenia. As a result of the fighting, the Azerbaijani military captured not only the southern part of the former Karabakh Autonomous Region and its historic centre, the city of Shusha but also the other four regional centres around Karabakh, which since 1994 were no longer controlled by official Baku. The Azerbaijani army also made significant progress northward, capturing two important cities, a reservoir and a mountain range. Despite the apparent Azerbaijani military advantage, the fire in Karabakh ceased on November 10 and create a new reality on the ground.

As a result of the truce, a peacekeeping mission consisting of Russian troops was formed which occupy the rest of the territory of the former Karabakh Autonomous Region (Oblast), which is still held by Armenian forces, centred in Stepanakert. They also occupied the Lachin corridor, which connects Karabakh with Armenia. According to the agreement, the Armenian militia and armed forces must withdraw from all Azerbaijani districts around Karabakh by December. But as Russia is responsible for controlling, observe and overseeing peace on the ground it is possible for Armenian militia to remain in and around Stepanakert. No matter how this issue is resolved, it is clear that the region gets a large Russian military base on the territory of de jure Azerbaijan. Despite that, the 26-year status quo has changed, which will result in Azerbaijan successfully recaptured all areas around Karabakh except Lachin, official Baku has not been able to fully retake Karabakh territory and de facto cede the control rest of the territory to Russia and indirectly to Armenia. This changes the pre-existing order even more, as Russian military bases and, consequently, political leverage is found in the internationally recognized territories of the three South Caucasus countries: Georgia – in occupied Abkhazia and Samachablo (AKA South Ossetia), Armenia – in Gyumri, and in Azerbaijan – Karabakh and Lachin. As a result, Russian influence throughout the region is growing and creating a so-called Russian Peace (Pax Russica), a term that portrays reality far from real peace, development and stability. If Armenia or Azerbaijan seeks to aspire to an independent foreign policy from Russia and/or pursue projects that are unacceptable

to the Kremlin, Russia, as a peacemaker, may launch a military-political manoeuvre to dissuade both of them.

Russia has set a precedent that any conflict in the South Caucasus will eventually come to end when Russia really insists. Throughout the war, both the Armenian and Azerbaijani sides had communicated with Kremlin. The abrupt end of the conflict indicates that during all six weeks of fighting both official Yerevan and Baku had not only openly, but also covertly negotiated with official Moscow. Such a development indicates an increase in Russian political weight which threatens the Western interests in the region.

Despite the victorious war, Azerbaijan failed to fully restore its territorial integrity. On a short time scale with the change of the status quo, Azerbaijan gains a noticeable advantage and even manages to get rid of the label of a loser. It is also expected that official Baku will soon begin the process of returning 600,000 IDPs to its controlled territories. In addition, the Azerbaijani military is gaining the status of a leading and modern force in the region. Despite all of these significant successes, de facto control of Azerbaijan could not be exercised over the entire territory of Karabakh, which is compounded by the emergence of Russian military bases on the ground. This reality is, from a strategic point of view, a problem, a challenge, and to some extent a limitation of foreign political sovereignty for the country that won the war.

Another notable result is the stabilization of the government of Ilham Aliyev and the achievement of political consolidation. The demand for Azerbaijani political diversity will not be tangible for some time. At the same time, Turkish influence in Azerbaijan's domestic and foreign policy will increase, which has been growing dynamically in recent years. After the war significant infrastructural projects in and around Azerbaijani controlled Karabakh supported or financed by Turkey (Gokhan Ergocun, 2021). It is also important to note that in the long run the increased role of Turkey during and after the conflict will inevitably come into conflict with Russian interests, and this is clear to all actors. This is especially true, after January 2022 Armenia and Turkey started normalization of political relations, which could increase Ankara's economic influence over Armenia. To Russia increasing Turkey's influence in South Caucasus will be problematic.

Militarily, Armenia was defeated. The perception inside the country about the invincibility of the Armenian army is changing, which is followed by the dissatisfaction and anger of the people. The investments of the Armenian Diaspora, used for the reconstruction of Karabakh, were destroyed

in six weeks, and a significant part of the territories inhabited by the Armenian population came under the direct control of Azerbaijan. Armenia's military potential is significantly reduced, as well as its combat motivation. The country will definitely have to go through a reassessment process and think about who its real ally is and what the country's foreign policy vector should be. The war has once again proved that the existence of Russia as its main ally is a mistake and contains wrong expectations especially when the Kremlin have a bad reputation of being an unreliable force. But still, it is unknown what conclusions Armenia will draw after the war.

The situation is changing in Yerevan as well. If the revolutionary government of Nikol Pashinyan and his project of modernization and democracy, to some extent, allowed the idea of playing independently from Russia, now this may change – Pashinyan has to fight for its own political survival.

Despite the defeat in the war, Armenia still manages to maintain fragile but de facto control over the small part of the former Karabakh Autonomous Region (Oblast) – centred in Stepanakert. This means that the worst-case scenario was avoided by Armenia, which would lead to the complete loss of the Armenian-populated territories in Karabakh. It is clear that as a result of the war, Armenia's foreign policy will become even more subordinate to Russia. Of course, recognizing and assessing military defeat after the victorious war in the 1990s will not be easy and consolidating revanchist forces may occur, but it will further destabilize the country.

Another very important outcome is the possible construction of a road connecting Nakhichevan with the rest of Azerbaijan which will build through the Syunik province of Armenia. If this project is implemented and Azerbaijan will invest heavily to the road to Nakhichevan. The road will pass through Armenian province of Syunik. It is also important to note that the high-permeability concrete-asphalt road from Nakhichevan to Turkey already exists and can be widened. This further increases the motivation to implement the Syunik road project. After some tensions in late 2021 Azerbaijan and Armenia agreed to start working to impliment the project (Mushvig Mehdiyev, 2021). It is still unknown who and in what form will control the road between Nakhichevan and the rest of Azerbaijan and whether there will be customs services on it. The issues around the corridor could be another conflicting subject in relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia, but in Baku expectations for this project are very high.

Azerbaijan Imports from Turkey was US\$1.56 Billion during 2020 (Trading Economics, 2022.). A significant part of them was transported by land or air corridor of Georgia. If this is reality changes and corridor diversifies, it will slightly reduce the geopolitical weight of Georgia, but it will not pose a threat to the existing gas or oil pipelines, which are one of the main energy arteries for the EU.

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The EU and poverty eradication – which format to choose?

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Abstract

In line with the analysis of the legal and policy framework of the European Union (EU) related to poverty eradication present paper gives an overview of the aspirations of the organization in terms of international cooperation with partner countries on the one hand and with other intergovernmental organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) on the other. In so doing the paper claims for the importance and the efficiency of the EU to intensify targeted cooperation with partner countries and demonstrates major challenges that are associated with the decision making on the level of the UN and the WTO. With this approach the paper clearly shows how multilateralism overcomplicates the already very challenging reality, in line also with the economic shock caused by the COVID 19 and therefore claims for the need for more flexible approaches that will lead to the rapid recovery.

Key Words: European Union, Poverty Eradication, United Nations, World Trade Organization,

Introduction

The political guidelines for the next European Commission 2019-2024 underline the importance of refocusing “the European Semester into an instrument that integrates the United Nations (UN) Sustainable Development Goals” (Leyen 2019, p.9). This undertaking is very much in line with the aspirations of the European Union (EU) reflected in the article 3(5) of the Treaty on the EU (TEU) underlining that the Union amongst others shall contribute to the sustainable development, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty as well as to the strict observance and the development

of international law, with due respect of the principles enshrined within the United Nations Charter (TEU art. 3.5).

In continuation of this article 21 (1) of the same treaty underlines that: “The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organizations which share the principles of the United Nations Charter to promote multilateral solutions to common problems in particular in the framework of the United Nations” (TEU art. 21.1).

EUs strong emphasis on the importance of the poverty eradication is also evidenced from the focus that is put on children and youth and on the need of doing more in the developing and least developed countries as being reflected in the policy documents of the organization (Leyen 2019, p.10).

Article 21 of the Treaty of the EU underlines that: “The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance” (TEU art. 21.2).

The multilayered approaches of the EU towards poverty eradication reflected in both the declared and implied competences of the organization for global governance inevitably linking the two-fold development cooperation aspirations of the EU with each other, meaning cooperation a) with partner countries and b) enjoying active participation in the UN and WTO, rises questions in the direction as of which format of global governance will be more efficient for the EU to engage with for the purposes of poverty eradication.

On the one hand this is interesting because the EU institutions and countries are the world’s leading donor of development assistance and cooperation and therefore, have very strong cooperation practice with the 150 partner countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific (EC 2021), for the purposes of poverty eradication.

On the other hand, the international community has been observing the difficulties that multilateralism especially within the WTO (in which the EU is member) has been experiencing

over the last decades getting more and more difficult to reach an agreement regarding the crucially important issues in poverty eradication amongst others.

Therefore, the question is, which format of global governance is to be chosen by the EU to intensify its efforts of helping developing and least developed countries to overcome poverty related challenges especially in the times of global economic shock produced by the COVID 19? Is it EUs multilateral and bilateral cooperation agreements with the partner countries or is it intensification of the work within international organizations, such as, the UN and the WTO? While answering these questions one also has to consider the newly accomplished elections of the Director General at the WTO bringing additional issues to the table of multilateral negotiations.

Therefore, the next parts of the paper give the overview of the EUs international cooperation agenda, showing the EU's role within the systems of the UN and the WTO and making relevant conclusions in the concluding part.

The overview of the EUs international cooperation agenda

The EUs vision for international cooperation is reflected in the major legal documents of the organization clearly showing its aspirations to combat poverty in the world and therefore promote more prosperity on the global level. This is evidenced for instance from the wording of the Article 8 of TEU, namely: the Union shall develop a special relationship and cooperation with neighboring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness, founded on the values of the Union. The Union may conclude specific agreements with the countries concerned based on reciprocity and periodic consultation (TEU art. 8, paras 1 and 2). The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action, ensuring consistency between these and its other policies (TEU art. 21.3).

The treaty of the functioning of the European Union further underlines that: the Union's development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other (TFEU, art. 208.1), having as its primary objective the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty with special emphasis on developing countries (TFEU, art. 208.1).

Bearing in mind the importance of the implementation of sustainable development goals with poverty eradication as its core the EU promoting the rules-based global order, in alignment with

multilateralism and the United Nations as its cornerstone has issued the New European Consensus on Development “Our World, Our Dignity, Our Future” [hereinafter as the consensus] (European Consensus on Development 2017, p.1) .

The significance of the Consensus is multifold, mainly because it shows the aspirations of the European Union to combat poverty in two directions, namely, a) promoting the role of EU as a global actor and establishment of it’s development cooperation agenda on a global scale and b) showing the role of the EU in promoting SDGs through it’s participation in international organizations.

To begin with it is interesting to see how the EU sees itself as a global actor in implementation of the 2030 Agenda in partnership with all developing countries, in line with the framework and political instruments provided by the Lisbon Treaty and equipping the union with all tools to respond to global challenges (European Consensus on Development 2017, p.2-3). This also goes hand in hand with the Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (Shared Vision A Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016, p. 8) that provides an overall vision and action for a global governance.

The Consensus as a cornerstone of the EU’s development policy, is part of the overall EU response to the 2030 Agenda identifying the reduction and in the long term the eradication of multidimensional poverty leaving no-one behind as a primary objective of the EU development policy (European Consensus on Development 2017, p.4), in line with the article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU art. 208).

Yet another interesting feature of the consensus is that it focuses on trade as a tool for poverty eradication, namely through the implementation of the ‘Trade for All’ strategy, the EU with its Member States shows the readiness to support trading partners, including through economic partnership agreements, trade instruments and economic diplomacy, to integrate sustainable development at all levels of trade policy (European Consensus on Development 2017, p. 25).

The prime focus of EU’s development cooperation remains poverty eradication in all its dimensions, and that there will be no diversion of efforts from that goal is constantly reassured in the text of the consensus, putting emphasis on the importance of multi-stakeholder approaches for comprehensive solutions to poverty on global scale, ensuring partnership in implementation of the

2030 agenda for sustainable development. As it is recognized by the European Union itself “to be more effective in pursuing its objectives, and consistent with the primary aim of eradicating poverty, the EU’s development policy should be adaptable and responsive to changing needs, crises and priorities” (European Consensus on Development 2017, p. 25, 32-36).

The EU’s commitments towards poverty eradication are indeed further reaching engaging in development cooperation, policy dialogue and partnerships with Middle Income Countries (MICs) (European Consensus on Development 2017, p.43), with partner countries, in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, as well as in Latin America and Asia, and the countries of the neighboring regions in coherence with the European Neighborhood Policy under the 2030 Agenda (European Consensus on Development 2017, p.45), as being reflected for instance also in the following documents Joint Way Forward (Joint Way Forward - Afghanistan and the EU 2016), EU’s strategy on India (EU’s Strategy on India 2019) so called tailored agreements with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (Cotonou-Agreement 2020) and many more.

The Global Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation to which the EU also participates is a multi-stakeholder platform to advance the effectiveness of development efforts by all actors, to deliver results that are long-lasting and contribute to the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (Global Partnership 2021). As being indicated in the results of the Busan High Level forum the development co-operation is only part of the solution, it plays a catalytic and indispensable role in supporting poverty eradication, social protection, economic growth and sustainable development (Busan Partnership 2011, para.9).

Yet another forum in which the EU takes part is the Nairobi High Level Meeting. The results of the Meeting in Nairobi in 2016 reaffirmed that the levels of poverty and inequality remain high, especially in Africa, least developed countries, landlocked developing countries, small- island developing states, countries affected by conflict and Middle Income Countries, therefore the effective development co-operation is in common interest (Global Partnership, Nairobi Outcome 2016, para. 4), in line with the 2030 Agenda calling for all countries and all stakeholders to act in active partnership for its implementation (Global Partnership, Nairobi Outcome 2016, para. 4).

2015 Valletta declaration and Action Plan to which the EU also adheres to recognizes the high degree of interdependence between Africa and Europe facing common challenges in terms of eradicating poverty amongst others (Valletta Summit, Political Declaration 2015), prioritizing

integration of migration in development and poverty eradication strategies and programs, in particular in the areas such as labour market/employment, private sector development and education by the means of ensuring the full policy coherence (Valletta Summit, Action Plan 2015).

To achieve poverty eradication, the EU focuses its development cooperation on helping the poorest and most vulnerable categories of people, in the least developed, conflict-affected, and most fragile countries of the world, aspiring to leave no one behind in line with the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the European Consensus on Development (International Partnerships, End Poverty 2021). Based on the position of the EU for fighting against poverty development actors need to better cooperate in supporting partner countries (International Partnerships, End Poverty 2021).

The information given above is the clear evidence of the EU's active engagement in poverty eradication on the global level accounting to be the world's biggest development donor. The European development assistance represents almost 57% of the total global development assistance by all OECD-DAC donors (Europe the world's biggest development donor 2020). As being noted by the EU itself the budget support will be applied consistently with the principles of development effectiveness in support of sustainable development, and to promote inclusive growth and job creation, poverty eradication, inequality reduction and peaceful societies in the world (European Consensus on Development 2017, p. 39). Bering all these in mind the question remains if the EU can be more efficient to combat poverty while acting under the umbrella of the International Organizations next to the fact that it on its own is already a greatest contributor to global prosperity making positive changes on international level. Since the whole world has to overcome the economic shocks produced by the COVID 19 and given the heaviness of the multilateral universal organizations such as the UN and the WTO will not it be more efficient for the EU to keep active engagement in the targeted responses and its own multilateral and bilateral agreements with partner countries? Before answering these questions, it is important to see what is the EU's action agenda under the key international organizations.

The EU in the UN

Article 208 (2) of the treaty on the functioning of the European Union stipulates that the union and the Member States shall comply with the commitments and take account of the objectives they

have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent international organizations (TFEU art. 208.2).

Ban Ki-moon supported by Germany and its European Union partners, immediately after being appointed as eighth Secretary-General of the United Nations on 13 October 2006 declared: "The world's people will not be fully served unless peace, development and human rights - the three pillars of the UN are advanced together with equal vigour" (Matussek A Special Partnership with the UN: A European Perspective, 2021). This position of Ban Ki-moon found its reflection in the official position of Javier Solana (the former EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy) while stating that the European Union is deeply committed to UN goals and principles and that the United Nations is and remains the central institution for effective multilateralism, the "centre of gravity" of the multilateral system (Matussek A Special Partnership with the UN: A European Perspective, 2021). The European Union stands for a policy of dialogue and for the peaceful reconciliation of differing interests. It is in this spirit that the union is committed to actively reaching out to all Member States and groups of Member States within the United Nations (Matussek A Special Partnership with the UN: A European Perspective, 2021).

Cooperation between the UN and the EU has increased very significantly over the last years and as it appears will continue to do so due to an evolving framework of the organizations addressing common challenges of the world and the EUs aspirations to strive for more by strengthening unique brand of responsible global leadership (Leyen 2019, p.17).

This kind of cooperation practice between the EU and UN resulted in granting the enhanced observer status for the EU in the UN General Assembly since 2011 (A /RES/65/276). Bearing in mind that the General Assembly is the principal organ of the United Nations for the fulfillment and implementation of the UN charter this is indeed big step forward for making the EU as regional organization being stronger represented within the system of United Nations as compared to the period from 1974 until 2011 when by that time European Economic Community and lately European Union was enjoying rather weak participatory status being observer within the UN (Resolution 3208 (XXIX) of 11 October 1974).

Based on the position of the UN General Assembly the enhanced observer status of the EU was important for strengthening the multilateral system in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations and the principles of international law and in line with the aspirations of the

UN to cooperate with regional organizations to meet the goals of the charter (A /RES/65/276).

The enhanced membership of the EU in the UN being reflected in the annex to the GA Resolution (A /RES/65/276, annex) allows the European Union, to present the positions of the European Union and its member States as agreed by them, as being inscribed on the list of speakers among representatives of major groups, to make interventions; to participate in the general debate of the General Assembly, including to have its communications relating to the sessions and work of the General Assembly and to participate in all international meetings and conferences under the auspices of the Assembly and of the United Nations, having access to the documents of the assembly, meeting or conference without intermediary, next to also having permission to present proposals and amendments orally in conjunction with States members of the European Union in line with the procedure that such proposals and amendments shall be put to a vote only at the request of a Member State (A /RES/65/276).

The importance of making the UN more active in poverty eradication through increased international cooperation is not a new phenomenon (A/RES/48/166), therefore the former EEC and current EU play significant roles in tackling global poverty reduction challenges both from organizational as well as from member states perspectives. At least the observance of the resolutions issued and declarations adopted under the umbrella of the UN proves the active role that the EU plays in the world. The most remarkable examples of this are: Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (GA Res. 3281(xxix), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50), Brussels Declaration (2001), the Monterrey conference (2002), GA Resolution about the process of preparation of the environmental perspective (A/RES/38/161), UN Millennium Declaration (2009), the New Delhi Declaration (2002), Addis Ababa Action Agenda (A/RES/69/313), Beijing Platform for Action covering 12 critical areas of concern including poverty eradication being as relevant today as 20 years ago (2021), the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and the outcomes of its review conferences (European Consensus on Development 2017, p.12), underlining that the widespread poverty remains the major challenge to development efforts closely related to unemployment (Cairo Programme of Action 1994, p.21), the International Development Strategy for the Fourth United Nations Development Decade, the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the 1990s, the outcomes of the eighth session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, and the United Nations New Agenda for the Development

of Africa in the 1990s (GA Res 45/199; A/CONF 147/18; GA Res 46/151, annex, sect II).

But such an impressive number of legal documents encompassing multifold and multilateral obligations bestowed on the shoulders of the UN member states in general and the EU and its member states in particular raise questions in the direction of how capable is the EU to be efficient within the UN system and if not whether it would be more relevant for it to work more on its own behalf rather than within the UN system. This becomes even more important nowadays when the whole world tries to tackle the COVID19 related economic crises and when the need for the targeted approaches to help developing and most vulnerable parts of the world emerges as not only top priority, but most importantly legal obligation for global actors to comply with. It is even difficult for the EU sometimes to reach an agreement on the crucially important aspects of its daily operational agenda within 27 member states as it is evident from the ongoing and lengthy negotiations between the European parliament and the council being supported by the commission on several sectoral acts especially during the approval of budget for 2021-2027 (EU's long-term budget for 2021-2027; Varju 2017, pp.161-162), and how can the better progress be imagined for the poverty eradication if being negotiated with 193 member states of the UN and therefore having much more complicated negotiations based decision making process.

The Enhanced Observer's status of the EU in the UN General Assembly and the discourse of high level political decision makers for the importance of cooperation between the two organizations leaves the impression that the role that is assigned to the EU within the UN system will be getting stronger and stronger in policy papers and therefore will be harder and harder to be implemented in practice leaving the EU's motivation to make the UN system 'deliver as one' as unreachable dream (European Consensus on Development 2017, p.42). Given the fact also that the EU and its Member States are motivated to strengthen their partnerships with the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank Group, regional development banks, the G7, the G20, the OECD and other regional and multilateral institutions (European Consensus on Development 2017, p.42).

Next to exploring the cooperation patterns of the EU and the UN in terms of poverty eradication it is interesting to see also what are the developments in international trade relations and therefore what are the conditions and visions of the EU and the WTO for using trade as an engine for prosperity.

The EU and the WTO

Based on the position reflected in the POLITICAL GUIDELINES FOR THE NEXT EUROPEAN COMMISSION 2019-2024 “Trade is not an end in itself. It is a means to deliver prosperity at home. Every new agreement concluded shall have a dedicated sustainable-development chapter and the highest standards of climate, environmental and labour protection, with a zero-tolerance policy on child labour” (Leyen 2019, p.17).

It is interesting to observe that the EU is not only active within the UN system, but it is even more intensely represented in the WTO. With the aspirations to look for multilateral solutions to global challenges the EU intends to lead the efforts on updating and reforming the World Trade Organization (Leyen 2019, p.17). This is not surprising at all, because unlike the UN the EU is represented as a full member within the WTO system making the overall picture even more interesting, next to the fact that the EU members are also individually enjoying full membership within the WTO (WTO members and observers 2021). “The European Commission — the EU’s executive arm — speaks for all EU member States at almost all WTO meetings” (The European Union and the WTO 2021).

Since trade is an opportunity for economic growth the EU with its trade policy seeks to create growth and jobs by increasing the opportunities for trade and investment with the rest of the world inextricably bounding up its own success with the success of its trading partners, both in the developed and developing world keeping sustainable development in the center to trade policy (EU Position in the World Trade 2019).

The focus of the EU to uphold and update the rules-based global order (Leyen 2019, p.17) in line with strengthening the Europe’s role as a global leader and standard setter through a strong, open and fair trade agenda (Leyen 2019, p.17) derives from the fact that trade accounts for over a third of the EU’s GDP and supports over 36 million jobs. The EU is the largest exporter of manufactured goods and services and the largest export market for 80 countries. Claiming the attractiveness of Europe for business (EU Position in the World Trade 2019; Leyen 2019, p.17). Looking at the map of the EU trade agreements (2021) and being impressed with the results one can ask the same question, what is better for combating poverty in the world? Shall the EU act more intensively with its own agenda of multilateral and bilateral agreements with partner countries or shall it use the WTO platform for this?

It is true that the WTO is the most important player on the global level to deal with trade rules (Azevêdo 2017), but in doing so it also faces significant challenges in terms of moving trade negotiations forward. After The Buenos Aires MC of 2017 that has clearly showed no major achievement in the trade in services negotiations making the former Director General of the WTO Roberto Azevedo to draw a differing line between wants and possibilities of the Multilateral Trade system calling upon to all stakeholders for more understanding of the sensitivity of the situation (WTO doc. WT/MIN(17)/74). Given the fact that no considerable progress is seen within the organization from trade in services negotiations compliments the results of all previous Ministerial Conferences such as the Doha Ministerial Conference (Doha MC) (WTO doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1; Parsadanishvili 2018, pp.340-342), Cancún Ministerial Conference (Cancun MC) (Fifth Ministerial Conference 2003; Parsadanishvili 2018, pp.340-342), the Hong Kong MC (WTO doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC para. 25., Parsadanishvili 2018, pp.340-342), Geneva MC (WTO doc. WT/L/847., Parsadanishvili 2018, pp.340-342), Bali MC (WTO doc. WT/MIN(13)/DEC., WTO doc. WT/MIN(13)/43 WT/L/918, Parsadanishvili 2018, pp.340-342), Nairobi MC [this last even decided to extend the waiver of preferential treatment to LDCs until 2030] (WTO doc. WT/MIN(15)/DEC para. 24. WTO doc. WT/MIN(15)/48 WT/L/982).

Leading to more trade, employment and economic growth in the world is being bestowed as a major obligation on the shoulders of the WTO back from the times of Marrakesh Declaration of 1994. In this light it is also interesting to observe that since 2017 there has been no Ministerial Conference delivered within the framework of the organization and the one that was scheduled for 2019 to take place in Kazakhstan and then being rescheduled three times, the last time with no fixed dates for its delivery (WTO 2021), proves that the processes within the WTO are getting slower and slower day by day. Observing the previous rounds of the WTO Ministerial Conferences and daily growing number of the interest of various stakeholders in trade negotiations that over complicates the overall process even further not to say anything about the complexities that the WTO has to deal with because of COVID19 does not leave much reason for optimism. There is a hope that the appointment of the new Director General of the WTO for the first time to be female and to be from Nigeria will bring positive developments, but many things will not change much in this overall process because the system is system, the Director General can not act as if being omnipotent and most importantly the whole world has to tackle with the COVID19 economic shock (WTO 2021) for which the expectations towards the WTO will increase, putting much more

pressure on all sides participating in trade negotiations and it is hard to imagine that progress will be made any time soon. Since the previous administration has played its active role in trade relations (The Economist 2018, p. 7 and pp.15-17) much will also depend on the position of the administration of the newly appointed U.S. president and its response towards readiness of the EU ‘to strengthen a balanced and mutually beneficial trading partnership with the United States’ (Leyen 2019, p.79).

Yet another argument to support this vision is linked to the last but not least Buenos Aires MC of the WTO underlining the role that trade plays in poverty alleviation and promoting economic growth for all members (WTO doc. WT/MIN(17)/55/Rev.1) on the one hand and failure of the WTO to consider the interests of the Group of African States in trade in services negotiations on Mode 4 related issues (WTO doc. WT/MIN(17)/8, JOB/GC/166 JOB/TNC/68, JOB/SERV/274.), leaving aside the Agenda 2063 for African Countries (WTO doc. WT/MIN(17)/8, JOB/GC/166 JOB/TNC/68, JOB/SERV/274.), and neglecting the drastic situation of impoverishment of the population on the African continent for which trade is a major tool to eradicate poverty (WTO doc. WT/MIN(17)/11, JOB/GC/167 JOB/TNC/69, JOB/AG/133 JOB/DEV/50, JOB/DS/24 JOB/IP/28, JOB/MA/133 JOB/RL/10, JOB/SERV/275 JOB/TE/48.), proves that multilateral trade negotiations do also experience hardships and it rather slow to respond to daily growing economic needs of the developing and least developed countries.

India’s and its co-sponsors initiative to negotiate a Trade Facilitation for Services Agreement because of the importance of Mode 4 for the developing and LDCs’ within the WTO (WTO doc. WT/MIN(17)/19, JOB/GC/168 JOB/TNC/70, JOB/SERV/276, WT/MIN(17)/7; WT/GC/190) is yet another confirmation that the world trade system does not work the way it should be working and that there is a need for Plurilateral solutions to Multilateral challenges (Natens & Wouters 2013, p.253).

In any case all these developments and the powerful participation of the European Union in the WTO system brings no major progress to the complicated trade negotiations and therefore can not facilitate much to combat poverty using the WTO platform. The WTO is member driven organization with 164 members (WTO 2021) and this explains all the reasons for challenges that the organizations faces from the perspective of the lack of efficiency nowadays. Therefore, the European Union with its 27 member states and incumbent relative flexibility in its daily working

agenda has to become more active outside the multilateral organizations using targeted approaches in continuing bilateral and multilateral trade agreements with partner countries. In so doing the EU will facilitate the use of its external actions capacity to help those in need especially in the process of “rapid” recovery from the economic shock caused by the COVID 19.

This is also the only solution for promoting yet another priority of the EU that is to establish highest standards of labour protection as being cited above. Because the labour issues still remain to be the bone of contention between the UN/ILO and WTO. This is backed up by the fact that if for instance ILO operating under the umbrella of the UN (ILO 2021) underlines the importance of trade in establishing social justice and therefore facilitating the establishment of the peace and security in the world by tackling the challenge of poverty eradication and puts this idea in all its major documents and conferences such as the ILO Constitution (Codified version 2015), the Declaration of Philadelphia (Codified Version 2015), the Declaration for social justice (2008) and it’s annex (2008) the WTO keeps the different vision.

While recognizing the importance of compliance with all international obligations and therefore the need for the consideration of the labour standards (WTO 2018; Charnovitz 2006) keeping in mind that trade is a tool to eradicate poverty (Moore 2002), raising standards of living and ensuring full employment with special focus on developing and least developed countries being backed up by the Marrakesh agreement (1994) and respective multilateral treaty (GATS 1994), the practice of the WTO still goes to the direction of avoiding much discussion regarding social clause within the world trade system as being evidently seen in the results of the respective Ministerial Conferences (Bronstein 2009, p.95; Parsadanishvili 2018, pp.340-342). Even though the WTO has strong basis for making its decisions enforceable (Parsadanishvili 2018, pp.340-342), the efficiency of the European Union in protecting labour standards and therefore facilitating the poverty eradication in the world remains more evident. Because the “EU intervenes not with a view to exporting its standards but with a view to launching interactive processes to identify and evaluate the different approaches that may be adopted to ensure that shared regulatory objectives can be met” (Scott 2014, p.125).

The “EU measures that give rise to territorial extension allow the EU to shape behavior and regulation internationally and in other states. Thus, although it is the existence of an initial point of territorial connection that sparks EU law into life, some of the transactions governed by EU law

will, when taken individually, have no territorial connection with the EU in the end” (Scott 2014, p.124).

Conclusion

The aspirations of the European Union to develop cooperation with the International Organizations and partner countries in line with the 2030 agenda for sustainable development, respecting the principles of the UN charter and relevant norms of international law are indeed impressive. Given the capacities of the EU and its economic and trade potential emerging as a leading power and major donor in handling development aid in 150 partner countries, with particular consideration of the needs and interests of the developing and least developed countries undoubtedly and without alternative demonstrates the leading role of the EU in combating poverty in the world.

On the other hand, daily growing role of the EU within international organizations such as the UN and the WTO and the existing overcomplicated reality accompanying the multilateral decision making delaying the progress and demonstrating the evident differences in visions of global players leaves no other option for the EU rather than to strengthen the cooperation with partner countries.

Much will definitely depend on the newly elected director general of the WTO and the new presidential administration of the United States, but rapid changes in multilateralism is hard to imagine given the realities that exist nowadays. At the same time the current economic shock caused by COVID19 demands for more flexible approaches and more targeted actions demonstrating that there is no time to waste on the way of rapid recovery from the global challenges related to poverty.

Which ever way will be chosen by the EU it will know better what is the best and the words of the president of the European Commission that: “We need to put the clear focus of our development cooperation on improving the perspectives of young women and men in their countries of origin, investing in their education and skills, in infrastructure, sustainable growth and security” (Leyen 2019, p.15-16), gives the impression that hopefully the EU will intensify its work outside the multilateral international organizations reaching closer its partner countries.

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Orthodox Christianity and Liberal Democracy –

Theoretical Inroads

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Abstract

This article aims to explore compatibility of Orthodox Christianity with the liberal democracy. It shares the argument that core premises of liberalism such as the freedom of choice, individual autonomy and tolerance intrinsically antagonize Christian religion's absolutism and universality. The cohabitation of conflicting ideologies is only possible through state-church separation and strong prevalence of liberalism over the religious value framework. While Protestantism and Catholicism followed this path, the Orthodox Christianity has never intended to find either theological properties or ideological determination, positively corresponding to the liberal democracy, the article concludes.

Key words: *Liberal democracy, Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism, Protestantism, Religion*

Introduction

The remarkable figures in social and political sciences, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, heralded that modernity would bring religion to the periphery of political concern (Vlas & Gherghina, 2012). However, the recent empirical data shows alternative picture, depicted in a growing importance of religion in peoples' lives and politics, regardless of developed or developing countries ([Berger, 1999](#); [Fox & Sandler, 2004](#); Petito & Hatzopoulos, 2003; [Thomas, 2005](#))

Such progression has vigorously revived debates over the impact of religion on the process of democratization. The secular prone authors deemed religion as an antidemocratic force and an intruder in the political sphere (Rorty, 1994), while a great deal of scholars considered some denominations of Christianity more compatible with democracy than the others (Berger, 2004; Fukuyama, 2001; Huntington, 1991; Lipset, 1994; Weber, 1905)

One of the founders of the sociology of religion, Peter Berger (2004, p, 80) to the question, how Christianity relates to democracy, responded: "*In the cases of Catholicism and Protestantism, the answer is pretty definitely yes. In the case of Orthodoxy, it is maybe*"

This article aims to cast light on Orthodox Christian traditions in attempt to bring more certainty to its relation with the liberal democracy and modernity. The paper assumes that having illiberal legacy and lack of Reformation traditions, Orthodox Christianity holds the weakest affinity to the liberal democracy, compare to Catholicism and Protestantism, and potentially negatively relates to it.

Methodology

Since the article is purely theoretical, we choose qualitative method as more appropriate for this study. To address the major claim of the paper, we operationalize two variables: *liberal democracy and Orthodox Christian traditions*.

Initially, the study intends to conceptualize the liberal democracy as the major driver and conceptual component of modernity. This analytical tool will help to catch the insight of liberalism–Religion contradiction through disclosing core premises of each and their intrinsically conflicting nature. Then, we briefly unfold how Catholicism and Protestantism achieved peaceful cohabitation with liberal democracy; and against this background, unpack traditions of Orthodox Christianity; Finley, on the bases of these findings we try to detect correlation between the variables and explain why Orthodox Christianity may relate negatively to the liberal democracy.

Analysis

1. Modernity and Liberal Democracy

Modernity involves hardware and software realms reflected in modernization and modernism respectively. Modernization implies scientific and technological advances caused by industrial revolution, while modernism comprises a set of liberal ideological premises, directly challenging religion traditions (Lawrence, 1990).

In liberal democracy, democracy is not the first idea and even not the fundamental one. Instead, at the fore comes tradition of protection of an individual's autonomy, deeply rooted in Western history, started from Greeks' appreciation of individual liberty and Romans' respect to rule of law, continued by Magna Carta (1215), Fundamental Orders of Connecticut (1639), Enlightenment (1685-1815), Declaration of Independence (1776), The French Revolution (1789-1799) and Helsinki Final Act (1975), (Litonjua, 2007).

Frequently, especially in the young democracies there is no conceptual distinction between democracy and liberal democracy, which in fact is “theoretically different and historically distinct” (Zakaria, 1997, p. 22; Welzel, 2013). The lack of liberal foundations creates elected autocrats in many developing countries, never bothering themselves to ensure balance “between the will of the majority and the rights of the minority—or, more broadly, between liberty and democracy” (Zakaria, 2003, p. 135).

If democracy is not capable to protect liberal law, then there are not many hopes for its survival since, this kind of democracy is rather susceptible to economically powerful interest groups paving the way for the governments, encumbered with wealthy politicians (Greider, 1992; Litonjua, 2007; Zakaria, 1997, p.23).

“As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism” (John Paul II, 1991, p. 46).

We assume, therefore that neither democracy nor modernization held capacity to challenge Christian religious essentials; Only the conceptual part of modernity - liberal ideology – with its values, attitudes and orientations, appeared empowered to contradict religious dogmas and create supportive value system for the liberal democratic governance (Basáñez, 2016; Inglehart, 1997; Welzel, 2013).

2. Religion-Liberalism Controversies

Given the Christian ideology’s strong, steady and consistent belief schemes, the process of its replacement by liberalism lasted for a long and included crucial moments such as the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the Industrial Revolution and Globalization. These landmarks, made liberal ideology determining sociopolitical value framework in the West and caused the decline of Christian ideology gradually (Widdows, 2004).

Liberalism, with its central premises of freedom of choice and tolerance, does not allow penetration of innately opposite traditional value system. Firstly, it questions moral absolutes of religion and rejects to embrace any authority uncritically (Dupre, 2004). Secondly, it contradicts religious universality, which allegedly gives Christians a ‘legitimacy’ to attack violently non-Christians and use force against those who refused to convert (Jewett & Lawrence, 2003).

Such a set of beliefs contends the liberals’ understanding of freedom of religion. To deal with this challenge, the founding fathers of United States of America, themselves men of religious conviction, moved religion to the private field. Thomas Jeffersonian understanding of democracy implies that one can be either religious or irreligious but not ‘fanatical,’ being capable to keep personal beliefs remoted (Owen, 2001, pp. 90-95).

That meant the separation of church and state, where the latter is neutral and tolerant to religious pluralism. In this distinction between sacred and secular, or alternatively, between the spiritual and temporal orders, the religious citizen has been assumed to be a bridge linking two realms (Litonjua, 2007).

3. Religion-Liberalism Coexistence

State-Church separation was not quick and straightforward process and the different branches of Christianity dealt with it in their own way (Philpott, 2004).

A great deal of scholars thinks that among Christian denomination, Protestantism holds the strongest affinity with liberal democracy (Basáñez, 2016; Huntington, 1998; Weber, 1905; Woodberry & Shah, 2004).

Martin Luther's doctrine of universal priesthood of all believers, played decisive role in bringing Protestantism closer to modernity and capitalism (Weber, 1905).

The doctrine, implying that each Christian is a priest regardless of his vocation, surged Protestants' dedication to their work and enabled them to grant greater purpose to their jobs and tasks, what meanwhile increased social coherence and meaningfulness of secular life. Protestant ethic teaches that salvation comes through the everyday "accumulation of correct actions" (Basáñez, 2016, p. 43) such as: hard work, tolerance, honesty, frugality etc. These "mediating mechanisms" have developed cultural foundations easily translated into liberal democracy (p. 35).

Catholicism, unlike Protestantism, has never considered dedication to the vocation as an enough practice for the salvation. Indulgence of a sin could only be possible with the continual prey, confession and forgiveness through the mediation of Catholic Church, pushing the importance of the religious institute ahead of a men's morally approved conduct (Basáñez, 2016, pp. 126).

More community accepted Catholic Church as an indispensable and exclusive way for the salvation, stronger and powerful was its message to the public. However, all changed with overwhelming wave of modernity, signaling the declining importance of Catholic Church's delivery to the modern society without recognizing its diversity and pluralism.

Against this background, the Catholic Church made quick and "theologically justified embrace" with liberal democracy (Diamond, 2005, p. 147). At the Second Vatican Council (1965-1969), it openly recognized the universal human rights, religious liberty, and democracy as the best form of

governance; And later, even greatly contributed to the dispersal of democracy thanks to the Roman Church's global influence. In fact, the "third wave" of democratization of 70s and 80s has been largely stimulated and catalyzed by Roman Church (Diamond, 1999; Huntington, 1991; Philpott, 2004).

4. Illiberal Traditions of Orthodox Christianity

Formation of Christian theocracy traces back to the period of Theodosius I and Constantine Great, when Byzantine political theory of Christian Empire and Emperor was elaborated on the bases of Eusebius of Caesarea's works, granting Orthodox Christianity cultural and political dominance.

Orthodox Christianity served as an axis of Byzantium unity. It theologically supported imperial structures and during the centuries was established as the state-sponsored religion. Consequently, Eusebius' works succeeded in "sacralization of Empire" (Fowden, 1993, p. 89) by presenting it as the divinely willed order of one true God (Papanikolaou, 2003, p. 82).

As Justinian I (527-565) claimed "by the will of God we govern an Empire that has come to us from His Divine Majesty ... [and] can rule the world with justice" (Papanikolaou, 2003, p. 82).

In his sixth Novella, Justinian theorized the model of cooperation between the emperor and the patriarch of Constantinople as a harmonic, something, similar to 'symphonia.' The model expressing State-Church "cohesion of one single human society." (Paul, 1977, pp. 238-264)

The Orthodox Christianity penetrated in all layers of political and social life. The ecclesia formed cultural aspects of Empire through the system of beliefs, institutional arrangements, practices, art etc. while the ecclesial canon laws were frequently enforced as the civil ones (Papanikolaou, 2003).

Although it is often dubbed as a 'multinational Empire,' the Byzantine theocracy showed a low acceptance of multiculturalism where non-Christian confessions were unprivileged and even prosecuted time to time. When Ottoman Empire conquered Byzantium in fifteenth century, Orthodox Christianity became a minority religion. To resist to the politically and culturally dominant Islam, orthodox Christians were less engaged in the religious debates or the reforms of the Enlightenment. (Paul, 1977).

Another turning point was introduction of Soviet Union and the spread of communism, again preventing Orthodox countries, except Greece, from interacting with modern democracy.¹

5. Interaction of two variables

The liberal democratic ideology with its central values of freedom of choice, individual autonomy and tolerance does not allow penetration of traditional value system in its realm. Coexistence possible but only if religion operates in the private sphere as a secondary source of value framework (Owen, 2014).

This is so since the liberal democratic ideology does not come from value-neutral background. The core liberal values define communication line with other values and belief systems. For example, the endorsement of tolerance bears high costs for traditional moral understanding (Widdows, 2004, p. 204). Yet, tolerance naturally excludes intolerance of alternative beliefs.

Thus, the principal facilitator of liberalism-religion cohabitation is the state-church separation via recognition of primacy of liberal democratic system and ideology.

Orthodox Christianity's Byzantine heritage and the historical setting in which it has been struggled to survive, fundamentally antagonize the concept of state-church separation since the model theorized by Justinian I, was constructed on the state-church cohesion. The latter aimed to ensure the unity of multicultural Empire, with low tolerance to the ethnically and culturally diverse society.

“Byzantine notion of a Christian theocracy is a classic case of religious influence on the understanding of the imperial authority” (Papanikolaou, 2003, p. 82). The history of two Orthodox Empires – Byzantium and Russia – seems illustrative in this regard. One school of historians even coined the word ‘Caesaropapist’ to describe the emperors’ status, being Caesar and Pope at the same time. That feature has firmly distinguished Orthodoxy Christianity from its Western European counterparts (Runciman, 1957, p.1).

¹ Under the Orthodox countries, we imply those whose majority of population is Orthodox Christians: Russia, Ukraine, Romania, Belarus, Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, Moldova, Georgia, North Macedonia, Cyprus and Montenegro.

Orthodox Christianity has not ever experienced neither something similar to the conflict, taken place between papacy and empire nor the period of Reformation. It was fully isolated from 17th and 18th centuries' theoretical debates and after the failure of communism, appeared face to face to the processes of liberalization and democratization and had to cope with the religious pluralism, multiculturalism and a church-state separation concepts (Papanikolaou, 2012; Dobrijevic, 2006).

Since the Byzantine Empire appeared to be a formative rather than sporadic period for the history of Orthodox Christianity, the latter chose the model of church-state cohesion, endorsing itself as a source of national identity and unity. (Tevzadze, 2009; Zedania, 2009; Papanikolaou, 2003, pp. 76-84).

Regaining traditional influence, lost in the Soviet times, Orthodox Churches of post-communist countries hardly express desire either to move to the private sphere or contribute to the liberal democratic transition.

On the contrary, in its fear of modernity, Orthodox Church strongly rejects individualism, relativism, globalization and new experiences brought by liberal democracy (Gavashelishvili, 2012; Sulkhaniashvili 2012)

Since Orthodox Church considers modernity as a destructive force for its institutional buildup, it potentially relates negatively to the liberal democracy.

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